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FOREWORD: COMBATING INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM
VED P. NANDA*
I.
This symposium issue of the Denver Journalof InternationalLaw and Policy
comprises much of the most timely thinking on international terrorism from a legal
perspective. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September
11, 2001, the United States and the international community are addressing the
challenge of combating terrorism through enhanced domestic' and international
efforts. 2 The United States responded by enacting the USA Patriot Act 3 and
providing for the establishment of military commissions for the detention and trial
of alleged terrorists, 4 creating a Department of Homeland Security,5 imposing
immigration restrictions, and further tightening security measures. 6 And in the
boldest of its responses, the US entered into war in the attempt to prevent weapons
of mass destruction believed to be present in Iraq from being used against our
territory by the Iraqi government or rogue terrorist elements.
Vice Provost for Internationalization, Evans University Professor, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of
Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver.
1. See generally Sean Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 237 (2002).
2. For a review of measures predating September 11, 2001, see Ved Nanda, International,
Regional and U.S. Responses to International Terrorism, Address at the University of Denver University of Bologna Colloquium, 2000 (manuscript on file with the Denver Journalof International
Law & Policy) [hereinafter Responses to Terrorism]. For the status of international legal instruments
related to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism, see Status of international
conventions pertainingto internationalterrorism, extract from the Report of the Secretary-Generalon
Measures to Eliminate InternationalTerrorism, U.N. Doc. A/57/183, para. 1ILA, (2002) as updated on
10 December 2002 [hereinafter Report on Measures].
3. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
4. See 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) for the President's Military Order and Dept. of Def.
MCO No. 1, Mar. 21, 2002, for the Secretary of Defense's Military Commission Order implementing
the President's Order regarding policy, responsibilities, and procedures for trial before military
commissions. See also Katharine Q. Seelye, Military Tribunals-Staffing Defense at Guantdnamo,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2003, at A16 (describing the Pentagon's recruitment of civilian lawyers to serve
as defense counsels for terrorist suspects in its military tribunals at the US Naval Base in Guanthinamo
Bay, Cuba).
5. See Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812, Oct. 8, 2001, which established the Office
of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council responsible for "advising and assisting the
President with respect to all aspects of homeland security." Id. § 5(a).
6. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (allows the
federal government to have control of the security of airports). See generally Press Release, Office of
the Press Secretary, Strengthening Homeland Security Since September 11 (April 11, 2002), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/sixmonthupdate.html (last visited June I, 2003).
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International measures have included adoption of new conventions such as the
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism of June 3, 2002, 7 which provides
for regional use of a variety of legal tools that have been employed effectively in
the past against terrorism and transnational organized crime. The Inter-American
Convention, building upon a number of multilateral and bilateral instruments
already in place, is aimed at increasing the effective communication between the
governments of the Organization of American States and provides for financial
intelligence units for gathering terrorist financing information, measures improving
the communication between law enforcement authorities, mutual legal assistance,
and improved exchange of information for border controls. Accelerated efforts
have also been undertaken toward implementing the 1997 Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,8 which imposed binding legal obligations on
parties to prosecute or extradite terrorists and provides an international framework
for cooperation among states directed toward prevention of terrorism and
punishment of offenders. And the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, 9 which criminalized financing of terrorist activities and
established an international legal framework for cooperation in preventing such
financing and punishing offenders, has also been given further impetus.
Perhaps the most significant development was the adoption by the UN
Security Council of its Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001.10 In this
resolution, the Security Council stressed its determination to prevent acts of
terrorism" and called for all "States to work together urgently to prevent and
suppress terrorist acts," 12 to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, and to
"find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of.. . information."' 3 It
also formed a committee to monitor its implementation 4 and directed the
committee to establish a work program in consultation with the Secretary General
on specific tasks under the program. 5 States were asked to report in 90 days on
the steps they had undertaken to implement the resolution.
Earlier, on September 12, 2001, the Security Council had adopted Resolution
1368,16 which unequivocally condemned "in the strongest terms the horrifying
terrorist attacks" of the previous day and regarded such acts "as a threat to
international peace and security."' 7 The resolution "called on all States to work
7. Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, S. Treaty Doc. No. 107-18, AG/RES. 1840
(XXXII-0/02).
8. G.A. Res. 52/164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., 72d Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/64 (1997). All UN
conventions are availableat the UN website, http://www.un.org.
9. G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 76th Plen. Mtg., Agenda Item 160, U.N. Doe.
A/RES/54/109 (2000). For the status of these and other such instruments, see Report on Measures,
supranote 2, para. III.A.
10. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess, 4385th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
11. Id., preamble.
12. Id.
13. Id., para. 3(a).
14. Id., para. 6.
15. Id., para. 7.
16. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess, 4370th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
17. Id., para. 1.
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together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of
these terrorist attacks and stressed that those responsible for aiding, supporting or
harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held
accountable." 18 Also noteworthy was the report of the General Assembly's Sixth
Committee's working group, which was earlier constituted to develop measures to
eliminate international terrorism. 19
To illustrate the efforts of international organizations, the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund have accelerated their work on anti-money
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. 20 And the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe is enhancing its efforts in the war on
terrorism. 21 Finally, although the statute of the International Criminal Court 22 was
not drafted with terrorism as its primary focus, nevertheless, terrorism is a crime
within the Court's jurisdiction.23
II.
The Bush administration's policy for responding to the threat of international
terrorism was announced on September 20, 2002.24 Its centerpiece is the doctrine
of preemptive military intervention: "We will not hesitate to act alone, if
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively., 25 This
policy, based in essence on the concept of self-defense as embodied in UN Charter
Article 51, goes beyond what has been accepted as a legal response to the threat of
attack, since the Charter allows the use of force when the Security Council has
determined that there is a breach of or threat to international peace, or an act of
aggression; and force is allowed in self-defense only in case of an armed attack.
Given that the situation presented by terrorist individuals and rogue states presents
new challenges to the Charter, whose terms did not contemplate such dangers, the
legal criteria must nevertheless always be met: the danger must be shown by clear
evidence and military action may be taken only as a last resort when diplomatic,
political and other nonmilitary means have failed.
Following the US-led
18. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 16, at para. 3.
19. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Working Group, U.N. GAOR
6th Comm., 56th Sess., Agenda Item 166, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/56/L.9 (2001).
20. See generally Matthew Levitt, Iraq, U.S., and the War on Terror, Stemming the Flow of
Terrorist Financing: Practicaland Conceptual Challenges, 27 SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 59
(2003).
21. See, e.g., Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe report, "Hearing Before the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe," CSCE 107-2-2 (May 8, 2002).
22. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1999), available
at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited June 1, 2003).
23. Art. 5 crimes are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.
See art. 6-8 for definitions of these crimes. Under the statute, natural persons who commit these crimes
are within the Court's jurisdiction. Id. at art. 25.
24. The White House, National Security Strategy, Sept. 17, 2002, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html (last visited June 1, 2003).
25. Threats and Promises; From the Document: A Stress on Disrupting Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 2002, at A14. See Ved Nanda, Pre-emptive Danger, The Nat'l L. J., October 21, 2002
[hereinafter Pre-emptive].

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 1:1

preemptive war in Iraq, many26 of these issues will have to be revisited and held up
to the light of close analysis.
The use of military force to combat terrorism must be seen as a new powerful
tool being wielded by the United States. Having employed it first in Afghanistan
and now in Iraq, the US has been emboldened by its reception at home and
seemingly undaunted by criticism of it overseas. Its implications are far-reaching,
perhaps especially for the integrity of the law itself.
Domestically, as well, concerns have arisen with regard to the impact on civil
liberties of stricter security precautions. Executive and legislative initiatives in the
fight against terrorism have caused concerns among critics that, in the name of
security, the freedoms and liberties Americans deeply cherish might be excessively
abridged.2 7 On May 20, 2003, the US Department of Justice released a report to
members of Congress giving previously undisclosed data on the implementation by
the Department of its new powers to fight terrorism. 28 The report reveals
everything from the use of hundreds of secret search warrants to the29fact that some
50 people have been detained without charges as material witnesses.
International terrorism constitutes a continuing menace for the world
community two years after September 2001. After a brief lull following the war
on Iraq, waves of terrorist attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 30 and Casablanca,
Morocco, 31 in May 2003 killing scores of people and injured many more, were
suspected to have been carried out by Al Qaeda or its supporters.32
Counterterrorism officials suspected that Al Qaeda had reorganized bases of
operation in several locations, including Kenya,3 3 Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,34
and Chechnya, recruiting and training new members and planning new attacks on
Western targets.3 5 This has led to further security measures, including heightened
26. See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, Iraq, U.S., and the War on Terror: Bellum Americanum, 27 SPG
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 29 (2003); Shashi Tharoor, Iraq, US., and the War on Terror:
Understanding & Defeating Terrorism, One Year Later, 27 SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 9 (2003);
Nanda supra note 26.
27. See, e.g., ACLU, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: DiSSENT IN POST-9/II AMERICA, MAY, 2003,
available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12666&c=206 (last visited June 1,
2003); Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense (Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/
military-comm-ltr.htm (last visited June 1, 2003).
28. Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Lists Use of New Power to Fight Terror, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
2003, at Al.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Saudis Are Shaken as JihadErupts at Their Front Door, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 2003, atAl.
31. See Suicide Bombs Kill at Least 20 In Casablanca,N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2003, at A 1.
32. See MoroccansAssert Al Qaeda Financed Suicide Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2003, at
A16; Neil MacFarquhar, Saudis Link 4 In Bomb Plot To Qaeda Cell, N.Y. Times, May 19, 2003, at Al.
33. See, e.g., Kenya Is on Terrorist Alert After Reported Sighting of Suspect in 1998 Embassy
Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2003, at A14; Alan Cowell, Kenyan Asks U.S. and Britain To Ease
Their Security Alert, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2003, at A8.
34. See Don Van Natta, Jr. & Neil MacFarquhar, 3 Qaeda Cells Are OperatingIn Saudi Arabia,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003, at A16.
35. See Neil MacFarquhar & Don Van Natta, Jr., Aftereffects: Warnings; New Tape, Linked To bin
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alerts both at home36 and abroad when called for by intelligence developments,37
often undertaken by governments working in close collaboration.38
Among policy alternatives to combat terrorism, the use of military force
dominates the US agenda today. The implications of this are far-reaching. As
historically unprecedented as the challenges are, it would appear that more creative
approaches are urgently called for, approaches that do justice to the multi-faceted
character of this problem.39
III.
The symposium sponsored by the International Legal Studies Program at the
University of Denver and Public International Law and Policy Group, Washington,
D.C., was organized with the excellent advice and help of my colleagues Paul
Williams from Georgetown University and Michael Scharf from Case Western
Reserve University Law School. The Carnegie Corporation and the Social Science
provided the financial assistance that made the conference possible. Selected
papers from the conference are included in this symposium issue. We are
extremely proud to have the opportunity to present these outstanding pieces of
legal analysis on this critical and unfortunately urgent topic.
This year's Myres S. McDougal Lecture was presented by James A.R.
Nafziger, Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law and Director of International
Programs at Willamette University College of Law, and president of the American
Branch of the International Law Association. Professor Nafziger set the stage for
our symposium and does the same for this volume by providing an overview of the
threat of terrorism and domestic and international responses to it. He calls this a
"Grave New World of Terrorism," which warrants extremely close watching.
Applying methods that do honor to the lecture's namesake,40 Professor Nafziger
examines both the ideas of "terrorism" and "war" and notes that both remain
undefined, and he recounts the legal measures taken by the United Nations and the
United States. Throughout, Professor Nafziger carefully analyzes the quagmire of
effects set into motion by the Bush administration's chosen approach. He
concludes his perceptive remarks with the query: "As we struggle through this
Laden Aide, Urges More Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at Al; David Johnston & Don Van Natta,
Jr., U.S. Officials See Signs of a Revived Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2003, at Al, [hereinafter Al
Qaeda Signs].
36. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum, Precautions-Securityis Stepped Up at Landmarks and
Borders, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2003, at A15.
37. See, e.g., Al Qaeda Signs, supra note 35.
38. See Steven R. Weisman & Neil MacFarquhar, US. Agents Arrive to Join Saudi Bombing
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2003, at A14; Douglas Jehl, Saudis Triple Bomb Inquiry; Vow Joint
AntiterrorEffort, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2003, at A7; but see Douglas Jehl and David E. Sanger, Five
Requests to Saudis Went Unheeded, US. Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2003, at A14.
39. See generally Michael Mousseau, Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror, 27 INT'L
SECURITY 5 (2002-2003); Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalization and International
Terrorism, 27 INT'L SECURITY 30 (2002-2003).
40. See Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, LAW AND MINIMUM PUBLIC
WORLD ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961).
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unwanted war on terrorism, is it not better to be on the side of humanity and to
follow the dictates of public conscience?... Why not allow reason and dialogue
to shine on the Grave New World of Terrorism? Why not try to convert adversity
into opportunity by doubling efforts to create a truly global community, identity
and stability? The choice is ours.'
Laura Dickinson's focus is on the apprehension and punishment of the
perpetrators of the September 11 attacks. She reviews the emerging "transitional
justice mechanism-the mixed domestic-international tribunal-and consider[s]
the role such tribunals might play in the fight against terrorism., 4' These are the
tribunals in which local and international judges sit together and which have been
used already in Kosovo and East Timor and now in Sierra Leone with some degree
of success. She underscores the advantage of the hybrid nature of these courts
when we consider issues of accountability in post-Taliban Afghanistan. She
analyzes the legitimacy problems and capacity-building problems of such tribunals
but feels that the advantages, based upon our prior experience, to outweigh the
disadvantages. She does not, however, believe that these are the only forums for
trying suspected terrorists, but suggests that international accountability
mechanisms could also be used. Ultimately, she says, "[I]t is only through a
combination of accountability and the establishment of rule of law that we will
have a chance of holding the forces of terror in check. As we consider various
models of justice in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the lessons
learned elsewhere about forging justice after mass atrocity provide a fertile ground
for creative innovation.' '
Mary Ellen O'Connell, who has written extensively on war and peace issues,
addresses the law of self-defense, clarifying this murky area. She goes on to what
she calls the "law of exceptionalism," which characterizes the US tendency to
excuse itself from application of generally applicable international laws or to
reinterpret the law or the facts so as to exempt itself. Especially concerned with
the ramifications for the state of the law, she warns, "If the United States...
declares itself above the law, it will help break down the commitment to law
generally in the international community."4
Derek Jinks' focus is on the applicability of international human rights law to
the trials and prosecutions of alleged terrorists. He begins with an analysis of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), looking at the US
government's position that the special circumstances of the war on terrorism allow
for derogation of the ICCPR's terms. He does not feel that the conditions for
derogability exist in this case and reminds us that "[i]nternational human rights law
recognizes the bare minimum of standards necessary to protect the safety and
integrity of individuals from abuses of power. As such,
it governs how states treat
45
all people in all circumstances-even in time of war.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Infra, page
Infra, page
Infra, page
Infra, page
Infra, page

22.
26.
42.
57.
67.
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Mark Drumbl discusses the mixed criminal/military response to terrorismthe former under the traditional law enforcement model and the latter under
Chapter 7 Security Council authorization after determination of a threat to
international peace and security. He considers various alternative methods of
obtaining justice and suggests that an international criminal tribunal might be a
proper forum to try those who have committed heinous terrorist acts for crimes
against humanity. He also compares the rhetorical and pragmatic positions of the
US in response to the propriety of international criminal tribunals versus military
tribunals in the context of the Rwandan genocide and the September 11 terrorist
attacks. He cautions, "Law and due process are now often rhetorically presented
as inconveniences to the pursuit of justice, whereas in other post-atrocity situations
' 46
law and due process are rhetorically presented as requirements for justice.
Larry Johnson, who has served as the Legal Adviser of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, brings his profound knowledge of the subject to an
examination of the potential threat from terrorist attacks upon nuclear facilities.
He stresses that after September 11, 2001, it is manifestly clear that everything
possible must be done on the international level to protect these facilities from
breach and that the existing international measures do not even address this issue.
He suggests preventive measures which should eventually be codified in a treaty
form. Such binding preventive measures, in his estimate, are essential for the
suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism. Thus, it is his advice that "policy-makers
[must] focus on the treaty-making aspect of this campaign. The U.S. should go
beyond "feel good" treaty amendments with no "bite." If the drafters of nuclear
terrorism treaties ignore the lessons of September 1 th, they do so at their, and our,
47
peril."
IV.

Challenges to find effective means to combat terrorism remain with us. We
are keenly aware of the shortcomings of the international instruments addressing
terrorism, and yet some seem intent upon avoiding the ambit of international legal
norms in general. It is feared that only through continued terror will we learn the
impact of an unbalanced, military-centered approach dominated by the US. An
effective, sustained, and multilateral response has yet to be found.48

46. Infra, page 74
47. Infra, page 86.
48. See generally Nanda, Responses to Terrorism, supra note 2.

THE GRAVE NEW WORLD OF TERRORISM:
A

LAWYER'S VIEW

JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is truly a pleasure and an honor for me to present the 2002 Myres
McDougal Lecture. When I first ventured into the field of international law,
several distinguished colleagues of ours were especially kind and helpful to me.
Believe me, I needed all the help I could get as the first Fellow of the American
Society of International Law! I will always be grateful to Ved Nanda, Harold
Lasswell, and Myres McDougal, among a handful of professional mentors, for
their advice and encouragement despite my tainted past as a recent graduate of
what was, for them - all of them good Yalies - the "other" New England law
school.
Policy-oriented studies, which the Lasswell-McDougal team pioneered at
Yale, have been instrumental in the transformation of international law from
prescription to process during the last half century. One of these studies, Law and
Minimum Public World Order,' which Professor McDougal co-authored, became a
classic. From beginning to end, it still speaks to my topic today. The opening
paragraph of the book, after noting the "high and still rising levels in tension and
expectations of comprehensive violence,"2 emphasized "the urgent need for
rational inquiry into the potentialities and limitations of our inherited principles for
controlling violence between peoples and for the invention and establishment of
more effective alternatives in principles and procedures." 3 So there you have it:
Myres McDougal never minced either big words or big agendas - not to mention
big books! The penultimate chapter of his 872-page treatise on minimum public
order concludes exactly as many of us might conclude today: "the ideal
represented by a permanent international criminal court with jurisdiction over war

" Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law and Director, International Programs, Willamette
University
College of Law. Professor Nafziger is President of the American Branch of the International Law
Association. The author presented these remarks as the McDougal Lecturer during the 2002 Sutton
Colloquium and McDougal Lecture at the University of Denver College of Law, March 23, 2002. The
theme of the Sutton Colloquium was "International Terrorism, Ethnic Conflicts and SelfDetermination."
1. MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM PUBLIC WORLD
ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961).
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id
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crimes remains a valid goal of world public order.",4
obviously a man of big vision.

Myres McDougal was

Let us now go back to the future from another source. In the summer of 2001,
while Easterners breathlessly awaited shark attacks on Atlantic beaches and the
entire country speculated on the next installment in the Gary Condit soap opera, at
least one serious issue hit the front pages, namely, stem-cell research. After years
of public debate about artificial fertilization and cloning, we began to wonder, was
this the Brave New World? Were we ready? Maybe we weren't quite ready for the
Social Predestination Room, the Organ Store or the Bottling Room of Huxley's
novel. But the planetary motto for the Brave New World- "Community, Identity,
Stability"- sounded okay to us. And Helmholtz Watson, the Emotional Engineer
in the book, seemed to describe our world, too, when he cheerfully concluded that
"[t]he world's stable now. People are happy, they get what they want. .. ." On
the international level, weren't we also managing, in the tradition of the Brave New
World, "to keep the world so orderly that it won't bother the United States",6 in its
national quest for invulnerability?
II.

A GRAVE NEW WORLD OF TERRORISM

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 jolted us out of our complacency.
We became profoundly aware of a Grave New World And we became quickly
aware that many people did not share our particular sense of well-being. For
them-to quote Helmholtz Watson in the Huxley novel again- "Being contented
has none of the glamour of a good fight against misfortune... or a fatal overthrow
by passion.",7 As if the Cultural Revolution in China, the brutal regime of Pol Pot
in Cambodia, the nearly endless conflict in the Middle East and genocide in Africa
had not haunted us enough in recent years, we found ourselves on September 1 th
face to face with the suicidal partners of yet another radical movement, this one
already notorious, to quote the Brave New World, "by a campaign against the past;
by the closing of museums, the blowing up of historical monuments.., by the
suppression of all books published before [a certain date]."' In the background of
the suicide bombings you could almost hear the Second Solidarity Hymn of the
Brave New World: "Come, Greater Being, Social Friend, Annihilating Twelve-inOne! We long to die, for when we end, Our larger life has but begun." 9 We
quickly realized that Community, Identity and Solidarity could mean very different
things to different people. Then came the anthrax scare. And, again, it was back
to the future of Helmholtz Watson. As he asked seventy years ago in the Brave
New World : "What's the point of truth and beauty or knowledge... when the
4. Id. at 731.
5. ALDous HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Harper Collins Perennial Classics ed. 1998) (first

published by Harper & Brothers in 1932).
6. See A Look Back/2001/A Look Ahead, CHRIST. Scl. MoN., Dec. 28, 2001, at 10, 11 (remarks
of Ronald Steel, tcole des Hautes ttudes).
7. Huxley, supra note 5, at 228.
8. Id. at 51.
9. Id. at 81.
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anthrax bombs are popping all around you?"'

A.

Root Causes

What causes terrorism as a whole to pop all around us? Each of us would
probably come up with a different list of the root causes, but we might agree on at
least a few of the following: illiteracy and under-education; rampant population
growth; widening disparities in wealth among peoples and states; deprivations of
fundamental freedoms and human rights; a sensed loss of power as a result of
modernization and secularization of traditional values; the mass displacement of
persons
and
populations;
denials
of self-determination;
political
disenfranchisement; religious intolerance and militance;" de-privatization of
religion to shape a new public order; 12 and the lack of a sustaining civic culture in
13
so-called failed or politically disrupted states. Disruption breeds destruction.
Perhaps most important, however, is a shared sense of historic injustice that excites
a relentless paranoia toward the outside world. One commentator has identified
three elements of this shared sense: a widespread resentment of authoritarian rule,
an overbearing foreign presence, and unequal income distribution.14
These sources of terrorism have become effective in today's world because of
such phenomena as arms proliferation and trafficking, advances in electronic
technology, and banking secrecy. The terrible instruments of violence are also
apparent: they include a vast arsenal of weapons, from explosive shoes to cybersabotage to hijacked aircraft to weapons of mass destruction-biological, chemical,
or nuclear.
In this lecture I was asked to set the stage for today's discussion of legal
10. Huxley, supra note 5, at 228.
11. See, e.g., Michael Scott Doran, Somebody Else's Civil War, 81 FOR. AFF. 22 (Jan./Feb. 2002);
Bernard Lewis, The Revolt of Islam, NEW YORKER, Nov. 19, 2001, at 50; Andrew Sullivan, This Is a
Religious War, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 7, 2001, at 44; Robert Worth, The Deep Intellectual Roots of
Islamic Terror,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at A 13.
12. In other words:
Acts of religious terrorism have thus been attempts to purchase public recognition of the
legitimacy of religious world views with the currency of violence. Since religious
authority can provide a ready-made replacement for secular leadership, it is no surprise
that when secular authority has been deemed to be morally insufficient, the challenges to
its legitimacy and the attempts to gain support for its rivals have been based in religion.
When the proponents of religion have asserted their claims to be the moral force
undergirding public order, they sometimes have done so with the kind of power that a
confused society can graphically recognize: the force of terror.
Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Name of God, 100 CURRENT HIST. 357, 361 (2001).
13. Terrorist operations have often been conducted in states that were supportive, internally
disrupted or where governments were too weak to exercise control. With the increasing probability of
disruption within states in many parts of the world, there should be no shortage of venues for terrorist
bases in the future. W. Michael Reisman, New Scenarios of Threats to InternationalPeace and
Security: Developing Legal Capacitiesfor Adequate Responses, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT: NEW SCENARIOS - NEW LAW? 13, 37 (Jost Delbrfck ed. 1993).
14. Mark Katz, Osama bin Laden as Transnational Revolutionary Leader, 101 CURRENT HIST.
81, 81-82 (2002).
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issues and responses in the aftermath of September 11th. Ultimately, we will be
concerned about preferred processes of world order, in the language of Myres
McDougal, for addressing acts of terrorism in a Grave New World. Most of you
are, no doubt, familiar with the salient issues and responses to them. 15 You may
even be suffering from September 11th fatigue. You will appreciate that the socalled world of terrorism is not really new at all though it has seemed disturbingly
immediate to Americans since September 11 th. You will also appreciate that acts
of terrorism are not necessarily international. They are often confined to national
territory or are mixed, domestic and international. Finally, you will appreciate that
the September 11th suicide bombings were extraordinary, indeed, and let us hope,
unique. Given the diversity of contexts in which acts of terrorism occur, it is
therefore unwise to generalize too much on the basis of our recent experience.
Despite all of these disclaimers, however, the aftermath of September 11th
provides a very good context for discussions today of terrorism.
B.

Responses
1.

Homeland Security

Considering, first, our homeland security, we can sense a state of national
alert even without the color-coded warnings borrowed from Smokey the Bear to
advise the public on the degree of danger from terrorism. 16 The war on terrorism is
not quite reminiscent of Rosie the Riveter in the vanguard of the home front during

15. For a summary of the events of September 11, 2002 and the responses to it, see Contemporary
Practiceof the United StatesRelating to InternationalLaw, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 237, 255 (2002) (Scan
D. Murphy cd.) (hereinafter Contemporary Practice).
16. Take, for example, an appeal to farmers from the Department of Agriculture:
Farmers Can Play A Very Important Role in Preventing Terrorism
Since September I11 ', 2001 we will forever be changed in our thoughts of tragedy and
destruction in this county [sic]. We have the responsibility to never let this happen
again. It is our duty to be vigilant and report to the authorities any activity that is
unusual or contrary to what we see day in and day out.
Farmers across this land can help by:
*
protecting the fertilizer, chemicals and fuel sitting out in the fields from
becoming a resource for terrorists.
*
keeping in closer contact with neighbors and report to authorities anyone who
does not have the right to be around your livestock or on one's property.
*
practicing good biosecurity by requiring that all visitors to your livestock
facilities wear clean outer clothing and wear clean disinfected boots.
*
making sure our pets and livestock are healthy and well vaccinated.
*
reporting any unusual level of sickness or death to the local veterinarian or
state or federal authorities.
*
reporting any unusual occurrences such as higher than normal death rates
observed in wildlife or local livestock populations or unusual symptoms such
as vesicles (blisters) on animals' mouths or feet.
It is suggested you have a list of telephone numbers available for your family to notify
the appropriate authorities of any situations that make you suspicious.
United States Dep't of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, FSA Fact Sheet - Feb. 2002, at 10.
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the Second World War, but it is not business as usual, either. I want to highlight
two developments in particular: the recent expansion of the federal government's
investigative and prosecutorial powers and the reexamination of immigration
procedures.
In enacting the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,'7 the United States Congress
sought to strengthen federal law enforcement.' 8 The Act is comprehensive. It
imposes, first, new record-keeping and reporting measures on financial institutions
including banks, investment companies, commodity-pool operators and
commodity-trading advisers. The measures are intended to discourage and detect
money-laundering by relying on Suspicious Activity Reports, which are filed by
banks and other financial institutions with a federal governmental agency know as
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. The Act also provides for greater
information-sharing among federal intelligence and criminal justice officials;
efiables a special intelligence court to authorize the collection by law enforcement
authorities of data from roving wiretaps; enlarges the availability of information
from grand jury investigations; restricts access to biological and chemical agents
and criminalizes their possession for other than peaceful purposes; relaxes rules for
gaining access to electronic communications and student records by subpoena;
provides for limited detention of certified terrorists; and facilitates governmental
eavesdropping and so-called "sneak and peek" searches of private premises. The
USA PATRIOT Act also authorizes indefinite detention of certain aliens in
renewable six-month increments.
These initiatives raise serious issues of civil liberties. We should all be
concerned about any substantial erosion of our individual privacy, freedom of
expression or freedom of association, whatever the tradeoffs for national security.
Since September 1 th people in this country have experienced new threats to their
civil liberties, such as the selective interrogation of non-citizens regardless of the
existence of any reasonable suspicion, the detention of non-citizens without
disclosure of their names or details of their detention and for indefinite periods of
time,' 9 airport profiling, cultural insensitivities in security patdowns, plans for the
installation of public surveillance cameras on Main Street, DNA profiling of
suspected terrorists, dragnets of foreign employees at airports and other sensitive
workplaces, and closed immigration hearings to protect the anonymity of sensitive
sources.
Although the new initiatives taken by Congress may be rational, we should be
wary about making too many tradeoffs for physical security. We might recall that
Huxley's novel speaks to a mindless tradeoff of personal dignity and autonomy for
an assurance of well-being and security. Ultimately, the best fortress against
terrorism is to reject that kind of tradeoff. The best fortress is our Bill of Rights.
17. Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001 [sic], Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 STAT. 272 (2001).
18. For a critique of this Act and related government measures, see Harold Hongju Koh, The
Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 23, 34-39 (2002).
19. For a concise summary of this particularly troublesome aspect of the homeland security
program, see ContemporaryPractice,supra note 15, at 251.
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A reexamination of immigration procedures primarily addresses two
problems: snafus within an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
processing system that might have been inspired by Rube Goldberg or Franz
Kafka 20 and the problem of visa overstays. The snafus are a reminder of the need
to restructure the INS, especially to separate its law enforcement operations from
its service functions. It is also time to improve management of clerical functions.
But I want to focus my concern about immigration procedures primarily on the
problem of visa overstays.
Of some four to nine million undocumented aliens in this country - nobody
knows the exact number - about half are thought to be legally admitted persons
who have stayed beyond the limits of their visas. For many foreign visitors, visa
overstaying has become the immigration procedure of choice. The United States,
unlike most other countries, has relied primarily on admission requirements to
regulate migration of some twenty million foreign visitors a year. Once they are
admitted, however, it is nearly impossible to ensure their exit from this country on
schedule. We have no reliable system of exit controls, despite a congressional
mandate in 1996 to establish such a system. Moreover, our long and strong
tradition of protecting civil liberties, for which we should be thankful, has
discouraged the introduction of a national identification card, resident permits,
registration by non-immigrants and other techniques of control that are taken for
granted in other countries.
Controlled departure of non-immigrants would, of course, provide no specific
protection in itself against terrorism and only marginally greater capacity to locate
and deport visa overstayers. But controlled departure would at least provide some
deterrence of overstays as well as useful information about patterns of overstays,
and, in some cases, the status of individual criminal suspects. Better data could
help shape our general admission policies, including the visa-waiver program that
enables visitors from many countries to be admitted into the United States without
a visa. 21
2.

Initiatives Abroad

When we turn from homeland security to initiatives abroad against terrorism,
it is clear how much we will have to depend on international cooperation. It is also
clear, in the words of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, that "[t]he power of
international cooperation and understanding is greater than the obstacles we
face." 22 But it is just as clear how little we have really cooperated in addressing
the root causes of terrorism and how much catching up we have to do - on both
20. See Eric Schmitt, The Rube Goldberg Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, at 5. This article
appeared the day after the author's remarks in Denver, giving him the satisfaction, for once, of being at
least one day ahead of the New York Times. See also Abraham McLaughlin, INS reachesfor high-tech
silver bullet, CHRIST. SCI. MON., March 18, 2002, at 2 (describing INS failures and proposed
improvements).
21. See 8 C.F.R. 217.5 (2001).
22. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address, Annual Meeting, American Society of International
Law, March 15, 2002.
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domestic and international fronts - to resume a position of constructive leadership
in the global community.
On the domestic front, let me give just one example of the catching up we
have to do. In an earlier McDougal Lecture, Leonard Sutton reflected on "what
might be done to discourage international terrorism and how the United States
seeks foreign cooperation., 23 One of two problems he cited was the difficulty of
gaining extradition of suspected terrorists to face prosecution on capital charges in
a world largely convinced that the death penalty is a fundamental violation of
human rights. That is still a red flag that should prompt this country to reconsider
its pursuit of final solutions to even the most monstrous criminal acts.
On the international front we have much to do. During the 1990s the United
States failed to leverage its vaunted superpower status for the good of world order.
We simply lacked the national will and leadership in Washington to assume the
responsibility incumbent of a superpower. And it is much the same in the new
century. Just a little over a month before the September 11th attacks, President
24
Bush rejected a protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
that provides for investigation of treaty violations and suspicious outbreaks of
illness, and greater transparency of research and other activity in bioscience.
However intrusive such measures might seem to be, surely they would be in the
national, not to mention global, interest. How can the United States expect Iraq to
cooperate in an inspection regime if the United States itself doesn't?
You might say that we were our own worst enemy. It all reminds me of Pogo
and his friends-not to put too light a touch on these remarks. Do you remember
Walt Kelly's comic strip? Do you recall that when trouble broke out in the bayous,
its denizens would form a rag-tag militia and march off to25battle, only to discover,
in Pogo's words, "We have met the enemy, and he is us"?
Haven't we Americans also been our own worst enemy by failing to pay our
dues to the United Nations, by disassociating ourselves from international
organizations such as UNESCO, and by refusing to ratify one treaty after another,
ranging from prohibitions on land mines to the International Criminal Court. The
United States has certainly talked terrorism to the international community and the
importance of collective action against it, as in President Clinton's 1998 address to
the United Nations General Assembly. But even then the Administration failed to
specify practical measures or the nature of the recommended collaboration.
Perhaps, most tragically, since the end of the Cold War we have been our own
worst enemy by declining to help construct a system of collective security of the
sort that was to have been the cornerstone of the United Nations system. Why
could we not have exercised more constructive, cooperative leadership during the
last decade? Small wonder that it is often lonely for us in the Grave New World of

23. See Leonard v.B. Sutton, Political Asylum and Other Concerns: Some Reflections on the
World, Yesterday and Today, 19 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 475, 580 (1991).
24. See Raymond A. Zilinskas, Rethinking Bioterrorism, 100 CURRENT HIST. 438,442 (2001).
25. See M. Thomas Inge, COMICS AS CULTURE 26 (1990) (Pogo had the same to say about rubbish
heaps despoiling the environment).
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Terrorism.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
What, then, is the international legal framework for combating terrorism and
for evaluating the measures taken so far by the United States in the aftermath of
September 11th? Let's begin with a couple of definitional problems.
A.

DefinitionalProblems

1.

"Terrorism"

What exactly is terrorism? Although modem terrorism, by that name, has
roots as deep as Robespierre's Reign of Terror in eighteenth-century France, we
still do not know how to define it exactly. It is broadly accepted as a phenomenon
of some coherence that transcends isolated acts of savagery and frequently, though
not always, calls for some sort of international legal response. And it has a long
and varied history. Long before the terrorists of the French Revolutions, the
zealots threatened Roman rule in Palestine, the assassins menaced the Crusaders,
and the fraternity of thugs plundered Northern India. They all had their reasons, of
course. As the clichd goes, one person's terrorist may be another person's freedom
fighter. And that person may be us. We shouldn't forget, for example, our
homegrown Sons of Liberty who tarred, feathered and forced the expulsions of
loyalist citizens during the Revolutionary War. They were the original redblooded patriots. They were us, and they were terrorists.
One problem in defiming terrorism is the sheer diversity of objectives and
characteristics we associate with terrorism, including religious vendettas, social
revolution, transnational revolution, national self-determination, and even
genocide. Narodnaya Volya, a seminal movement that erupted in 1879, sought to
spark rebellion among Russian serfs by demonstrating the vulnerability of the
civilian elite. 26 Such mass consciousness-raising, however, has been at most a
secondary aim of the Red Brigade or the Basque ETA. Nor does it resemble the
genocidal al Qaeda movement. Nor does mass consciousness-raising necessarily
have much in common with mass aspirations for self-determination such as the
long struggle for Palestinian statehood. Nor do the production of weapons of mass
destruction and trafficking in them, which are apparently the criteria for
membership in the "axis of evil,"2 7 resemble the threats in Chechnya, Colombia,
Georgia, India or Indonesia. Terrorism is a method, not a system of belief or set of
common aspirations.
Given the enormous diversity of terrorist purposes and situations, a second

26. See David C. Rapoport, The Fourth Wave: September II in the History of Terrorism, 100
CURRENT HIST. 419 (2001).

27. President's State of the Union Message, Jan. 29, 2002 Found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/01/200201-1 I.html (last visited September 11, 2002).

2002

THE GRAVE NEW WORLD OF TERRORISM

problem in defining terrorism is the lack of agreement among municipal legal
systems on a definition. Typically, definitions are tailored to national contexts and
a specific threat or range of threats to national security. It is therefore very
difficult, if not impossible, to rely upon municipal practice or custom as an
acceptable basis for defining terrorism at the international level. For example,
India's Prevention of Terrorism Act, 200228 refers to specific instruments of
terrorism, membership in officially designated associations, and the more or less
common-law crime of conspiracy that generally does not exist in civil law systems.
Moreover, the sheer complexity of the Indian definition, which runs to some 1/2
pages of single-spaced print, would challenge efforts to distill a practicable
international definition.
A third definitional obstacle is one of scale. When do sporadic acts of rock
throwing, gang warfare, and animal rights violence exceed the bounds of ordinary
criminal law? Taken together, when do they constitute terrorist violence? When
do they justify an endless "War on Terrorism?"
A fourth problem infects any effort to overcome disparities of purpose,
national context and scale: governments naturally want to keep their political
options open. They are therefore reluctant to bring all assassinations and all
military targeting of civilians within a definition of terrorism. Moreover, they do
not want to condemn state acts, only acts of non-state actors.
Despite these and other problems, the exercise of trying to define terrorism is
worthwhile. It will hardly do to apply Justice Stewart's famous definition of
"obscenity" - "I know it when I see it."' 29 Of course, impressions accumulated
over time help shape a definition. We "know" that terrorism today is more sharply
distinguishable from ordinary street crimes than it used to be, just as "piracy"
30
today transcends mere robbery on the sea, as Justice Story famously defined it.
We therefore agree on the need to seek some sort of consensus on a definition of
what we loosely call "terrorism." There is also substantial agreement on two
elements of terrorism: the use of violence against innocent persons and the intent
to frighten them into action or inaction according to the perpetrator's purpose.
Beyond these two elements, however, there is little agreement on a definition of
terrorism. Let me cite just four examples to demonstrate this problem.
When the Mitchell Commission addressed the problem of violence in the
Middle East, it defined terrorism as "the deliberate killing and injuring of
randomly selected noncombatants for political ends. It seeks to promote a political
outcome by spreading terror and demoralization throughout a population. ,3 1 But
28. THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT, 2002, India. Cen. Act No. 15 of 2002.
29. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
30. See UnitedStates v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153 (1820) (defining piracy as a violation of the
law of nations).
31. Michael J. Jordan, Terrorism's Slippery Definition Eludes UN Diplomats, CHRIST. SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 4, 2002, at 7, 8. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International
Terrorism: A Policy-OrientedAssessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 84 (2002) ("Terrorism is a strategy
of violence designed to instill terror in a segment of society in order to achieve a power-outcome,
propagandize a cause, or inflict harm for vengeful political purposes.").
Professor Bassiouni
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why single out political ends and a political outcome? What about violence to
destroy an economic system, to force an unwanted ethnic population to flee its
homeland, or to vindicate divine revelation?
A definition proposed by the Council of Ministers of the European Union
overcomes the problem of a constricted focus on political change by defining
terrorism to include offenses intentionally aimed at "intimidating [other countries],
their institutions or people and seriously altering or destroying the political,
economic or social structures of a country., 32 But the term "offenses" may be too
broad. It may sweep in such legitimate activities as anti-globalization and
environmental protests, labor demonstrations and other normally protected activity.
What's more, any reference to motive or aims, such as in the European Union's
definition, seems too subjective and implies that other motives or aims may be
legitimate. On the other hand, if all violence against innocent citizens regardless
of its ends constitutes terrorism, why should acts of terrorism be distinguished
from common crimes already prohibited by most legal systems? We can begin to
see why an operational definition remains the Holy Grail of the terrorism debate.33
In case a reference to the Holy Grail sounds too Western, let me cite a draft
definition of terrorism put forward by the Convention of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference on Combatting International Terrorism. Although this rather
complicated definition has failed to generate agreement among all members of the
Conference, 34 it nevertheless is noteworthy:
"Terrorism" means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its
motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal
plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling
their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or
any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them,
or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the
35
stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States.
This raises a number of important questions. Would a threat of military
sanctions constitute terrorism if its purpose is to "threaten the stability" of an
independent state like Iraq? Would a criminally irresponsible failure to contain oil
pollution at sea fall within the same definition if it thereby exposed the
environment to hazards? Are we prepared to accept the Islamic Conference
definition insofar as it specifically excludes national liberation movements, such as
in Kashmir, and movements of resistance to foreign occupation, such as the
Palestinian intifadas on the West Bank? Indeed, can terrorists ever be "freedom

acknowledges that the term terrorism "means different things to different people" and that the term has
"never been satisfactorily defined." Id. at 101.
32. Jordan supra note 31 at 8.
33. See Jeffrey Laurenti ed., UNA-USA, COMBATING TERRORISM: DOES THE U.N. MATTER...
AND How 25 (2002) [hereinafter COMBATING TERRORISM].
34. See Muslims deadlocked on defining terrorism, INT'L HERALD TRIB., April 3, 2002, at 1.
35. Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combatting International
Terrorism § 2 (1999).
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fighters?" Despite questions of this sort, the definition of terrorism proposed by
the Islamic Conference must be considered seriously in today's world precisely
because it is an Islamic formulation.
The alternative to a comprehensive definition of terrorism that the
international community has taken so far is simply to define constituent offenses,
one by one, that constitute terrorism. Some twelve major treaties take this
approach.36 Several of them rely for enforcement on the extradition principle of
aut dedere aut punire - either render over or prosecute. They range from the first
three agreements, which seek to suppress hijacking and other acts against aircraft
safety, to conventions for the suppression of terrorist bombings and financing of
terrorism. The suicide bombings of September 11th sounded a wake-up call for
the United States to become a party to the latter two treaties. Accordingly, the
Senate soon gave its advice and consent to the two treaties on December 5, 2002,
the President signed instruments of ratification, and Congress enacted
implementing legislation.37 Meanwhile, efforts
continue to complete the drafting
38
of a comprehensive convention on terrorism.
2.

"War"

The term "war" raises a second major definitional problem. The vocabulary
of warfare sparks patriotism and enhances public relations, but the term "war" has
little general meaning under international law, except as a general topic such as the
laws of war, war crimes and prisoners of war. Instead, the modern law of warfare
uses the term "armed conflict," which avoids both the formal premise of the
traditional use of the term that required an explicit declaration of war, as well as
the ambiguity of applying the term to contemporary situations. Nevertheless, the
term "war" has nominal significance, at least, in United States law because of the
power of Congress to declare war 39 although that is seldom an issue anymore.
36. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft; Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation;
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf, Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection;
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism.
37. Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-197, 116 Stat.
721; Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-197, 116 Stat. 724.
38. COMBATING TERRORISM supra note 33, at 26. The United Nations General Assembly's Ad
Hoc Committee on Terrorism has preliminarily approved a majority of the draft agreement's 23 articles,
but difficult issues of definition and scope remain, such as the applicability of the "terrorist" label to
members of armed forces while engaged in combat. WASHINGTON REPORT, Feb. 2002, at 8.
39. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8.
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What, then, does it mean to be caught up in a "War on Terrorism"? Perhaps
President Bush had in mind a war in the colloquial sense of the War on Poverty or
the War Against Drugs. Or perhaps he was simply responding to Osama bin
Laden's own Declaration of War, his call for a jihad, against the United States in
1996. 40 Quite likely, however, the White House equates "war" with any major,
sustained armed conflict abroad.
As to the laws of war and war crimes, there may be a growing recognition that
terrorism is the peacetime equivalent of a war crime. One leading commentator
has suggested that this identification helps close gaps in the existing international
legal regime against terrorism, based as it is primarily on the twelve conventions. 4'
But identifying acts of terrorism as war crimes carries with it certain problems
such as granting terrorists a combatant's privilege and a right in some situations to
exact collateral damage on civilians.
The term "war" is also legally significant in defining the status and rights of
captives taken in armed combat, such as the suspected terrorists detained in
Afghanistan and at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba.42 How do we distinguish "prisoners
of war" from so-called "unlawful combatants?" Ordinarily, a captive's command
authority must enjoy a minimum of international legal personality. Since only
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan ever recognized the Taliban, and no state ever
recognized al Qaeda, neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda enjoyed international legal
personality on a dejure basis. Technically, Afghanistan has not been engaged in
international armed combat because its recognized government was not the Taliban
but the Northern Alliance, which the United States and the United Kingdom have
supported. On the other hand, the Taliban government was certainly the de facto
authority, exercising a substantial measure of effective control over Afghan
territory for more than five years. It therefore had some claim to represent the
Afghan state and to maintain that Taliban fighters are entitled to international legal
protection. The prisoner-of-war status of al Qaeda partisans, especially those of
foreign origin with no direct links with the Taliban, is, however, tenuous.
It is clear, then, that members of neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda fit easily
40. See Doran, supra note 11, at 26, 29, 31.
41. Michael Scharf notes:
The proposal to define terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes
necessitates application of the laws of war to terrorists. The approach would fill some
of the gaps of the current anti-terrorism treaty regime. It would give the prosecution
the ability to argue the doctrine of command responsibility, which was not previously
applicable to peacetime acts. And it will encourage terrorist groups to play by the
rules of international humanitarian law. On the other hand, the approach virtually
declares open season on attacks on government personnel and facilities. It would
encourage insurrection by reducing the personal risks of rebels. And it would enhance
the perceived standing of insurgents by treating them as combatants rather than
common criminals.
Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peace Time Equivalent of War Crimes: A Case of Too
Much Convergence Between International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law?, 7
ILSA J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 391, 397-98 (2001).
42. For a concise description of captive life at Guantdnamo Bay, see Warren Richey, A Prisoner's
Day at Guant6namo, CHRIST. SCI. MON., March 14,2002, at 1.
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into the rickety nation-state structure that undergirds the laws of war - more
precisely, international law of armed conflict 4 3 - because the rules it supplies were
never intended to cover the current situation. At first, the Bush Administration
was reluctant to extend international legal protection to captives taken in Operation
Enduring Freedom. Its refusal to extend the Geneva Conventions to the captives,
however, provoked considerable criticism and resulted in embarrassment to the
United States." As a result, and under considerable political pressure, the
Administration acknowledged 45 that the Geneva Conventions of 194946 apply to
the Taliban, though not al Qaeda partisans, who are presumed to be unlawful
combatants outside the protections of the laws of war.
The question then becomes whether Taliban captives are "prisoners of war,"
and if so, to what extent. Despite its acknowledgment of the applicability of the
Geneva Conventions, the Administration insisted that none of the Taliban or al
Qaeda captives are entitled to POW status because of the irregular nature of the
Taliban militia. In coming to this conclusion, the Administration relied on
interpretation of Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, the first paragraph of
which extends POW status to members of the armed forces, militia or volunteer
corps of a Party to the Convention. Members of other militias or voluntary corps
belonging to a Party are entitled to POW status only if they are commanded by a
person responsible for subordinates, have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
43. During the Cold War the law of armed conflict, like so much international law, developed
rapidly. Among the achievements were the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, and the 1949
Geneva Conventions that still define the basic rules of humanitarian law. Other important instruments
of international law that bear on armed conflict include the two United Nations Covenants on human
rights, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the United States Convention on the Law of the
Sea, and the Stockholm and Rio instruments that have shaped the development of international
environmental law. Unfortunately, however, Cold Warriors discounted the growing role of non-state
actors in the international legal system, such as the Red Cross, the Olympic Movement, multi-national
corporations, and political cells spawned in the squalor of Palestinian refugee camps. The end of the
Cold War inspired greater attention to the idea of a transnational civil society and non-governmental
organizations. The rules of war, however, continued to be expressed in terms of national armed forces,
state sovereignty, state responsibility, and a reliance on diplomatic protection of individual claims.
44. Michael O'Hanlon notes:
[T]he administration's initial reluctance to guarantee the basic protections of the
Geneva Conventions to Taliban soldiers and its continued refusal to apply them to al
Qaeda were unwise. These decisions fostered the impression that the detainees were
not being treated humanely. This perception was wrong, but it became prevalent.
Rumsfeld had to go on the defensive after photos circulated around the world showing
shackled prisoners kneeling before their open-air cells; Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
General Richard Myers talked somewhat hyperbolically about how the detainees
might gnaw through hydraulic cables on airplanes if not forcibly restrained; and some
Pentagon officials even suggested that the detainees did not necessarily deserve
Geneva treatment, given the crimes of al Qaeda on September 11. But Rumsfeld's
comments came too late, and America's image in the Arab world in particular took
another hit.
Michael E. O'Hanlon, A FlawedMasterpiece, 81 FOREIGN AFF., 47, 56 (May/June 2002).
45. See Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives; In Shfit, Bush Says Geneva Rules
Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at 1.
46. Geneva Convention Relative To The Treatment Of Prisoners Of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION] (adopted Aug. 12, 1949).
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distance, carry arms openly, and act in accordance with the laws and customs of
war. 47 Taliban captives technically did not "belong to a Party" to the conflict
because the Party, Afghanistan, was still represented by the Northern Alliance and
therefore not in conflict with the United States and other members of the allied
coalition. But POW status is also extended to "members of regular armed forces
who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the
Detaining Power., 48 Since the Taliban is clearly such "an authority," the
remaining question is which members of the Taliban, if not all of them, were
"members of regular armed forces."
Under international law, most of the Taliban captives would seem to be
entitled to that status regardless of whether they individually displayed a fixed
distinctive sign. Technically, to be entitled to POW status, members of the armed
forces of either a recognized or non-recognized government or other authority
must wear the required insignia despite the argument that members of regular
armed forces do not have to satisfy the criterion. 49 But general practice has been
quite tolerant. By international custom, failures to conform to all of the formal
criteria for membership in "other militias" are overlooked. The badge of
protection is one of function, not insignia.
Significantly, any cases of doubt about the POW status of particular detainees
are to be resolved under Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention by a
"competent tribunal" 50 - it can be either a military or a civilian tribunal - of the
detaining state. Of course, it would be possible for the United States to argue that
there is no "doubt" about the non-applicability of POW status, despite the Geneva
Convention, or that Article 5 provides no timelines for resolving individual cases.
But such arguments would smack of bad faith. Even if the conflict in Afghanistan
is deemed to be a civil war rather than one of an international character, common
Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and the more expansive Article 75 of
Protocol I to the Conventions 51 apply minimum standards of treatment to all
protected persons in time of armed conflict. Also, Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions 52 expands the protections ensured to persons during non-international
conflict. I will return to the legal status of captives toward the end of my lecture.
Let me now turn, however, from definitional issues to substance.

47. THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 46, art 4(2); see also 1907 HAGUE CONVENTION,
art. 1, infra note 82.
48. THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 46, art. 4(3) (emphasis added).
49. But see Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Who is a Prisonerof War? You Could Look It
Up. Maybe., N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 2002, at Wk. 9 (remarks of Doug Cassell, arguing that regular
members of armed forces do not have to satisfy the criterion).
50. THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 46, art. 5.
51. PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 AND RELATING
TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL 1), art. 75, U.N.

Doc. No. A/32/144 (1977), 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter PROTOCOL 1].
52. PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING
TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL II), U.N.
Doc. No. A/32/144 (1977), 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter PROTOCOL II].
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Post-September 11th Law in Action

Law and minimum world public order have developed rapidly in the throes of
the War on Terrorism. The suicide bombings of September 11th triggered a volley
of new authority. We are seeing international law in action. That is fortunate, for
the most part, given the antiquated nation-state premises of the law and the
inadequacy of applicable rules in current circumstances. In the old clichd, the laws
of war are always one war behind.
Immediately after the suicide bombings, the United States claimed that it had
53
an inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
At that point there was no clear precedent supporting the use of force in selfdefense against non-state actors such as al Qaeda5 4 Nor was it clear that the
famous Caroline doctrine, 55 permitting self-defense only as a sort of necessary
reflex action, would support a delayed and long-distance response, even to an ongoing threat. For example, in 1985 the United States bombing attack on the shores
of Tripoli to avenge an alleged sabotage by Libyan agents of a Berlin nightclub
filled with American GIs proved to be controversial under the Carolinedoctrine.
In Resolution 1368,56 however, the United Nations Security Council,
responding to September 11th, confirmed a very broad right of individual and
collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. For the first
time ever, the Security Council defined terrorism, whether undertaken by states or
by non-state actors, as a threat to international peace and security under Chapter
VII of the Charter, thereby enabling the Council to make decisions binding on all
member states. Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also
took unprecedented action, deciding, for the first time in its history, that the
September 11th attack against one of its members, the United States, would be
considered an armed attack against all members under Article 5 of the NATO
57
Treaty.
Resolution 136858 expressed the Security Council's determination "to combat
by all means" 59 threats and acts of terrorism and to bring to justice all persons
responsible for them. It stressed that those persons are to be held accountable
53. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51. Under Article 51, a member of the United Nations can undertake both
individual and collective self-defense, for which no prior authorization by the Security Council is
necessary so long as the member state is held accountable to the Council.
54. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Terrorismand the Concept of "ArmedAttack" in Article 51 of
the UN. Charter,43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 41 (2002).
55. In diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain arising out of an incident involving the vessel
Caroline on the Great Lakes, United States Secretary of State Daniel Webster established what has
become a customary confinement of self-defense to instances where "the necessity of that self-defense
is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." 2 MOORE,
A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-14 (1906).
56. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001), 40 I.L.M. 1277 (2001).
57. See Press Release, Statement by the North Atlantic Council 124 (Sept. 12, 2001), 40 1.L.M.
1267 (2001). The statement applies Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat.
2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.
58. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 56.
59. Id., pmbl.
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under international law. Finally, the Council stood ready to "take all necessary
steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all
forms of terrorism., 60 The General Assembly unanimously endorsed the Security
Council's action by calling for "international cooperation to bring to justice the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors" of the suicide bombings. 6 1 Although
Resolution 1368 stopped short of authorizing the use of force, the global
community acquiesced in the Afghan intervention after the fact.
In Resolution 137362 the Security Council took a further step by imposing
substantial obligations on member states for the purpose of combating terrorism.
These obligations are drawn heavily from the twelve anti-terrorist conventions that
largely define the international regime today.63 All member states were required to
take certain specific steps under domestic law. The Security Council's actiontruly law in action-accomplished instantly what years of effort to universalize and
expand international treaty law had failed to accomplish. After Resolution 1373,
states are expected to criminalize willful funding of terrorism, freeze financial
assets or economic resources within broadly defined networks facilitating
terrorism, suppress recruitment of members of terrorist groups, eliminate the
supply of weapons and safe havens or bases of operations to them, offer early
warning of terrorist activity to other States, exchange critical information on
terrorists and terrorist activity, cooperate in investigating suspects, acquire
evidence about them, prosecute them, deny safe haven and territorial bases of
operation to support them, and institute effective border controls to constrain
transboundary movement of terrorists. To help ensure that these requirements
stick, Resolution 1373 also established a Counter Terrorism Committee for
monitoring its implementation but unfortunately not for protecting civil liberties
imperiled by abuses of the new authority. The same instrument also calls upon
states to become parties to the twelve anti-terrorist treaties.
Subsequent Security Council Resolutions reinforced Resolution 1373 and
elaborated further on the work of the Counter Terrorism Committee. 64 Also,
within several months of Resolution 1373, nearly 150 governments had
specifically reported to the Counter Terrorism Committee of the Security Council
on their measures of implementation. 65 A successful program of notification,
however, does not ensure that the Committee will be able to overcome great
national divergencies, for example, in accounting and banking standards. Nor will
it be easy for the Counter Terrorism Committee to gain agreement on the
identification of entities and individuals suspected of engaging in the financing of
terrorist acts. One state's list of terrorists is another state's list of revenue sources,
if not freedom fighters. Nevertheless, the Security Council's deep involvement in
60. S.C. Res. 1368, supranote 56, at 15.
61. G.A.Res. 56/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/1 (2001), 40 I.L.M. 1276 (2001).

62. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001), 40 I.L.M. 1278 (2001).
63. See the Conventions listed supra note 36.
64. S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001), 41 I.L.M. 503 (2002); S.C. Res. 1390, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1390 (2001), 41 I.L.M. 511 (2002).
65. See Negroponte Discusses Post-9/11 U.N. Agenda During House Appropriations
Subcommittee Hearing, UNA- USA, WASH. REP., Mar. 26, 2002, at 1,2.
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giving effect to conventional law is compelling. In historical perspective, its
actions follow an impressive series of decisions during the 1990s that provided for
far-reaching leadership.
In those decisions the Security Council organized
peacekeeping operations around the globe, established so-called safe havens for
refugees and internally displaced persons, conducted democratic elections,
temporarily staffed new governments, and instituted the war-crimes tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Let me cite one last example of post-September 11th law in action within the
international community. The United Nations family of organizations includes
such important specialized agencies as the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The only major country in the world that at
that time was not a member of UNESCO was the United States. UNESCO,
however, was the first specialized agency to affirm Resolution 1373 by
emphasizing that "acts of terrorism can never be justified whatever the motives"
and by confirming that "intolerance, discrimination, inequality, poverty and
exclusion, among others, provide fertile ground for terrorism." 66 The UNESCO
resolution also noted its role in facilitating a dialogue among civilizations to
overcome inter-religious tensions. UNESCO's focus on root causes of terrorism
ought to redirect some of the global efforts against terrorism. We need to do more
than simply react. Just as the War on Terrorism and the U.N. Resolutions are
intended to be of indefinite duration, so should be the commitment of states to
serious dialogue with non-state actors. Surely, the United States, at least, has
learned a lesson from its failure to listen in good faith to others.
C.

Emerging Issues of Law and Policy

These examples of law in action bespeak both progress and the woefully
inadequate framework of international law for dealing with the threat of terrorism.
In improving that framework and developing a new regime of authority, several
questions loom large: How far does the scope of self-defense extend under Article
51 of the U.N. Charter? For example, does Article 51 justify anticipatory measures
against non-state actors? What exactly is the role of the United Nations Security
Council or of the General Assembly, under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, after
a unilateral act of self-defense? Can the U.N. Charter's prohibition on the use of
force and the principle of non-intervention be reconciled with the humanitarian
principle of intervention to restore or institute democratic institutions in the face of
terrorism?
In the long run the war on terrorism, whether it is metaphorical or real, will
require much more than the ethical and legal framework that has emerged in the
aftermath of September 11th. We will need willpower more than military power.
We will need to address root causes.67 For starters, we should accelerate initiatives
66. Negroponte Discusses Post-9/l I U.N. Agenda During House Appropriations Subcommittee
Hearing, supra note 65, at 27.
67. Terrorists must be punished. But will Washington limit itself to a merely punitive
agenda to treat only the symptoms of crisis in the Muslim world? A just settlement for the Palestinians
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to establish a Palestinian state and a just settlement of Palestinian claims; adopt
national energy and transportation policies and programs to encourage
conservation of fuel resources; provide financial and technical support of such
regional initiatives as the Central Asian Battalion of Peacekeepers and Central
Asian Economic Community for water management, economic development and
security; substantially increase funding for public diplomacy and education abroad,
particularly through new media in the Islamic world and in Africa; and leverage
higher levels of economic and military assistance to promote self-determination
and encourage the development of democratic institutions.
D.

Treatment of Captives
1.

Basic Protections of POWs

Let me return now to the question of legal obligations involving the treatment
of captives from Afghanistan, as well as suspects in the planning and execution of
the suicide bombings and their accomplices. With respect to captives from
Afghanistan, we have already seen from attempts to define the term "war" that
international law is unclear about the status of partisans to a conflict who do not
act under bright-colored authority of a recognized "Party" to the conflict. But the
1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 68 extends basic protections to all
captives regardless of their formal POW status. Although the United States is not
a Party to Protocol I, it seems to accept it as custom. Also, common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions, 69 extends minimum standards of treatment to all
protected persons in a non-international conflict. Any question about the
entitlement of particular captives to POW status is to be resolved on a case-by-case
basis by an Article 5 tribunal of the detaining state.
POWs are entitled to certain privileges and immunities. 70 For example, they
may be required to disclose only their name, rank, serial number and date of birth.
They are entitled to reasonable satisfaction of basic physical and spiritual needs.
They are also entitled to protection by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC). They must be returned to their home countries at the end of a
conflict. This particular protection obviously presents a problem during a war on
terrorism that is intended to be of indefinite duration. POWs may be prosecuted
for war crimes, but only in full conformity with the rules and procedures of
military courts martial, including provisions for appeal of decisions.

and support of regional democratization remain among the key weapons that can fight the growth of
terrorism. It will be a disaster for the United States, and another cruel chapter in the history of the
Muslim world, if the war on terrorism fails to liberalize these battered societies and, instead,
exacerbates those very conditions that contribute to the virulent anti-Americanism of today. If a society
and its politics are violent and unhappy, its mode of religious expression is likely to be just the same.
Graham E. Fuller, The Future ofPoliticalIslam, 81 FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2000, at 48, 60.
68. See PROTOCOL I, supra note 51 at art. 75.
69. THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 46, at art. 3.
70. See id., passim.
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2.

Prosecution of Captives

Huge questions remain concerning the proposed prosecution of captives. Is
Guantdnamo Bay sufficiently outside United States territory and jurisdiction to
deny captives full constitutional protections? What will be the charges against the
captives?
Will the charges include criminal conspiracy, as the Bush
Administration has intimated? And what will be the rules and standards of
evidence? Are anonymous or pseudonymous witnesses permissible? What about
the prosecution of so-called "unlawful combatants" - primarily members of al
Qaeda - who are suspected of terrorism? Have they been in "armed conflict" with
the United States and the allied coalition? May they be prosecuted for war crimes
on that or some other basis? May persons implicated in planning and executing the
suicide bombings of September 11 th be accused of war crimes? Or should they
instead be prosecuted only for common crimes in civil courts and for crimes
against humanity under international law? (That would seem to place prosecutions
beyond the competence of a military commission but within the competence of an
international tribunal or a mixed domestic-international tribunal). Where exactly is
the line between military and civil justice when the defendants are non-state
actors?
3.

Military Commissions

Consider the proposed military commissions for trying captives who are
neither citizens nor POWs. 71 Are the rules which would govern proceedings by the
commissions consistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights? 72 When could a defendant's act or omission, otherwise not constituting a
71. See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001); Department of Defense,
Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain NonUnited
States Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism
(March
21,
2002), at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf. Generally, the rules and procedures for
the military commission provide for proceedings before three to seven military officers (always seven
in proceedings where the defendants face the death penalty), without ajury. The presiding officer must
be a military lawyer who will decide legal issues, subject to being overruled by other members of the
commission. The proceedings are to be open to the public except when publicity may threaten the
safety of witnesses or national security. Defendants will be assured a presumption of innocence, a right
to examine evidence, a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for conviction, a two-thirds vote of the
commission for conviction, and a military lawyer or a combination of a military lawyer and a civilian
lawyer of the defendant's choice. A unanimous vote of the commission is required in order to impose a
death sentence. All convictions are appealable to a review panel composed of three military officers.
72. For example, Article 14 provides, inter alia, that:
3. In the determination of any criminal charges against him, everyone shall be entitled to
the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: ... (e) to examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ...
5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence
being reviewed by a higher tribunalaccording to law.
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (emphasis added). The United States is a party to this agreement.
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crime under United States law, be sufficient to sustain a trial and impose
punishment directly under general principles of international law? 73 As a policy
matter, how can prosecution before a military commission be reconciled with the
insistence by the United States that Former Yugoslav partisans, Rwandan captives
and potentially others should be prosecuted by internationaltribunals? In other
words, is it acceptable for the United States to prescribe one procedure when its
interests are implicated and another procedure when its interests are not
implicated?
Are the military commissions constitutional and valid under international
The United States Supreme Court has ruled on the constitutionality of
special military commissions in two cases, Ex parte Milligan75 after the Civil War,
and Ex parte Quirin76 during the Second World War. Accordingly, their
jurisdiction seems to be limited to the prosecution of certain combatants and
unlawful belligerents or to instances when law enforcement and the legal order
have broken down to the point that civilian courts are not functioning. Given the
jurisdictional limitations, the Supreme Court decided in Ex parte Milligan that it
was beyond federal authority to require a United States citizen to defend himself
before a military commission "where the courts are open and their process
unobstructed. 77 By the same token, however, the Court decided in Ex parte
Quirin that a military commission was entitled to prosecute several German
military saboteurs who had disguised themselves as civilians after coming ashore
in the United States.78 We should keep in mind, however, that Quirin was decided
after Congress had declared war. Also, the decision was handed down several
years before the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the adoption of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice in 1950. Times have therefore changed since the Supreme
Court's pronouncements on military commissions. For more than a half century
now, the law has required that proceedings of special military commissions or
tribunals to try non-citizens must be as full and fair as established court martial
proceedings against citizens.
law? 74

73. Article 15 provides as follows:
(1) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law,
at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one
that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed....
(2) Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any
act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the
general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
Id., art. 15.
74. Compare Jordan J. Paust, AntiterrorismMilitary Commissions: CourtingIllegality, 23 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1 (2001) (questioning their validity) with Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 249 (2002) (defending the
constitutional validity of the President's Order).
75. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866).
76. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). For an account of the affair, see Gary Cohen, The
Keystone Kommandos, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2002, at 46.
77. 71 U.S. at 121 (1866).
78. 317 U.S. at 1 (1942).
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What does all this mean today? Strictly speaking, most al Qaeda members
and perhaps some Taliban are not POWs and are therefore not entitled under the
Third Geneva Convention to the process due to defendants in a military court
martial. But in bringing alleged terrorists to justice, the general practice, as in the
endless conflict in Northern Ireland, has been to extend full protections to
combatants. The Bush Administration unquestionably did the right thing in
promising that during detention even "unlawful combatants" will be treated in a
manner that is reasonably consistent with the Third Geneva Convention, including
supervision of detention centers by the ICRC. 7 9 But the Administration should go
a step further to ensure ex gratia, as a matter of grace, that captives will enjoy
POW rights. 80 That would ensure them the due process rights ordinarily required
in a court martial of United States military personnel, including a right of habeas
corpus from detention and, if prosecuted, a right of appeal. That would be the right
thing to do. Surely, within the dictum of the Supreme Court, we are not faced with
a breakdown of the normal processes of justice. There are not, and it is unlikely
that there will ever be, enough captives at a given point in time to burden the
administration of justice. And, surely, we can protect classified information at trial
without depriving defendants of their rights to a fair trial. At the very least, the
United States would be well-advised to comply with Article 7581 of Protocol I to
the Geneva Conventions so as to extend fundamental guarantees to all captives.
Surely it will accrue to the benefit of this country in the long run if we offer the
same generous due process upon which our constitutional order and international
reputation lie. No less than the security of reciprocity and the rewards of comity
are at stake.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Let me conclude by citing the famous Martens Clause, which is found in the
preambles to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on the Laws of War. 82 These
agreements still form a framework of general rules and expectations about
implementation of the laws of war. Czarist Russia took the lead in promoting the
first Hague Conference in 1899. A distinguished Russian delegate, Frdddric
Martens, will go down in international legal history primarily for the principle still
in effect that he formulated, as follows:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in
the Regulations adopted by them, inhabitants and belligerents remain
79.

THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION,

supra note 46, arts. 3, 8, 10.

80. See O'Hanlon, supra note 44, at 56.
81. PROTOCOL I, supra note 51, art. 75.
82. CONVENTION RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND, WITH ANNEX OF
REGULATIONS, Oct. 18, 1907, pmbl., 36 Stat. 2277, 2279-2280, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907 HAGUE
CONVENTION]; CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND, WITH

ANNEX OF REGULATIONS, July 29, 1899, pmbl, 32 Stat. 1803, 1805, T.S. No. 403. See Theodor Meron,
The Martens Clause, Principlesof Humanity, and Dictatesof Public Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 78,

79 (2000).
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under the protection and empire of the principles of the law of nations as
they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from
the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.83
As we struggle through this unwanted war on terrorism, is it not better to be
on the side of humanity and to follow the dictates of public conscience? Would
that not be a better choice when the enemy may sometimes be us? To quote the
contemporary Afghan poet, Mohamed Yasin Niazi:
We saw the results of the work of the ignorant.
Now we should be rational.
It is time for open windows
84
Through which the sun shines.

Why not allow reason and dialogue to shine on the Grave New World of
Terrorism? Why not try to convert adversity into opportunity by doubling efforts
to create a truly global community, identity and stability? The choice is ours. As
Aldous Huxley wrote, at the end of his Foreword to the 1946 edition of Brave New
World: "You pays your money and you takes your choice."8 5 That still speaks to
us today in our quest for minimum public world order rather than national
invulnerability.

83. 1907 HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 82 (with minor variations between the 1899 and 1907
Hague formulations).
84. Quoted in Andrew Solomon, An Awakening After the Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at
1,20.
85. HUXLEY supra note 5, at xvii, Forewordto BRAVE NEW WORLD.

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN:
THE PROMISE OF MIXED TRIBUNALS
LAURA A. DICKINSON*
In the wake of the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, how to apprehend, question, and punish the perpetrators remains a
difficult question to answer. Despite the United States-led military response in
Afghanistan, which ousted the Taliban regime, Osama bin Laden and the leaders of
al Qaeda remain at large. United States' forces in Afghanistan captured and then
jailed several hundred suspects on Guantanamo Naval Base, in Cuba, but the
relationship between these suspects and al Qaeda is unclear.' United States allies,
such as Great Britain, France and Germany, also detained individuals suspected of
supporting the September 11 th attacks and other terrorist plots. 2 Even countries
long considered hostile to the United States, such as Syria, have detained and
questioned suspects.' Yet with a few exceptions, most of those apprehended
appear to have played only a minor role, if any, in the September 11 th plot itself.
And on U.S. soil, while authorities had at one point detained over 1,000 people
believed to be involved in the attacks, only a handful appear to have any link at all
to al Qaeda or the September 11th attacks. 4
If capturing suspects has been difficult, the question of how (or whether) to
hold these suspects individually accountable has proven to be even more vexing.
. Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. This article was presented
as part of
the Sutton Colloquium, InternationalTerrorism, Ethnic Conflicts, and Self-Determination, held at the
University of Denver College of Law on March 23, 2002. 1 owe thanks to: Mark Weston Janis, Richard
S. Kay, Harold Hongju Koh, Diane F. Orentlilcher, and Jeremy Paul. I also acknowledge the diligent
research assistance of Cara Cutler and Justine Parker.
1. See 34 More Detaineesfrom Afghanistan Jailed at US. Base, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at
AI5 (noting that just under 500 prisoners were detained at Guantanamo naval base as of June 13, 2002)
[hereinafter 34 More Detainees]; Katharine Q. Seelye, Rumsfeld Backs Plans to Hold Captives Even if
Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at A18 (observing that none of the detainees has been charged
with any crime and reporting statement of top officer in charge of anti-terror intelligence that some of
those being held in Guantanamo "were essentially lost souls who could provide scant intelligence").
2. See, e.g., France Investigates a Terror Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, at A22; Edmund L.
Andrews, German Officials Find More TerroristGroups, andSome DisturbingParallels,N.Y. TIMES,
April 26, 2002, at A12; Alan Cowell, A Suspect's Story; Algerian Pilot Says Detention Has Made Him
a Sept. 11 Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,2002, at A9.
3. See Steven Erlanger, Germans Say Man Tied to Sept. 11 is in Syria Jail, N.Y. TIMES, JUNE 19,
2002, at A8; James Risen & Tim Weiner, C.I.A. Is Said to Have Sought Help From Syria, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2001, at B3.
4. See Susan Sachs, U.S. Deports Most of Those Arrested in Sweeps after 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 2002, at A20; Christopher Drew & Judith Miller, Though Not Linked to Terrorism,Many Detainees
Cannot Go Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at Al.
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The Bush administration has not pursued a consistent course but has, in the main,
eschewed the usual criminal law approaches in favor of military solutions. For
example, the suspects apprehended in Afghanistan and brought to Guantanamo
Naval base are now languishing in legal limbo. The administration asserts that
these detainees, who are not U.S. citizens, will not be tried in U.S. courts. 5 Rather,
administration officials suggest that they will be brought before newly established
military commissions, where they would be afforded fewer rights than would be
provided in ordinary criminal proceedings or even in military courts-martial.6 The
administration has also suggested that some of the Guantanamo detainees might be
returned to their home countries, or, possibly, not tried at all but rather held until
the end of hostilities, whenever that might be.7 At the same time, administration
officials have refused to be strictly bound by the Geneva Convention's
requirements for the treatment of detainees. Indeed, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld has said that the standards imposed by the Conventions will be observed
only "for the most part," and that detainees will not be given individual hearings to
determine whether they should be awarded prisoner of war status. 8
Meanwhile, authorities treat suspects captured in the United States
inconsistently. Zacarias Moussaoui, a non-citizen accused of participating in the
September 11 th plot itself, is being tried in federal district court. 9 But Jose Padilla,
an American citizen suspected of participating in a new al Qaeda plot, was
5. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Rumsfeld Lists Outcomes for Detainees Held in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2002, at A10.
6. See id. For a comparison of the rights provided to the accused in the proposed military
commissions, those afforded in ordinary criminal trials, and those afforded in courts-martial, see Laura
A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions,
InternationalTribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002); Neal K. Katyal &
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, Il1 YALE L. J. 1259
(2002).
7. See Dickinson, supra note 6; see also Seelye, supra note 5.
8. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Department of Defense News Briefing (Jan. 11, 2002) available at
http://www.dod.gov/news/Jan2002/t01 112002_t01llsd.html (last visited Oct. 21,2002). Rumsfeld also
categorically asserted that the detainees would "be handled not as prisoners of war, because they're not,
but as unlawful combatants," and that no hearings would be held to assess individuals' status, even
though the Geneva Conventions require a "competent" tribunal to make an individualized determination
as to whether a detainee qualifies as a prisoner of war. Id.; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW
Convention]. This position was immediately criticized, particularly overseas, as demonstrating that the
"U.S. administration is more at home with an improvised process that sometimes skirts the frontiers of
legality than with international agreements that impose firm reciprocal responsibilities." Stick to the
Prison Rules: The Geneva Convention Protects Us All, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 18, 2002, at 19. The
administration later reversed course and accepted the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, but only
as to Taliban fighters and not al Qaeda members. Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva
Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at AI. Moreover, the administration continues to
maintain that none of the detainees qualify as prisoners or war and that the detainees are not entitled to
individualized hearings to determine their status. This only slightly less extreme position has continued
to draw criticism, including a rare statement of disapproval by the International Committee of the Red
Cross. See Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Behind-the-Scenes Clash Led Bush to Reverse
Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at AI2.
9. See Indictment Chronicles 'Overt Acts' that it Says Led to Sept. 11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 2001, at B6 (describing Moussaoui indictment).
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transferred to military detention outside of the United States.' 0 Suspects captured
by other governments also face haphazard justice. Some are charged with crimes
and will be tried, while others are simply held and questioned."
Although some commentators support the administration's proposed use of
military commissions,' 2 few condone the indefinite detention of suspects without
any form of adjudicatory procedure. Many criticize the use of the military
commissions altogether, even if limited to suspects captured in the field of battle,
or if established with protections for the rights of the accused.' 3 Critics argue that,
instead, suspects should be tried in existing domestic courts and that no new
institutions are necessary. 14 Others, myself included, have suggested that some
form of international forum would provide the best method for holding at least
those most responsible for the September 11th attacks accountable for their
actions. 15 Yet in light of this administration's hostility to international processes, it
seems highly unlikely that, despite its advantages, a full-fledged international court
will be used to try those accused of planning and carrying out the September 11th
attacks.
Moreover, the question of where, and how, to try suspects raises a series of
deeper questions about the role of criminal accountability in times of conflict and
war. Scholars writing about the response to the September 11th attacks note that
the current conflict, between the United-States-led coalition on the one hand, and
terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda on the other, does not fit neatly into either
a "war" paradigm or a "criminal justice" paradigm.' 6 In such circumstances, what
rights and procedures are due to individuals who have engaged in atrocities? What
are the imperatives of victims who demand accountability? Do procedures to
adjudicate individual criminal responsibility have a role to play in containing a
current conflict, in deterring future conflict, or in inculcating norms? Do
international proceedings do a better job of inculcating such norms, or are
domestic processes better suited to that task? Is the effort to promote norms
through international proceedings an exercise in imperialism? In a globalized
world, does it even make sense to refer to international and domestic proceedings
as distinct, or might such processes be better termed transnational?
10. See Katharine Q. Seelye, War on Terror Makesfor Odd Twists in Justice System, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 2002, at A16.
11. See, e.g., Erlanger, supra note 3; Andrews, supra note 2.
12. See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at
Al8.
13. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337
(2002); George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitution, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 1-14, 2002, at
26.
14. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 6; Anne-Marie Slaughter, al Qaeda Should Be Tried Before
the World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A23; Richard Goldstone, ProsecutingAl Qaeda: September
11 and Its Aftermath, Crimes of War Project, Dec. 7, 2001, at http://www.crimesofWar.org/expert/algoldstone.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002); Michael P. Scharf, Editorial: The Casefor an International
TrialofAl-Qaeda and Taliban Perpetratorsof the 9/11 Attacks, Am. Soc'y Int'l L., Spring 2002, at 12.
16. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 457
(2002).
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Significantly, these questions are precisely the ones that scholars in the
emerging field of transitional justice have been asking over the past decade about
mass atrocities in general. Although these scholars do not focus on the question of
terrorism specifically, they study the ways in which societies that are attempting to
confront past and lingering mass atrocities do so through a variety of means:
criminal trials, truth commissions, civil compensation schemes, lustration
programs, and so on. 17 An exploration of how the insights derived from this body
of work might be applied to the problem of terrorism in the wake of September
11th would be a fruitful source of further research.
This Essay is an effort to initiate that process by examining an emerging
transitional justice mechanism-the mixed domestic-international tribunal-and
considering the role such tribunals might play in the fight against terrorism. Mixed
tribunals, courts in which international and local judges sit side by side, have
already been used with some degree of success in Kosovo and East Timor, and one
has recently been established in Sierra Leone. The hybrid nature of these courts
may be an advantage when considering issues of accountability in post-Taliban
Afghanistan. A purely domestic process is probably impractical in light of the
limited capacity of the indigenous legal system. And, given the sheer number of
detainees and local distrust of international processes, a hybrid tribunal is more
realistic than the establishment of a purely international court. Moreover, a hybrid
local-international tribunal in this context may be politically palatable even to
those within the Bush administration most in favor of military commissions and
would at least pave the way for some form of multilateral justice mechanism in
response to the September 1 th attacks.
This brief Essay does not attempt to discuss all of these issues in detail.
Instead, I hope to delineate the recent history of this emerging accountability
mechanism and suggest its possible use in the current climate.'8 I will begin, first,
by describing the nature of these tribunals in the most notable post-conflict
contexts in which they have been used: Kosovo and East Timor. Second, I will
compare these hybrid tribunals to international tribunals, on the one hand, and
domestic tribunals, on the other, and explain why, in comparison to each, the
mixed tribunals hold so much promise. Finally, I will discuss the implications of
using such tribunals in a setting such as post-Taliban Afghanistan.
I. Prior Use of Mixed Tribunals

17. See generally, STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY (1997); ALEX
BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED (2000); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS:
CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY

(2001);

MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND

FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); RUTI G. TEITEL,
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2002); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON
WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz, ed., 1995).

18. For a discussion of hybrid tribunals in the context of other emerging mechanisms for
prosecuting violations of international humanitarian law, see Diane F. Orentlicher, The Future of
UniversalJurisdiction in the New Architecture of TransnationalJustice, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
NATIONAL COURTS AND PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (forthcoming 2003).
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In Kosovo and East Timor, the international community worked with local
populations to experiment with a relatively new form of accountability for past
human rights violations: criminal trials before mixed domestic-international courts.
For the most part, these courts emerged as ad hoc solutions in emergency
situations, the product of innovative thinking and collaboration among a variety of
international and local actors forced to make quick decisions and tough
compromises in the face of severe political and economic constraints. In both of
these instances, international actors stepped in to keep the peace in territories
ravaged by conflict and mass atrocity, at a time when detainees suspected of
committing those atrocities were languishing in makeshift detention facilities
without any prospect of trial. Domestic courts were not functioning, and
international courts were either ill-equipped to handle the number of cases at issue,
or were unlikely to be established due to financial or political obstacles. Releasing
the suspects into the general population would have led to violent reprisals, public
outcry, and general mayhem. Under these circumstances, the establishment of
hybrid domestic-international courts appeared to offer a reasonable solution to a
pressing and seemingly intractable problem.
Because these courts are the result of on-the-ground innovation rather than
grand institutional design, the precise form of each tribunal or set of tribunals has
varied considerably. Nonetheless, in both Kosovo and East Timor the courts share
an essential hybrid structure: both the institution and the applicable law consist of a
blend of the international and the domestic. Foreign judges sit alongside their
domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and defended by teams of local
lawyers working with those from other countries. These judges apply domestic
law that has been reformed to include international standards. This part discusses
the process by which each hybrid court was established and the form that the court
has ultimately taken.
A. Kosovo
In June of 1999, after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led
bombing campaign helped halt ethnic cleansing and other mass atrocities
committed primarily by Serb forces against the ethnic Albanian population in
Kosovo, the United Nations Security Council issued a resolution establishing the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 19 UNMIK's mandate required it to
maintain peace and security in the territory: to perform basic civilian
administrative functions (including the establishment of civil law and order), to
coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief, to facilitate the return of refugees, to
promote human rights, to support the reconstruction of key infrastructure, to help
establish substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, and to facilitate a
political process to determine Kosovo's future status. 20 UNMIK's responsibilities
19. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess. 4 0 11a mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
20. See id.; see also United Nations Mission in Kosovo, at http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm
(last visited Oct 21, 2002). The United Nations divided these responsibilities into four groups, two of
which are to be led by non-U.N. organizations, but all of which fall under U.N. jurisdiction: Police and
Justice (United Nations), civil administration (United Nations); democratization and institution-building
(OSCE), and reconstruction and economic development (European Union). See id.
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thus specifically entailed the institution of law and order, which included the
apprehension, trial, and punishment of those who had committed past atrocities as
well as those who
committed crimes after the establishment of United Nations
21
(U.N.) authority.
This task was not easily fulfilled. Much of the physical infrastructure of the
judicial system-court buildings, law libraries, and equipment-was destroyed or
severely damaged during the conflict.22 Local lawyers and judges were scarce, and
those available lacked experience, as most ethnic Albanians had been barred from
the judiciary for many years, and Serbian judges and lawyers mostly fled or
refused to serve.23
Detainees suspected of committing atrocities, once
apprehended by U.N. security forces, were crowding prison facilities, with little
prospect of trial.24 Devastated by the conflict and by years of discrimination
against the ethnic Albanian minority, the local judicial system did not have the
capacity or the independence to conduct such trials. Yet the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was also ill-equipped to handle such
cases. The prosecutor for the ICTY made it clear that the international tribunal
was not prepared to try any but those who had committed the worst atrocities on
the widest scale.25 As the detainees continued to languish in prison, many argued
that the continued detention itself violated international human rights standards,
and local frustration with the failure of the judicial process contributed to
increasing ethnic violence.26
To address what was rapidly becoming an accountability and justice crisis,
support grew for the creation of a special court, to be called the Kosovo War and
Ethnic Crimes Court, which was intended to have jurisdiction over war crimes,
other serious violations of international humanitarian law, and serious ethnicallymotivated crimes. 27 The court was to have concurrent jurisdiction with the ICTY,
21. For an overview of efforts to establish the rule of law in post-conflict Kosovo, see Wendy S.
Betts, Scott N. Carlson, & Gregory Gisvold, The Post-Conflict TransitionalAdministration of Kosovo
and the Lessons-Learned in Efforts to Establisha Judiciaryand Rule of Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371
(2001); Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The United Nations and the
Creation of TransitionalJustice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 107
(2001) [hereinafter Strohmeyer, Multilateral Interventions]; Hansjrg Strohmeyer, Collapse and
Reconstruction of a JudicialSystem: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo andEast Timor, 95 AM. J.

INT'L L. 46 (200 1) [hereinafter Strohmeyer, Collapse].
22. See Betts et al., supranote 21, at 376-77.
23. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 49-50, 53.
24. See id
25. See Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the ICTY, Statement on the Investigation andProsecution
of Crimes Committed in Kosovo, (Sept. 29, 1999) at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p437-e.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2002).
26. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 49. When the UNMIK issued a regulation
allowing for longer pre-trial detention of suspects, the OSCE's Legal System Monitoring Section
concluded that the new regulation was a "clear breach" of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). OSCE LMS, Kosovo:
Report No. 6: Extension of Time Limits and the Rights of Detainees: the Unlawfulness of Regulation
1999/26 (April 29, 2000) available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/
report6.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
27. See Betts et al., supra note 21, at 381.
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but to focus on the less high-profile offenders that the ICTY lacked the capacity to
try. 28 Yet due to a lack of resources and other political obstacles, the establishment
of the court was repeatedly delayed.29 In an effort to achieve similar results by
different means, U.N. authorities, quietly and with little fanfare, issued a series of
regulations allowing foreign judges to sit alongside domestic judges on existing
local Kosovar courts, while also permitting foreign lawyers to team up with
domestic lawyers to prosecute the cases. 30 The hope was that the infusion of
foreign experts would jump-start the judicial process, providing badly needed
capacity and independence.3 1
As of June 2002, Kosovo courts had held trials in seventeen cases.32 Initially,
international judges had minimal impact, as they did not comprise a majority on
the trial panels. 33 A new UNMIK regulation enacted in December 2000 sought to
rectify this problem, however, 34 and after that date all cases of war crimes have
been held in front of courts composed of a majority of international judges, while
prosecution has mostly been undertaken by international prosecutors. 35 The courts
have faced difficulties in finding qualified international personnel to serve as
judges and prosecutors, have been plagued by a lack of funding, and have issued
decisions that commentators have criticized.36 Yet at least one report, though
critical of the tribunals in many respects, suggests that the presence of international
actors has improved the quality of justice delivered in these cases.37
The substantive law applied in these cases was also a blend of the
international and domestic. Initially, with little input from the local population,
UNMIK authorities declared the applicable law in Kosovo to be Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia/Serbian (FRY/Serbian) law, modified to conform to international
human rights standards. 3' This decision outraged many ethnic Albanian Kosovars,
who identified FRY/Serbian law as the law of the oppressive Serbian regime.39
Kosovar Albanian judges refused to apply the law, resulting in widespread
confusion. a In response, UNMIK issued new resolutions describing the applicable

28. See Betts et al., supra note 21, at 381.
29. See Strohmeyer, MultilateralInterventions,supra note 21, at 119.
30. See Betts et al., supra note 21, at 381.
31. See OSCE, Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Legal
Systems Monitoring Section, Report 9--On the Administration of Justice, at 5-6 (Mar. 2002).
[hereinafter March 2002 OSCE Report].
32. OSCE, Department of Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Legal System Monitoring Section.
at
available
2002,
September
Review,
Trials:
A
Crimes
War
Kosovo's
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2002) [hereinafter
Kosovo's War Crimes Trials].
33. Id.
34. UNMIK Regulation 2000/64, Dec. 15 2000.
35. Kosovo 's War Crimes Trials, supra note 32.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. UNMIK Reg. 1999/1, U.N. Interim Adm. Mission in Kosovo (1999) available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg01-99.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
39. See Strohmeyer, MultilateralInterventions,supranote 21, at 112-13.
40. Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 1:1

law to be the law in force in Kosovo prior to March 22, 1989.41 But like the initial
decision, the applicable law was to be a hybrid of pre-existing local law and
international standards. Local law was only applicable to the extent that it did not
conflict with international human rights norms.
B. East Timor
East Timor's path to mixed tribunals resembles Kosovo's, though the decision
to use such courts was perhaps more self-conscious. In early September of 1999,
just three months after the U.N. Security Council established the U.N. Mission in
Kosovo, violence erupted in East Timor when nearly 80 percent of the population
voted for independence from Indonesia in a popular consultation. 42 Local militias,
backed by the Indonesian army and opposed to independence, went on a rampage,
killing hundreds of people, raping and injuring many more, looting and burning
public buildings and private homes, and forcing 200,000 people-approximately
one-quarter of the population-over the border into Indonesian West Timor.43 An
Australian-led multi-national force helped to secure peace in the region, 44 paving
the way for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET), established in October of 1999.45 Like UNMIK, UNTAET was
charged with keeping the peace, providing civil administration for the territory,
promoting human rights, supporting relief and reconstruction, and establishing
institutions that would allow for self-government.46 Like UNMIK, a central part of
this mandate consisted of establishing a credible criminal justice system to help
maintain law and order, which included providing meaningful accountability for
serious violations of international humanitarian law that occurred before UNTAET
was established, as well as such crimes committed following the creation of
UNTAET.47
As in Kosovo, an accountability crisis was rapidly developing. The capacity
of the local judiciary was perhaps even weaker than in Kosovo. Very few East
Timorese were trained as lawyers at all, and those that were had no government
experience, as most civil service posts had been reserved for Indonesians.48 The
physical infrastructure of the country had been almost completely destroyed during
the period of looting prior to the arrival of the multi-national force.49 Militia
members suspected of committing mass atrocities were being held in makeshift

41. UNMIK Reg. 1999/24, U.N. Interim Adm. Mission in Kosovo (1999) available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg24-99.htm (last visited).; UNMIK Reg. 1999/25, U.N.
Interim Adm. Mission in Kosovo (1999) available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/
1999/reg25-99.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
42. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supranote 21, at 46 & n.2.
43. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-General,
UN Doc. A/54/726-S/2000/59.
44. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1264 (1999).
45. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1272 (1999).
46. See id.; see also UNTAET Mandate, U.N. Trans'l Adm. in East Timor (1999), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetM.htm (last visited Oct 21, 2002).
47. See S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 45.
48. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 50.
49. See id. at 57.
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prison facilities.50 Yet, if no domestic court system existed to allow for meaningful
trials, unlike Kosovo no international court existed either. There was no
counterpart to the ICTY with jurisdiction over East Timor, and while many voices
within the international community and within East Timor have called for the
creation of such a court," the establishment of one seems highly unlikely. 2 In
addition, the members of the Indonesian military suspected of committing
atrocities were not within the jurisdiction of East Timor, and while the newly
democratic Indonesian government has conducted some trials, 3 these trials have
been severely compromised and subject to widespread criticism. 54 Under these
circumstances, the possibility of establishing hybrid courts looked particularly
attractive. The Kosovo experience may have shaped the thinking of UNTAET
officials, as many of the U.N. personnel in UNTAET had spent time in UNMIK."5
Ultimately, UNTAET established a process under which "serious crimes"
were to be tried before three-judge panels, comprised of two international judges
and one East Timorese judge, sitting within the jurisdiction of the District Court of
Dili. 56 "Serious crimes" were defined as "war crimes," "crimes against humanity,"
and "genocide," as well as murder, sexual offenses, and torture, insofar as the latter
50. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 57.
51. See, e.g., Joaquim Fonseca & Yaya San Hak, Prosecution of Crimes under an International
Justice Process, compiled in Justice and Accountability in East Timor: International Tribunals and
Other Options, Report of a one-day seminar in Dili, East Timor, Oct. 16, 2001, at
http://etan.orgilh/misc/justconf4.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002); see also Charles Scheiner, U.N. Rep.
Int'l Fed. for East Timor, Letter to Kofi Annan on the Anniversary of East Timor's Vote Calls for
International Tribunal, Aug. 30, 2001, at http://etan.org/ifet/ifetrib.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
52. See, e.g., Michael J. Jordan, Hopes Dim for International Tribunal in Thoenes Case,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 25, 2002, at 7.

53. See, e.g., UN. Administrator ofE. Timor faults Indonesian Tribunal, ASIAN POL. NEWS, May
7,2001.
54. For a discussion of the Indonesian trials and their deficiencies, see Laura A. Dickinson, The
Dance of Complementarity: Relationships Among Domestic, International, and Transnational
Accountability Mechanisms in East Timor and Indonesia in AVENUES TO ACCOUNTABILITY: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES To ATROCITIES (Jane Stromseth ed. forthcoming 2003).

55. For example, Hansjdrg Strohmeyer, who served as the legal adviser to the special
representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo from June to August 1999, also served as the acting
principal legal adviser to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor from October
1999 to February 2000 and then as deputy principal legal adviser to the mission until June 2000. See
Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 63 n. al.
56. See Section 10 of UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/11 on the Organization of Courts in East
Timor available at http://www.un.org/peaceletimor/untaetR/Regl l.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2002)
[hereinafter Regulation No. 2000/111, which gives to the Dili District Court exclusive jurisdiction over
the most serious crimes, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Regulation No.
2000/11 is further supported by UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with
Exclusive Jurisdiction for Serious Crimes, promulgated on June 6, 2000 available at
http:llwww.un.org/peaceletimor/untaetR/RegOOI5.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2002). For an analysis of
these provisions and the mixed tribunals they establish, see Suzannah Linton, Risingfrom the Ashes: the
Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice System in East Timor, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 122, 145-73 (2001);
Strohmeyer, Multilateral Interventions and Collapse, supra note 19; Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Benevolent
Despotism: A Critique of UN. State-Building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1101 (2001);
see also UNTAET Press Office, Fact Sheet 7, Justice and Serious Crimes, Dec 2001, available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/fact/fs7.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
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three crimes were committed between January 1, 1999, and October 25, 1999.5
were again drawn from other countries, as well as the
Prosecutors and investigators
58
local population.

By June of 2002, the serious crimes unit had issued forty-two indictments for
112 individuals and obtained twenty-four convictions.59 Some criticized the initial
indictments, most of which did not include charges of crimes against humanity,
because such comparatively "minor" indictments failed to capture the magnitude
of the crimes committed or the link to the Indonesian forces. 60 However, crimes
against humanity charges have now been brought in a number of cases and have
been added in several cases that initially involved only charges of individual
crimes such as murder. 61 The next major trial to occur will involve charges of
crimes against humanity, including acts of imprisonment, torture, inhumane acts,
persecutions, three rapes, and four murders in a series of incidents that allegedly
took play between May and September 1999 in the Lolotoe area near the West
Timor border. Two of the three accused are alleged to have been commanders of
the Kaer Metin Merah Putih militia, and the third was a former village chief. The
trial began on March 4, 2002, and is proceeding at the time of the writing of this
Essay, although it has been suspended several times due to staffing and other
problems.62 The serious crimes unit continues to be hampered by lack of funding,
inexperienced personnel, and vacancies in key positions. For example, the
appellate panel currently cannot function because too few judges have been hired,
and the trial courts have had to suspend proceedings periodically because of a lack
of personnel.63 Nevertheless, despite these problems, trials are proceeding, and it
appears that the hybrid court will continue to play a significant role in the process
of accountability for human rights abuses, even now that East Timor has gained
independence.
II. Analysis of the Advantages and Disadvantages of Hybrid Courts
57. Regulation No. 2000/11 supra note 56.
58. See, e.g., Strohmeyer, Multilateral Interventions, supra note 21, at 118; Sharifah al-Attas,
Picking Up the Pieces, THE NEW STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at 8 (interview with Malaysian
prosecutor who works for the Serious Crimes Unit Prosecution office noting that other prosecutors
come from Burundi, the United States, England, Brazil, Sri Lanka, and Canada); see also UNTAET
Daily Press Briefing (Jan. 9, 2002), available at www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/db090102.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2002) (announcing arrival of Siri Frigaard, from Norway, to take the position as the new
chief prosecutor for the serious crimes unit).
59. Judicial System Monitoring Program, Summary of Serious Crimes Cases, available at
www.jsmp.minihub.org/trialsnew/htm [hereinafter Summary of Serious Crimes Cases].
60. See, e.g., Linton, ProsecutingAtrocities, supranote 56; Human Rights Watch, Human Rights
Watch World Report 2002: Asia: East Timor, available at http://hrw.org/wr2k2/asia5.html (last visited
Dec. 26, 2002).
61. Summary of Serious Crimes Cases, supra note 59.
62. Id.
63. For an overview of the shortfalls of the special panels, caused in part by scarce resources, see
Richard Dicker, Mike Jendrzejczk & Joanna Weschler, Human Rights Watch, East Timor: Special
Panelsfor Serious Crimes, Aug, 6, 2002, available at http://hrw.org/press/2002/08/etimor-ltr0806.htm
(last visited Dec. 26, 2002); see also David Cohen, Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor
ISSUES available at
Tribunal Really a Model for the Future, ASIA PACIFIC
http://www.ewc.hawaii.edu/stored/pdfs/api061 .pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2002).
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The process leading to the establishment of the hybrid domestic-international
courts in East Timor and Kosovo, while somewhat improvised and seriously
under-funded, nonetheless reveals a few potentially enduring positive attributes of
this newly-emerging form of accountability. Of course, the success of any effort to
confront past atrocities, whether through criminal trials, truth commissions, civil
compensation schemes, vetting of public officials, or some combination thereof,
will depend on the particular social, political, and cultural context. The need for
such an effort to confront the past, and the role it might play in establishing peace
and democratic institutions of governance likewise varies considerably depending
on the unique circumstances of each case: there are no cookie-cutter solutions to
these highly complex problems. The Kosovo and East Timor cases share enough
similarities, however, that one can use them to draw a few tentative conclusions
about the promise that mixed tribunals hold in other settings.
Until recently, the primary mechanisms for imposing individual criminal
responsibility for grave human rights abuses fell into two categories. Either new
regimes attempted domestic trials, or the international community established
international tribunals to hold wrongdoers accountable. Both of these approaches,
however, have significant limitations. Such limitations can be conceptualized
along two axes: first, problems of legitimacy, and second, problems of capacitybuilding. Focusing on the lessons learned from Kosovo and East Timor, this Part
first outlines the problems of both purely domestic and purely international
tribunals, and then suggests ways in which hybrid domestic-international courts
might address some of these problems.
A. Legitimacy Problems
In some circumstances, hybrid domestic-international courts may have greater
legitimacy in the adjudication of serious human rights crimes than either purely
domestic trials, on the one hand, or purely international processes on the other. In
post-conflict situations, the legitimacy of domestic institutions is often in question.
Of course, the precise nature of the legitimacy crisis varies and is inseparable from
the unique history and culture of a given society.
Moreover, different
constituencies viewing the work of any court system may have different ideas
about what constitutes its legitimacy. For example, the factors that establish
legitimacy for national communities may be quite different from those that
underpin legitimacy in the eyes of an international community standing outside a
country and judging its legal process. It is beyond the scope of this brief Essay to
provide a comprehensive overview of the various types of legitimacy problems
facing juridical institutions in post-conflict societies.
Nonetheless, in most cases, to the extent that democratic institutions exist at
all, they typically will have suffered severely during the conflict. With respect to
the judiciary, the physical infrastructure often will have sustained extensive,
crippling damage. In addition, the personnel are often likely to be severely
compromised or lacking in essential skills. Judges and prosecutors may remain in
place from the prior regime that may have backed the commission of widespread
atrocities; the state may continue to employ those who failed to prosecute or
convict murderers or torturers or ethnic cleansers. Alternatively, the new regime
may replace the old personnel almost completely, resulting in an enormous skills
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and experience deficit, as well as the danger of show trials and overly zealous
prosecution for past crimes.
Kosovo and East Timor might be said to represent one type of extreme case.
In both, after the period of conflict that produced mass atrocities, no fully
functioning domestic institutions existed. Indeed, the lack of domestic institutions
led the international community, with the support of large segments of the local
population, to establish an interim transitional administration, run by the U.N. The
purpose of this interim governing entity was to restore peace and stability and to
develop the democratic institutions, including a fully-functioning judiciary,
necessary to pave the way for self-governance. In such circumstances, there is no
clear way to legitimize institutions through a normal political process. Not only is
there no functioning court system, but there are no other political institutions,
executive or legislative, to establish such a system. And if the lack of formal,
institutional legitimacy is difficult to confer on a fledgling justice system, the
establishment of informal legitimacy-broad societal acceptance of institutionsis even more difficult to establish.
Moreover, in both Kosovo and East Timor, not only was the physical
infrastructure of the legal system severely damaged by the conflict, but the system
was also tainted by the former oppressive regime, undermining public confidence
in, and the broad societal legitimacy of, the system as a whole. Indeed, the justice
systems were run by perceived oppressors, Serbs in the former case and
Indonesians in the latter. 64 Ethnic Albanians were systematically excluded from
the system in Kosovo as were East Timorese in East Timor.65
Even if a new local system can be established quickly, over-correction for
these imbalances can create new problems. In the case of Kosovo, for example,
after the conflict, it was easier to appoint ethnic Albanian judges than ethnic
Serbian judges. Only a few Serbian judges were willing to serve, and, responding
to pressure from Belgrade, even those who had been appointed stepped down in
protest. 66
Yet without representation of Serbs within the judiciary, the
independence of the decision-making, key to legitimacy among the entire local
population, was severely in question.67 In fact, several judgments imposed against
Serbian defendants by panels of ethnic Albanian judges were later thrown out by
panels that included international judges, due to concerns about lack of due process
and insufficient evidence.68 In East Timor, this was less of a problem because
most of the Indonesians had left, and the overwhelming majority of the population
remaining after the conflict was pro-independence Timorese. 69 Nonetheless, a
64. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supranote 21, at 48-50.
65. See id. at 48-53.
66. March 2002 OSCE Report, supra note 31, at 5.
67. See Andrew McKay, JudicialAffairs: DeliveringEffective Law and Order, Focus Kosovo,
Oct. 2001, at http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/oct01/focusklawl.htm (last visited Oct. 21,
2002); Multi-Ethnic Justice, Focus KOSOVO, Dec. 2001, http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/
dec01/focuskchron.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2001).
68. Detentions: A Tale of Two Prison Groups, FOCUS Kosovo, Feb. 2002, at
http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/feb02/focusklawl .htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
69. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 50-53.
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small segment of the population supported only limited autonomy for East Timor
under the authority of Indonesia, 70 and many of those individuals were the ones to
be put on trial for committing atrocities. 7' Thus, serious questions were raised
about whether they could receive a fair trial under the newly-created Timorese
system. Given these circumstances, in both Kosovo and East Timor, there was
little ability for the local justice system to deliver verdicts perceived to be
legitimate in trials of those suspected of committing mass atrocities.
At the same time, the legitimacy of purely international processes is often
difficult to establish. In the case of Kosovo, an international tribunal-the ICTYdid exist as a forum to try those few individuals responsible for the most egregious
atrocities. Yet this institution was ill-equipped to address more than a handful of
cases, as international courts undoubtedly always will be. Moreover, establishing
the legitimacy of an international institution within a country that did not support
its creation is quite difficult. The ICTY was established by Security Council
resolution, without the consent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 72 In light of
the continuing ethnic tensions within the region, the creation of an international
court based at the Hague, removed from the scene of the atrocities and run by
international judges and staff, may have been necessary to create the kind of
independence that would be required to impose individual criminal responsibility
for atrocities on such a large scale. Certainly many segments of the local
population, particularly the predominantly Muslim and Croat victims of the
atrocities, supported the work of the ICTY.73 Yet support within the Serbian
population of any of the countries and regions that now comprise what was the
former Yugoslavia has been more difficult. 74 And within all ethnic groups, the
work of the court is often misunderstood.75 In addition, some consider the ICTY
European powers and the United States and thereby
an imposition of Western
76
tainted by imperialism.
A recent empirical study of the perceptions of the ICTY within Bosnia and
Herzegovina illustrates the point. 77 The study indicates that a wide cross-section of
lawyers and judges from all ethnic groups and playing different roles within
Bosnian society were ill-informed about the ICTY's work, and were often
suspicious of its motives and its results. 78 Possible reasons for this lack of
legitimacy include the location of the tribunal in the Netherlands, far from the local
70. See Beauvais, supranote 56, at 1119-20.
71. Most of the atrocities were committed by pro-autonomy (anti-independence) militias, backed
by Indonesian authorities. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 46.
72. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993); S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
73. See The Human Rights Center and the International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of
California, Berkeley, & the Centre for Human Rights, University of Sarajevo, Justice, Accountability,
and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 102, 127-36 (2000) [hereinafter Joint Study].
74. See id. at 129-33.
75. See Joint Study, supra note 73 at 136-39.
76. See id. at 143-47.
77. See id. at 102.
78. See id. at 136-40.
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population, the failure of the ICTY to publicize its work within Bosnia, particularly
within the legal community, the lack of participation of local actors, even as
observers, and the use of predominantly common-law approaches to criminal
justice that were unfamiliar to local legal professionals, trained in a civil law
tradition.79 While no such study exists for Kosovo, similar problems might be
expected there. Of course, over time, the perceived legitimacy of the ICTY may
change as new generations of opinion-makers in the former Yugoslavia come to
view the conflict and its aftermath in new ways. Indeed, the norms articulated by
the ICTY may play a role in shaping such popular perceptions. Nevertheless, at
least in the short term, the ICTY must grapple with ongoing local resistance.
In the case of East Timor, no international tribunal existed to handle even the
most egregious cases. While many voices, both domestic and international, called
for such a tribunal in the immediate aftermath of the atrocities of 1999, the chance
that one will be established is minimal.80
It would be too simple to say that international tribunals have legitimacy with
respect to the international community, but not with respect to local populations.
In fact, the story is always much more complicated. Many segments of the local
population, as in the case of Kosovo and East Timor, often strongly support
international justice in the wake of mass atrocities. Moreover, the international
community does not always support the establishment of such institutions, and
when it does, it is hard to say that there is one, monolithic international
community. In truth there are multiple international communities-for example,
communities of nation-states (such as U.N. members, Security Council members,
NATO countries, the Council of Europe, and the Organization of American
States), communities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (such as human
rights NGOs, humanitarian NGOs, or development NGOs), or communities of
other actors such as corporations, academics, and on and on. Indeed, the division
between the international and the local may make little sense in the globalized era,
when international NGOs partner with local NGOs, foreign governments give aid
to local civil society organizations, and public policy networks routinely bridge
gaps between local and international actors.
Nonetheless, despite these
complexities, it does appear that international courts such as the ICTY face greater
obstacles in establishing local legitimacy in the places from which the accused
perpetrators come than in establishing legitimacy within broader international
communities.
B. Capacity-building problems
Purely domestic and purely international institutions also often fail to promote
local capacity-building processes. In post-conflict situations, the need to develop
local capacity in the justice sector is often an urgent problem. Kosovo and East
Timor provide extreme examples. In both cases, the conflict virtually eliminated
the physical infrastructure of the judiciary; court buildings, prisons, and equipment

79. See Joint Study, supra note 73 at 14447.
80. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 52.
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were destroyed. 8' But even more devastating than the physical loss was the loss in
human resources. In Kosovo, only Serbs had the experience and training to work
as judges and prosecutors, yet these Serbs often refused to work in the new system
because doing so would constitute a betrayal of their ethnic heritage. 8 2 Albanians
had some training but little experience, because they had been almost completely
excluded from the system for many years. 83 In East Timor, the capacity deficit
was even more severe, as the Indonesians, who had staffed the judiciary and had
essentially excluded the local Timorese from serving, had evacuated, and few
Timorese had any legal training or experience.84 Indeed, no East Timorese judges
or prosecutors existed until UNTAET made its first appointments in 2000.85 Under
such circumstances, a domestic system cannot be established for a significant
period of time, due to extreme lack of capacity in the local sector.
A purely international process that excludes local participation does not help
build local capacity. An international court staffed by foreigners, or a justice
system run by the U.N. transitional administration, also staffed by foreigners, does
little to train local actors in necessary skills. In short, local actors cannot run the
system themselves, but a system run by the international community does not help
improve the capacity of the local population.
C. Advantages of Mixed tribunals
Mixed tribunals, as suggested by their use in Kosovo and East Timor, can
offer at least partial responses to both these legitimacy and capacity problems. The
sharing of responsibilities among international and local actors in the
administration of justice, particularly with respect to accountability for serious
human rights crimes, can help to establish the legitimacy of the process as well as
strengthen the capacity of local actors.
In Kosovo and East Timor, the addition of international judges and
prosecutors to cases involving serious human rights abuses may have enhanced the
legitimacy of the process, at least to some degree, both with respect to the local
population and the international community. In both Kosovo and East Timor, the
initial failure of U.N. authorities to consult with the local population in making
governance decisions generally, and decisions about the judiciary specifically,
sparked public outcry. Without normal political processes in place, of course,
consultation is inherently difficult. When no elected officials exist to give advice,
and civil society is badly damaged by years of oppression and conflict, there are no
easy answers to the question of who should be consulted without creating
impressions of bias. Nonetheless, in both circumstances, the appointment of
foreign judges to domestic courts to sit alongside local judges, and the appointment
of foreign prosecutors to team up with local prosecutors, helped to create a
framework for consultation that may have enhanced the general perception of the

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 49-51.
See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 49-51.
See id.
See id. at 50.
See Linton, supra note 56, at 133-34.
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institution's legitimacy.
By working together and sharing responsibilities,
officials
necessarily consulted with each other.
and
local
international
At the same, time the appointment of international judges to the local courts
in these highly sensitive cases helped to enhance the perception of the
independence of the judiciary and therefore its legitimacy within a broad crosssection of the local population. In Kosovo this was most apparent, as the previous
attempts at domestic justice had failed to win any support among Serbs. 6 Indeed,
Serbian judges refused to cooperate in the administration of justice, and the
verdicts in the cases tried by ethnic Albanians were regarded by the ethnic Serbian
population as tainted. 7 In contrast, the verdicts of the hybrid tribunals garnered
some support, even among Serbs.88
The sharing of responsibilities among local and international officials is not a
Indeed, such hybrid
complete cure for legitimacy problems, of course.
the process.
controlling
about
who
is
really
new
questions
relationships can raise
the
than
local
officials-when
When international actors wield more power
when
the
local
for
example,
or
is
international,
majority of judges on a given panel
prosecutors merely serve as deputies to international prosecutors-some may
charge that the international actors control the process, and that such control
smacks of imperialism. In East Timor, some local actors involved in the criminal
justice process criticized the mixed tribunal on these grounds.89 On the other hand,
too little international control may lead to concerns about the independence and
impartiality of overly locally-controlled processes. 90 And the devil is, of course,
often in these details. Nonetheless, the shared arrangement does offer more
promise of working out these difficulties than a purely international or a purely
domestic process.
The mixed process offers advantages in the arena of capacity-building as well.
The side-by-side working arrangements allow for on-the job training that is likely
to be more effective than abstract classroom discussions of formal legal rules and
principles. 9' And the teamwork can allow for sharing of experiences and
knowledge in both directions. International actors have the opportunity to gain
greater sensitivity to local issues, local culture, and local approaches to justice at
the same time that local actors can learn from international actors.
To be sure, hybrid courts face difficulties in capacity-building. A lack of
resources has proven to be the most serious problem so far. In both Kosovo and
East Timor, the hybrid courts have been given an enormous mandate without

86. March 2002 OSCE Report, supra note 31 at 6.

87. See id. at 5-6.
88. See id.
89. See Linton, supra note 56, at 150.

90. See March 2002 OSCE Report, supra note 31, at 6. Efforts to establish a mixed tribunal in
Cambodia initially stalled due to an inability to agree about the balance of international and local
control. See Seth Mydans, U.N. Ends Cambodia Talks on Trialsfor Khmer Rouge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2002, at A4. Nevertheless, an accord has now been reached. See Seth Mydans, UN. and Cambodia
Reach an Accordfor Khmer Rouge Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,2003, at A5.
91. See Beauvais, supra note 56, at 1157-1159.
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receiving sufficient funding to carry out that mandate. Court personnel lack even
the most basic equipment necessary for them to do their jobs, translators and other
administrative personnel are in short supply, and, perhaps most significantly, the
courts have had trouble attracting and retaining qualified international personnel to
fill posts as judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. 92 To the extent that hybrid
courts are touted as a means of doing justice on the cheap, and then deprived of
even the most basic resources, they cannot fulfill their potential.
Nonetheless, such concerns about funding are issues more of implementation
than conception. And, of course, lack of resources can be a problem regardless of
the legal framework adopted. In the end, perhaps the greatest indication of the
promise of mixed tribunals is found in the support they garner. The U.N. has
advanced similar efforts elsewhere. After many years of efforts, an accord has
been reached to create a hybrid domestic/international court in Cambodia, 93 and
the project to establish a free-standing hybrid court in Sierra Leone is well
underway. 94 Even within the Bush Administration, which is generally resistant to
the idea of international justice, there is strong support for mixed domesticinternational tribunals such as the proposed special court for Sierra Leone.
III. Hybrid Courts in Afghanistan?
The potential of hybrid courts to address some of the problems of
accountability for mass atrocities in settings such as Kosovo and East Timor
suggests that such courts could at least be considered in other circumstances. Of
course, there are no uniform solutions to difficult problems of transitional justice,
and a mechanism that has found success in one context cannot simply be imported
to another. The outlook for the use of such courts is promising, however, and
should be considered in future post-conflict situations. This last Part considers
whether the use of such courts might make sense in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, as in Kosovo and East Timor, the international community
intervened to help a country make a transition to democracy after a period of
oppression and widespread human rights abuses. Of course, in Afghanistan, the
primary motivation for the international intervention was to halt the terrorist
activities of the al Qaeda network, which was extensively supported by the Taliban
regime. Although the Taliban committed human rights abuses on a grand scale for
many years, it was only after the attacks of September 11th that a U.S.-led
multilateral military force intervened in the country, putting an end to the regime.
Moreover, the ongoing commitment of the U.S. to nation-building in Afghanistan,
in the wake of the military intervention, remains unclear. 95 Nonetheless, U.S.
92. See, e.g., Beauvais, supra note 56, at 1160; Dickinson, supra note 54; Linton, supra note 56,
at 149; Kosovo's War Crimes Trials,supra note 32.
93. See Mydans, UN. and Cambodia Reach an Accord for Khmer Rouge Trial,supra note 90, at
A5.
94. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000),
available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N0O/605/32/PDF/N0060532.pdf (last visited
Oct. 21, 2002).
95. In April, Bush appeared to reverse his pre-September I1"' opposition to nation-building when
he called for a new Marshall Plan to rebuild Afghanistan. See James Dao, Bush Sets Role for US. in
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officials, as well as those from other governments who participated in the military
intervention, and the international community more broadly, support efforts to
promote peace and build democratic institutions in Afghanistan, goals similar to
those articulated in Kosovo and East Timor. % If for no other reason, there is a
widespread consensus that building rule of law in Afghanistan will make the
region a less fertile breeding ground for future generations of terrorists.97
Indeed, the goals of promoting peace in Afghanistan by supporting the justice
sector and ensuring accountability for human rights crimes intersect and overlap
with the fight against terrorism. Establishment of rule of law institutions is critical
to building a society where terrorism is an unacceptable option. Moreover, the
attacks of September 11 th could themselves be characterized as crimes against
humanity, serious violations of international law that warrant individual criminal
accountability.
As in Kosovo and East Timor, the success of these rule of law efforts depends
on the establishment and development of a functioning judicial system. While the
international community is not itself taking temporary charge of the civil
administration, international support for the local justice system will be critical to
ensuring its effectiveness. An important task for Afghan courts will be to hold
those on all sides accountable for violations of the laws of armed conflict, as well
as to try those responsible for serious crimes and human rights violations during
the Taliban regime. Meaningful accountability and fair proceedings will not be
possible without a significant contribution of funding and expertise by the
international community. As part of that effort, a hybrid court, with domestic
Afghan judges sitting alongside judges from other countries, could be established
to try those accused of human rights crimes and violations of the laws of armed
conflict.
The experience of using such courts in Kosovo and East Timor, where the
hybrid process may have helped to address some of the legitimacy problems of
purely international or purely local justice, suggests that they hold promise in a
place such as Afghanistan where external solutions are often greeted with
suspicion, but internal solutions are not workable. Like Kosovo and East Timor,
there is a growing accountability crisis, with thousands of suspects imprisoned
around the country in makeshift jails in poor conditions. 98 The United States took

Afghan Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Dao, Bush Sets Role]. In practical
terms, however, it is far from clear that the administration is actively supporting robust nation-building.
For example, the administration has not supported the expansion of the international security force in
Afghanistan, currently only operating within Kabul, even though Afghan President Karzai and many
humanitarian groups say such expansion is necessary for peace, security, and reconstruction of the
country. James Dao, Lawmakers Urge Bush to ExpandAfghan Force Beyond Kabul, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 2002, at Al1 [hereinafter Dao, Lawmakers Urge Bush].
96. See Dao, Bush Sets Role, supra note 95.
97. See Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, Remarks at
Symposium, Reluctant Nation-Building: Securing the Rule of Law in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 17
CONN. J. INT'L L. 433 (2002).
98. David Johnston & James Risen, US. Seeks DNA of All Captives in Afghan War, N.Y. TIMES,
March 3, 2002, at Al (noting that 7,500-8,000 captured fighters are being held throughout
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several hundred of these suspects into custody and brought them to Guantanamo
naval base, 99 but it is estimated that many more remain detained in Afghanistan.' °°
Their ongoing detention will undoubtedly continue to contribute to instability and
unrest within Afghanistan, and it is unclear to what extent there are reasonable
grounds to believe the detainees actually engaged in violations of international
humanitarian law, committed human rights crimes, or were involved in terrorist
acts, and to what extent they simply were captured as Taliban fighters. Yet the
release of the suspects, without investigation or trial, could lead to even greater
unrest.
In addition, such hybrid courts could aid in capacity-building. Currently,
there is no centralized Afghan justice system. Justice in Afghanistan has been
predominantly local, religious and tribal, in large part because the central state was
weak and the country was in a virtually perpetual state of conflict for decades. ° l
In addition, as in Kosovo and East Timor, the physical infrastructure of the court
system has been decimated by conflict. 10 2 And during the Taliban regime, as in the
regimes in Kosovo and East Timor prior to international intervention, large
segments of the population have been excluded from the legal system. 10 3 As a
result, the court system is extremely weak, and there is little prospect for trial of
these suspects in state-run courts.1°4
Accordingly, an international-domestic hybrid court will be necessary if for
no other reason than the sheer numbers of people awaiting trial. Moreover, as the
Kosovo and East Timor experiences have made clear, support for the establishment
of a strong judiciary is an essential foundation for lasting peace. 10 5 A hybrid
domestic/international structure for some courts and for some prosecution efforts
helps to provide both a vehicle for training of, and consultation with, the local
population and helps to establish a degree of independence in cases involving
intense ethnic conflicts and rivalries. Such a model may well be highly useful in
Afghanistan, and important lessons can be learned from mistakes in Kosovo and
East Timor. Certainly, in order to be successful, significant financial resources are
required.
Finally, such a hybrid judicial process could provide the best way of assuring
accountability and providing for a measure of deterrence for terrorism, human
rights crimes, and violations of the laws of armed conflict. Moreover, while the
United States might be unlikely to accept such a process for trying Taliban or al
Qaeda leaders, it might be willing to accept and support such trials for low-level
Afghanistan).
99. See 34 More Detainees,supranote 1.
100. See Johnston & Risen, supra note 98.
101. See William Spencer, Remarks at Symposium, Reluctant Nation-Building: Securing the Rule
of Law in Post-TalibanAfghanistan, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 445 (2002).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.; see also U.S. INST. OF PEACE, REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR
RESTORING SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW, January 15, 2002, at http://www.usip.org/
roI/afghan mainreporthtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
105. See Betts et al., supra note 21.
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Taliban or al Qaeda operatives.
I should note that I am not suggesting that hybrid domestic-international
tribunals could be, or should be, the only forum in which to hold suspected
terrorists accountable for their actions. Other domestic, transnational, and
international accountability mechanisms still have a role to play. Indeed, as noted
previously, if a hybrid court in Afghanistan were established, it would probably be
best-suited for trying lower-level al Qaeda and Taliban operatives for crimes
committed on Afghan soil (or with at least a link to Afghanistan). As between a
hybrid court within Afghanistan and other Afghani courts, distinctions could be
based on the types of crimes committed, using the East Timor and Kosovo models.
Relevant crimes might include crimes against humanity, violations of the laws of
armed conflict, and perhaps crimes of international terrorism as defined under
existing terrorism conventions. Because the hybrid court could also serve the goal
of ensuring more general accountability for serious human rights abuses committed
before or during the Taliban regime, as well as abuses associated with the Northern
Alliance insurgency itself, the court should have a relatively broad mandate to hear
other Afghanistan-based human rights crimes as well.
More broadly, this brief discussion of mixed domestic-international tribunals
demonstrates one way in which the growing scholarship on transitional justice may
be useful in considering various approaches to the task of ensuring accountability
for terrorism and assessing the importance and impact of such approaches.
Transitional justice scholars have amassed a body of knowledge concerning the
wide variety of mechanisms both for establishing rule of law institutions that will
be broadly accepted as legitimate and helping to develop the capacity of local
justice systems, all while trying to secure the stability of a fragile new regime.
This body of knowledge is a crucial resource in efforts to combat terrorism
because it is only through a combination of accountability and the establishment of
rule of law that we will have a chance of holding the forces of terror in check. As
we consider various models of justice in the aftermath of the September 11 th
attacks, the lessons learned elsewhere about forging justice after mass atrocity
provide a fertile ground for creative innovation.

AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL*
Following the September 11th attacks in the United States (U.S.), one could make
a case for America's use of force in Afghanistan as a lawful exercise of the right of
self-defense.' But the proposals to invade Iraq following September 11th cannot
be so defended. Those proposals did not concern defending the basic security of
the U.S. in the sense that basic security defense is currently understood in the
international community. They concerned, rather, defense of a more expansive
concept of security, a concept wherein the U.S. need not tolerate antagonistic
regimes with the potential to harm U.S. interests. The invasion plans represent a
view that the United States is a privileged nation with more rights than others. 2
Under this view, the United States may invade Iraq and remove Iraq's leader,
Saddam Hussein, because he poses an indefinite future threat, the type of threat a
superpower need not live with, though all other states must.
The belief in American exceptionalism has been part of American thinking
since the country's founding. Officials in the Reagan Administration, especially
Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson, applied this thinking to international law
rules on the use of force.4 The belief also appears in the Clinton Administration
policies of Madeleine Albright and William Cohen regarding the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and its right to use force without United Nations
(U.N.) Security Council authorization.5 American exceptionalism is fully evident
on the part of those who proposed invading Iraq in the aftermath of September
11th, especially Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Cheney. The position taken by other
governments - that an invasion of Iraq without Security Council authorization
would be an act of aggression - has not been answered by the Bush
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Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under InternationalLaw, 25
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 559 (2002); Thomas M. Franck, Terrorismand the Right of Self-Defense, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 839 (2001); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Responses to Terrorism, JURIST, Sept. 18,
2001 available at http://www.jurist.law.pittedu/forum (last visited September 3, 2002).
2. See generally Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 843 (2001).
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Administration. 6 A justification under law was not part of the Administration's
public position when it began discussing an invasion.7
This is one of the rare occasions since the adoption of the U.N. Charter that
the United States has been so disinterested in international law as to not provide an
explanation as to how a major use of armed force would comply with the law.
Another time was in 1999 in respect to the bombing of Yugoslavia. 8 The
significance of this is not that the United States has always acted consistently with
international law and now suddenly it is not. The United States has plainly
violated international law on the use of force in the past. The difference is that
now the prevailing view sees no need to offer explanations. The United States
need not show how it has acted consistently with the principles of the community.
The United States is above the law. That is a significant departure from the past
that may well have serious negative consequences for future legal restraints on the
use of force.
This paper is about the current and future law of self-defense. It applies the
law to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and to a proposed invasion of
Iraq in light of the circumstances prevailing in Spring 2002. The analysis shows
that while Enduring Freedom was arguably lawful, an invasion of Iraq would
indeed be an act of aggression. The discussion then turns to the impact an
invasion, or even the planning for an invasion, would have on the legal regime for
restraining force. Because international law's structure is based on the members'
equality under the law, 9 treating the United States exceptionally in a matter as
grave as an unlawful invasion will have serious consequences for the future legal
regime for restraining the use of force. The thesis of this paper is not necessarily
to defend the old order. The aim is a more modest one: pointing out how that order
is changing.
I.

THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE

International law generally prohibits the use of force except in self-defense or
with the authorization of the U.N. Security Council. 10 The right of self-defense
6. Neil MacFarquhar, Arabs Approve an Offer to Israel With Conditions It has Rejected, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at Al.
7. One of the most complete accounts of what invasion planners had in mind as of Spring 2002 is
found in Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, U.S. Envisions Blueprint on Iraq Including Big Invasion
Next Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at 1.
8. The bombing began March 24, 1999. No official legal position was presented. The State
Department Legal Adviser's Office did put forward a more general statement about the legality of the
bombing May 11 at the International Court of Justice in arguing the Court had no jurisdiction in a case
brought by Yugoslavia. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. Pleadings (Verbatim
Record: Request for the indication of provisional measures), para. 1.7 (11 May 1999), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iyall/iyall-cr/iyalliyusicr99241999051 l.html (last visited
September 27, 2002).
9. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 1 59 Stat. 1031. T.S. No. 993,3 Bevans 1153, amended24 U.S.T.
2225, T.I.A.S. 7739 [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER].
10. The most basic principle regulating the use of force in international law, refers only to "force"
and not to "armed force":
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allows the use of an armed force against an armed attacker when that force can
prevent future attacks and is proportional to the threat. These circumstances
arguably existed on October 7, 2001, when the United States and the United
Kingdom launched Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
The necessary
circumstances did not exist in Spring 2002 when the Bush administration openly
discussed invading Iraq. A state may still use force when conditions do not permit
self-defense, if the U.N. Security Council authorizes the force." But in the case of
Iraq, no sufficient authorization existed when the plan to invade was formed. The
discussion below begins with self-defense, then turns to the U.N. Security Council
authorization.
A. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE

An armed response in self-defense is lawful when four conditions are met:
I. An armed attack has occurred;
2.

The response is aimed at the armed attacker;

3.

The response has the purpose of preventing future attacks;

4.

The response is12necessary to remove the threat and is proportional in the
circumstances.

United Nation Charter Article 51 mandates that force in self-defense may only be
used to respond to an armed attack. 13 The International Court of Justice
[hereinafter ICJ] in the Nicaragua Case in 1986 provided an authoritative
interpretation of Article 51.14 The Court found the "attack" refers only to acts in
Article 51 which could amount to an actual armed attack. Moreover, such acts
must amount to significant force. The Court, relying on the General Assembly's
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see also generally on use of force: YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION
AND SELF-DEFENSE (3d ed. 2001); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
(2000); HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT
(1992); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963).
11. U.N. CHARTER art. 51
12. But see Robert F. Teplitz, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United States
Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush?, 28
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569, 576-583 (1995) (discussing the rules established by the Caroline case and
their interaction with U.N. Charter art. 51).
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
14. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
102 (June 27)[hereinafter Nicaragua].
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Definition of Aggression, held that "'armed attack' means 'sending by or on behalf
of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts
of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to' (inter alia)an
actual armed attack conducted by regular forces...., 5
The Court assessed U.S. claims that the United States used force on the
territory of Nicaragua in lawful collective self-defense of El Salvador. After
considering U.S. arguments that Nicaragua had first used unlawful force, the Court
concluded that the evidence did not prove Nicaragua had first used force
significant enough to trigger lawful collective self-defense.
The facts of Nicaragua did not invite the Court to consider the problem of
when self-defense may actually begin. In the circumstances of the case, attacks
were on-going and the question was one of significance in respect to what the
United States characterized as the first armed attack to trigger the fighting shipments of weapons by the Nicaraguan government to rebels fighting the
government of El Salvador. The Court only had evidence of low-level shipments,
which it found did not amount to an armed attack. 16 We have no judicial decision
on the question of when self-defense to an armed attack may begin. International
lawyers have reached consensus that just as in the case of individual self-defense
in domestic law, the state need not wait to suffer the actual blow before defending
itself, but it must be sure the blow is coming.
The United States and United Kingdom discussed the conditions giving rise to
the right of self-defense in the Caroline Case. 17 They concluded that a state is on
solid legal ground to begin self-defense when the "[n]ecessity of that self-defense
is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation."' 8
In the case of Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the September 11 th attack
was clearly an armed attack that could give rise to self-defense should other
conditions be met. The U.N. Security Council referred in two resolutions to the
right to resort to self-defense in the context of September 11th.' 9 No state argued
that such attacks should not give rise to self-defense.
This is the only event since World War II that has given rise to a U.S. use of
force in its own defense. The United States is justifiably worried about states, like
Iraq, possessing weapons of mass destruction. But mere possession of such
weapons without more is not an act amounting to an armed attack. In the ICJ's
advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons Case, the Court held the use of nuclear
weapons would be unlawful except in "an extreme circumstance of self-defense,"

15. Nicaragua, supra note 14 at 103.
16. Id at 119.
17. JOHN BASSETr MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906); see also
McCouBREY & WHITE, supra note 10, at 91-96; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 150-52 (1995).

18. MOORE, supra note 17, at412.
19. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001); S.C. Res. 1373.
U.N. SCOR 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
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but it could not decide whether the threat to use them would be unlawful. 20 A
fortiori, the mere possession without a threat is not unlawful under general
international law. 21 When Israeli jets bombed a nuclear reactor under construction
22
at Osirik, Iraq in 1981, the U.N. Security Council condemned the bombing,
despite the threat nuclear weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein could pose for
of the
Israel. The Council found "the military attack by Israel in clear violation
23
conduct.,
international
of
norms
the
and
Nations
United
the
of
Charter
Armed attacks, did occur on September 11th, however, so the United States
had the right to take self-defensive measures following that day. It has no right of
self-defense to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. It certainly has no
right of self-defense to attack a state to eliminate persons who might be planning to
possess weapons of mass destruction.
If the requisite armed attack occurs or will occur imminently, the response to
the armed attack must aim at those responsible for the attack. If the response aims
at the territory of a state, that state must be legally responsible for the attack before
it may be targeted in self-defense. Legal responsibility follows if the territorial
state used its own agents to carry out the attack; if it controlled or supported the
attackers; possibly where it failed to control
the attacks; or where it subsequently
24
adopted the acts of the attackers as its own.
The case can be made that the September 11th attackers were so closely
aligned and supported by Afghanistan's de facto leaders, the Taliban, as to give
rise to Afghanistan's responsibility. 25 No comparable case can be made, or indeed,
any case for Iraq's responsibility for September 11 th. In the Spring of 2002, no
evidence of a link had been found. Early reports that an Al-Qaeda member met
with Iraq's ambassador to the Czech Republic before the attack were subsequently
denied by Czech officials.26
Even if a link could be found, the United States also needs clear and
convincing evidence of future attacks. 27 A response in self-defense must be
defensive in nature. It must aim at deterring or degrading offensive capability.
With no evidence of future attacks, responsive armed attacks would only be
unlawful reprisals or punishment.28
The United States had evidence before Operation Enduring Freedom that Al-

20. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 l.C.J. 226 at para. 105 (July

8)[hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
21. Cf.Nuclear Weapons supranote 20..
22. See S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR 2288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (1981).
23. Id.
24. In the Hostages Case, the ICJ found Iran was responsible for the hostage-taking at the U.S.
Embassy because of the "failure on the part of the Iranian authorities to oppose the armed attack by
militants" and "the almost immediate endorsement by those authorities of the situation thus created."
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 42 (May 24).
25. See Beard, supra note 1,at 582-583.
26. Atta's CanceledCzech, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, at A18.
27. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J.OF CONFLICT & SEC. L. 19, 30 (2002).
28. Id. at 29, 30.
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Qaeda planned more attacks. That evidence was confirmed by documents and
video tapes found in Afghanistan during Enduring Freedom. 29 As of Spring 2002,
no evidence linked Iraq to Al-Qaeda and its plans to attack American interests, past
or future.
The final element of lawful self-defense requires that the response be carried
out only if the principles of necessity and proportionality can be respected.
Necessity restricts the use of military force to the attainment of legitimate military
objectives. Proportionality requires that the force needed to attain those military
objectives be weighed against possible civilian casualties. If the loss of innocent
life or destruction of property is out-of-proportion to the importance of the
objective, the objective must be abandoned.3 °
The amount of force used during the first weeks of Enduring Freedom
appeared necessary and proportionate - certainly while the United States restrained
the Northern Alliance from going to Kabul. Secretary Powell indicated that the
United States did not aim to eliminate the Taliban entirely. His approach tracks
the international legal rules. 3'
Degrading the Taliban's offensive ability was a legitimate objective. The care
taken in targeting to avoid civilian casualties kept the force used proportionate.
Changing the government of Afghanistan was arguably not necessary for the
defense of the United States. The United States warned the Northern Alliance not
to enter Kabul, though, in the end, the United States seems to have been overtaken
by events when the Northern Alliance took the city. After the Taliban fell in midDecember, however, the continued use of massive aerial bombardment was
arguably well out-of-proportion to the objective of capturing small groups and
individual Al-Qaeda members scattered in the Afghan mountains. The shift to
ground forces in mid-January was far more protective of civilians.
It is extremely difficult to understand how a massive invasion of Iraq would
meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality. These principles apply
even if the reason for going to war is unlawful. In the case of Iraq, the announced
reason for the invasion is to prevent Saddam Hussein from obtaining weapons of
mass destruction. Experts consistently testify, however, that the robust embargo
on Iraq is preventing the regime from getting the inputs for effective weapons of
mass destruction. An invasion does not appear necessary for the objective.
Continuing with the embargo will not cost the civilian lives of an invasion,

29. Tape Shows Bin Laden Celebrating,WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2001, at C14.
30. Proportionality prohibits force "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, art. 51, para. 5(b), 1152 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1413. "In
the law of armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is based on the fundamental principle that
belligerents do not enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy." Judith Gail
Gardam, Proportionalityand Force in InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391 (1993).
31. Serge Schmemann, UN. Envoy Says All Options are Open on a Post-TalibanAfghanistan,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at B4.
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especially if the embargo is more targeted. Estimates of the deaths from invasion
being suggested in Spring 2002 were in the thousands.3 2 We have a proportionate
way to achieve the objective through an embargo on inputs and verification by
inspections. Arguably some force could be used to get the inspectors back into
Iraq or to protect them once there, though that would really need a Security
Council authorization. [As this article goes to press, the Security Council has
adopted Resolution 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002) authorizing security guards for
inspectors.]
B. Security Council Authorization
The U.N. Security Council has spoken relative to both the use of force in
Afghanistan and Iraq. It had not, however, provided the requisite authorization for
force as of October 7 in Afghanistan or March 2002 in Iraq. This conclusion will
be discussed first before turning to the law of self-defense governing force in the
absence of the Security Council authorization. With regard to September 11th,
Security Council resolutions adopted in the wake of the attacks refer to the right of
self-defense. In particular, Resolution 1373 (September 28) reveals the Council's
consensus as to self-defense and terrorism shortly before Enduring Freedom was
launched:
The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999
and 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001, Reaffirming also its unequivocal
condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took place in New York, Washington,
D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, and expressing its determination to
prevent all such acts, Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in
resolution 1368 (2001), Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in
Nations, threats to international peace
accordance with the Charter of the United
33
and security caused by terrorist acts..

The operative part of the Resolution mandates economic sanctions to combat
terrorism. It does not authorize the use of armed force, nor does it explicitly
authorize the United States to use armed force in self-defense to the September
11 th attacks. As argued above, the Resolution supports the conclusion that the
September 11th attacks were significant enough to trigger the right of self-defense,
if the other conditions of legality are met. In several subsequent resolutions
relating to terrorism and the situation in Afghanistan neither the U.N. Security
Council nor the General Assembly condemned Enduring Freedom as a violation of

32. "But a ground invasion of Iraq might involve hundreds or even thousands of U.S. casualties,
while tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians would certainly have to die before there was any chance of
breaking Saddam's will through bombing alone." Anatole Kaletsky, America is Becoming its Own
Worst Enemy, THE TIMES OF LONDON, Mar. 14, 2002, availableat WL 4190063; Kenneth M. Pollack,
Next Stop Baghdad? United States' Foreign Policy, 81 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 32, 43 (2002) ("The
casualties incurred during such an operation might well be greater than during the Afghan or Gulf Wars,
but they are unlikely to be catastrophic.").
33. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
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the Charter.34 Still, these resolutions are not authorization. Nor do they indicate
that the U.N. Security Council would be taking over America's defense as it may
do under Article 51 and did do regarding Kuwait in the Gulf War.
Indeed, as a result of the Council's active role in the liberation of Kuwait
from Iraq in the Gulf War, it passed numerous resolutions, including, significantly,
Resolution 687.36 Resolution 687 sets out the terms of the cease-fire between the
coalition forces and Iraq. Some scholars have argued that this Resolution
authorizes an invasion of Iraq or at least creates conditions allowing for a lawful
invasion. Professor Yoram Dinstein at the March 2002 Meeting of the American
Society of International Law argued as follows:
As for Iraq, it must be pointed out that the situation there is sui generis. The Gulf

War that began on August 2, 1990 is not over yet. The United States-led
coalition's military actions - conducted in 1991 -were an exercise of collective
self-defense, with the full prior blessing of the Security Council. There was a
cease-fire, which Iraq has consistently breached (by expelling U.N. disarmament
supervisors and otherwise). The United States37can always resume hostilities,
irrespective of the presence of Bin Laden in Iraq.
There are several weaknesses in this argument. First, it is clear that the
Security Council took over the defense of Kuwait, as per Article 51. It ordered
economic sanctions and restricted the onset of hostilities until sanctions had been
given a chance to work. Neither the coalition nor Kuwait itself could start military
action against Iraq until the date set by the U.N. Security Council. The Council did
far more than give the coalition "its blessing." Second, the cease-fire agreement is
plainly between the U.N. Security Council and Iraq, not the coalition and Iraq.
Thus, it is for the U.N. Security Council to determine if it is aggrieved about noncompliance with the terms of the agreement, not the coalition. Finally, Resolution
687 contains enforcement provisions to be used in the case of Iraqi noncompliance. Economic sanctions remain in place until all the terms are met and,
should further action be required, Paragraph 34 of Resolution 687, states that the
Security Council "[d]ecides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further
steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to
secure peace and security in the area.",38 Finally, in the more than ten years since
the liberation of Kuwait, the U.N. Security Council has exercised oversight over

34. See Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 56/88, U.N. GAOR, 56 Sess,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/88 (Jan. 24, 2002); S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 4415th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1378 (2001); S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. SCOR, 4434th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (2001).
35. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The UN. 's
Response to Iraq's Invasion ofKuwait, 15 S. 1ll. U. L. J. 453, 479 (1991).
36. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2871st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1989), available

at 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991).
37. Yoram Dinstein, Remarks, 2002 PROC. ASIL (forthcoming); see also Ruth Wedgwood, The
Enforcement ofSecurity Council Resolution 687: The Threat ofForce Against Iraq 's Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 724 (1998).
38. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 36, at 854.

2002

AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

Iraqi compliance. 39 The coalition is no longer in existence. It ceased to exist with
the adoption of Resolution 687 - its task completed.
When Professor Ruth Wedgwood took a similar position on the meaning of
the unperfected cease-fire she only aimed to defend bombing Iraq, not invading.4 °
Once Kuwait was liberated, the overwhelming consensus was that the war was
over. Iraq and Kuwait normalized diplomatic relations in March 2002, an odd
thing to do in the middle of hostilities.
Even the use of bombing to enforce the secondary aspects of the Gulf War
cease-fire, is highly questionable under our analysis of Resolution 687. When the
United States and United Kingdom bombed Iraq in December 1998, to force
Saddam Hussein to comply with the weapons regime, France, Russia and China all
condemned the action. The United States and United Kingdom have also regularly
used force to police no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. This use of
force would be equally unlawful, except for the fact that for the first year or two
after the adoption of Resolution 687, France, too, joined in this policing and other
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council did not condemn the use. It may
be that in the case of the no-fly zones, we have acquiescence to the use of force by
the United States and United Kingdom. Once such as acquiescence has occurred,
it would take a U.N. Security Council resolution to condemn the policing. But the
United States and United Kingdom will veto any attempt to condemn their actions
and so the policing remains, arguably, lawful. The contrast with the weapons
regime is clear. The Council never acquiesced in the use of force to enforce the
weapons regime, and the December 1998 bombing never accomplished any
constructive outcome, quite the contrary.
C. Alternatives to Self-Defense
The law of self-defense did not unreasonably restrict U.S. action following
September 11 th. It does restrict what the United States might wish to do regarding
Iraq. If the United States nonetheless ignores the law, it will commit an act of
aggression. Such a grave violation of international law will have serious negative
consequences for the restraints on force, restraints which serve the United States
and the world in providing normative standards for the community and aiding in
some small way toward achieving peace. Undermining norms, and peace itself,
will be a high price to pay, especially in light of alternatives that exist in
international law for those cases where military force is unlawful to achieve
national policy. This section discusses alternatives to self-defense in the case of
Iraq: both unlawful aggression and lawful countermeasures.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted a "Definition of Aggression"
in 1974 .4 The Assembly concluded that aggression is "the use of force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
39. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 36, at 851-52.
40. See Wedgwood, supra note 37, at 727.
41. Definition of Aggression Resolution, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) 2, at
142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression].
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State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,
as set out in this definition. 42 The Definition excludes insignificant uses of force
that otherwise meet the elements in the Definition. The drafters of the crime
aggression agree that aggression also is not an insignificant use of force. In March
2002, members of the Arab League concluded that an attack on Iraq would be an
act of aggression. They announced that any such attack would be. treated as an
attack on each of them.43
In conditions that do not justify self-defense, avoiding acts of aggression does
not require an actor to refrain from all coercive acts. Countermeasures are also an
option for a state responding to another state's violations of international law. For
example, in cases where the victim of an armed attack has no evidence of future
attacks, countermeasures may be used until the wrongdoer provides a remedy for
the wrong. Appropriate remedies can include compensation and assurances of
non-repetition. Countermeasures are actions that violate the law but are taken in
response to prior violations. 4 Countermeasures must be proportional to the injury
suffered and are available only if the parties involved have no prior commitment to
resort first to the means of binding dispute settlement (as is the case, for example,
with trade disputes which must first be submitted to the WTO.) 45 Countermeasures
may be highly coercive, though they may not include violations of the U.N.
Charter, human rights or diplomatic immunity.46 Countermeasures may be taken
by the injured state but in the case of universal jurisdiction crimes, any state may
take measures.47 The attacks of September 1lth involved international acts of
intentional killing on a scale to qualify as crimes against humanity, which are
universal jurisdiction crimes.48
Any state's courts may exercise judicial
jurisdiction over persons accused of universal jurisdiction crimes. 49 Any state may
aid in the enforcement of the law prohibiting such crimes by taking
countermeasures.
42. See Definition of Aggression supra note 41 at 143.
43. See Shanker & Sanger, supra note 7, at 1.
44. Case Concerning the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 1, 47, paras
82-87 (Sept. 25); Air Services Agreement Case (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 RI.A.A. 416, para. 83 (1978)
[hereinafter Air Services]. See also Draft Articles on State Responsibility ProvisionallyAdopted by the
InternationalLaw Commission on FirstReading, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, pt. 2, at 58, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2), arts. 47-50, reprinted in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES

348, 360-361 (2002); Karl Doehring, The UnilateralEnforcement of InternationalLaw by Exercising
Reprisals, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WANG TIEYA 235-36 (Ronald St. John Macdonald ed., 1994);
ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES (1984).

45. See Air Services, supra note 44, para- 84, at 444.
46. ZOLLER, supra note 44, at 82.
47. Id. at 69.
48. Frederic L. Kirgis, Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, ASIL
INSIGHT, available at http://www.asil.org (last visited September 9, 2002) (citing the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court definition of a crime against humanity: "widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack."). Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 183/9, art. 1, (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
49. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66 TEX. L.
REv. 785 (1988).
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In the case of Iraq, there is already a regime of sanctions in place to deal with
any attempts by Iraq to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It might be possible
for the United States to persuade the U.N. Security Council to do more to get the
weapons inspectors back in Iraq and then to provide them with greater security so
they are not as vulnerable to being forced out again - that would presumably also
require commitments by the United States not to abuse the weapons inspection
regime by sending U.S. spies with the inspectors.
Otherwise, it is difficult to think what further violations against the United
States itself would result in a case of countermeasures against Iraq. If the United
States should acquire clear and convincing evidence that Iraq is harboring terrorists
rather than trying or extraditing them, it might be possible for the United States to
infiltrate agents onto the territory of Iraq to bring those accused persons out. This
might be a justifiable countermeasure. A police action or incursion is short of
armed force and is arguably proportional to the wrong of harboring terrorists.
However, support for this interpretation of the law is limited. We have examples
of police actions and the like on the state territory or areas beyond national
jurisdiction which states treat as not amounting to prohibited armed force. 50 These
police actions are better classified as de minimis uses of force. The best known
case is the "volunteer" action to kidnap Eichmann from Argentina on behalf of
Israel. 5' The action was condemned.5 2 Yet it occurred before the development of
the "try or extradite" principle.
Israel could not justify its action as a
countermeasure because it was not responding to a prior wrong by Argentina.
However, the kidnapping could hardly be characterized as a use of armed force or
an otherwise-prohibited measure. The best approach for a state interest in taking
forceful measures on the territory of another state is to seek U.N. Security Council
authorization for such an action. Failing such authorization, a state does have
alternatives to full-scale self-defense.
II.

THE LAW OF EXCEPTIONALISM

Yet, the Bush administration's position is equivocal with regard to respecting
international law in the case of Iraq. The invasion planners give little indication
that they are concerned with the law of self-defense - at least with respect to the
United States. In the past the United States has sought to characterize its uses of
force as within the international rule of law - even if that meant manipulating facts
50. States may use minimal armed force to enforce the law without violating Article 2(4).
Minimal use of force on the high seas or in air space over the high seas is permissible. For example,
states may use armed force in affecting arrests by shooting across the bow of a pirate ship on the high
seas or dropping a bomb on an oil tanker in international waters to prevent pollution damage. In 1967,
the UK bombed the Torrey Canyon, an oil tanker which had run aground in international waters and
threatened serious oil pollution damage to the UK coast. See In Re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 409 F.2d
1013 (2nd Cir. 1968). The action was universally approved and codified at Article 216 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature, Dec. 10, 1982, Art. 107, UN Doc.
A/Conf.62/122 (1982), reprintedin United Nations, Official Text of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, UN Sales No. E.83.v.5 (1983), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
51. Louis HENKIN, ETAL., INTERNATIONAL LAw 1083 (3d ed. 1993).
52. Id. at 1085.
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as in the cases of Vietnam and Grenada. The United States has officially argued its
uses of force were lawful. The invasion of Iraq, however, presents a significant
new development, which builds on the Clinton Administration's position,
demonstrated during Kosovo that NATO should not be subject to the Security
Council authorization. Some U.S. foreign policy planners apparently believe the
United States has a privileged, exceptional position in international relations and
that puts it above international law.
The Bush Administration's antipathy for Iraq was evident from its first days
in office. The Administration launched a large bombing mission over the no-fly
zones of Iraq. President Bush said: "Saddam Hussein has got to understand we
expect him to conform to the agreement that he signed after Desert Storm."53
Around the tenth anniversary of the end of the ground war to liberate Kuwait
(February 1991), the debate in Washington policy circles was all about the failure
of the first Bush Administration to take that war to Baghdad to oust Saddam
Hussein. In the summer of 2001, the Bush Administration held firm against
pressure to lift the sanctions on Iraq.54 Within days of September 1 th, a former
secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger, said: "You have to kill some of these
people; even if they were not directly involved, they need to be hit.",55 Deputy
Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, even said the United States should "end
states" that support terrorism. 6 Reportedly, he wants the United States to destroy
57
Iraq, despite the lack of evidence that it supported the September 1 th atrocity.
Apparently, Secretary of State Colin Powell was urging a different line. At any
rate, no attack on Iraq took place during Operation Enduring Freedom against
Afghanistan. But during his State of the Union address, President Bush again
focused on Iraq, including it with Iran and North Korea in an "axis of evil." 58 In
March 2002, Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East to rally support for an
Evidently, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis was diverting the
invasion. 59
Administration's attention from the invasion, but the Guardian newspaper of
London reported contractors were moving U.S. personnel and facilities out of
Saudi Arabia to other Gulf States willing to allow the United States to launch the
invasion from their territory. By March, the word in Washington was about a
September invasion involving around 80,000 troops. The March/April issue of
Foreign Affairs contained an article by Kenneth Pollack, who from 1999 to 2001
was the Director of Gulf Affairs on the White House National Security Council.
The article provides a detailed brief on why and how to invade.
53. Thomas E. Ricks, US., Britain Bomb 5 Iraqi Sites, Jets Hit Targets Near Baghdad in Biggest
Airstrike in Two Years, WASH.POST, Feb. 17, 2001, at Al.
54. Alan Sipress, Powell Defends Stand on Iraq; Goal of Lifting Economic Curbs Is to Revive
MilitaryEmbargo, Mar. 8,2001, WASH. POST, at A14.
55. Brian Toohey, Questionsfor Howard and Beazley on How to Wage War, AUSTRALIAN FIN.
REv., Sept. 29, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 27345798.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Karen DeYoung, Bush Lays Down a Markerfor 3 'Evil' States, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2002, at
A01.
59. Alan Sipress, Cheney Plays Down Arab Criticism Over Iraq, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2002, at
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Pollock advises on 200,000-300,000 troops, 700-1000 aircraft, and from one
to five carrier battle groups. 60 "The casualties incurred during such an operation
might well be greater than during the Afghan or Gulf Wars, but they are unlikely to
be catastrophic.'
The biggest headaches for the United States are likely to stem not from the
invasion itself but from its aftermath. Once the country has been conquered and
Saddam's regime driven from power, the United States would be left "owning" a
country of 22 million people ravaged by more than two decades of war,
totalitarian misrule, and severe deprivation. The invaders would get to decide the
composition and form of a future Iraqi government - both an opportunity and a
burden. Some form of unitary but federalized state would probably best suit the
bewildering array of local and foreign interests involved, but ideally this decision
would be a collective one: as in Afghanistan, the United States should try to turn
the question of future Iraqi political arrangements over to the U.N., or possibly the
Arab League, thus shedding and spreading some responsibility for the outcome.
Alternatively, it might bring in those countries most directly affected by the
outcome - the Saudis, Kuwaitis, Jordanians, and Turks - both to co-opt them and
as an incentive for their diplomatic support. In the end, of course, it would be up
to the United States to make sure that a post-Saddam Iraq did not slip into chaos
like Lebanon in the 1980s or Afghanistan in the 1990s, creating spillover effects
in the region and raising the possibility of a new terrorist haven.
In late April, the New York Times reported that a similar blueprint for
invasion was on the Bush Administration's drawing board.6 3 President Bush,
while visiting Berlin on May 17th denied he had war plans on his desk, but the
Washington Post reported on May 24"h that General Tommy Franks had briefed top
decision-makers on an invasion for which he wanted 200,000 troops. 64 The Post
reported top military commanders persuaded civilian leaders to at least delay the
invasion until 2003 or to reconsider it altogether. The military is chiefly concerned
65
with the difficulty of an invasion and potentially high casualties.
As mentioned above, at the Arab League summit in March, Arab leaders
stated an invasion of Iraq would be an act of aggression. 66 European leaders who
just three years ago fully debated the legality of intervening in Kosovo, concluding
it was unlawful, but allowing it anyway, did not debate the legality of invading
Iraq in Spring 2002. The United States did not request help from other countries,
and appeared resolved on invasion, so, the Europeans did not join their Arab
colleagues. No doubt they feared the implications of pronouncing that the United
States has committed aggression. The failure to name aggression, however, along
with the invasion itself will have repercussions for both the law and the U.N.
60. Pollack, supra note 32, at 43.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 45.
63. See Shanker & Sanger, supranote 7, at 1.
64. Thomas E. Ricks, Military Bids to Postpone Iraq Invasion - Joint Chiefs See Progress in
Swaying Bush, Pentagon, WASH. POST, May 24,2002, at AOt.
65. Id.
66. See Shanker & Sanger, supranote 7.
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NATO's intervention in Kosovo had major repercussions despite the fact that
European governments were adamant that it should not. It is surely less shocking
today to see the United States contemplating a war of aggression against Iraq, a
war without the U.N. Security Council's sanction or condemnation since the
NATO use of force against Yugoslavia. Secretary of State Albright at a NATO
meeting in December 1998 said: "let me say a word about [Security Council]
mandates. NATO will-in all cases-act in accordance with the principles of the
United Nations Charter, while continuing to address this issue on a case-by-case
basis.' 67 In June 1998, U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen had said that
NATO would not need a U.N. Security Council authorization to intervene in
Kosovo.68

The Clinton Administration spoke of NATO but the U.S. dominance of
NATO meant it was really speaking of the U.S. When the bombing of Yugoslavia
by NATO began on March 24, 1999, without the U.N. Security Council
authorization, the United States did not issue an official legal justification for the
action. The United States did not even care enough about the rules to manipulate
the facts or stretch interpretations. 69 Some in the Bush Administration hold the
view that no multilateral organization authorization or other justification under law
to invade Iraq is necessary. Rather, the United States is enjoying a position of
privilege in the international community and is being allowed to do so by other
states, including Europeans, perhaps best in a position to challenge it. As Detlev
Vagts has observed:
One increasingly sees the United States designated as the hegemonic (or
indispensable, dominant, or preeminent) power.
Those employing this
terminology include former officials of high rank as well as widely read
publicists. The French, for their part, use the term "hyper-power." A passage by
Charles Krauthammer in Time best captures the spirit" "America is no mere
international citizen. It is the dominant power in the world, more dominant than
any since Rome. Accordingly America is in a position to reshape norms, alter
expectations and create 70new realities. How? By unapologetic and implacable

demonstrations of will."

Saddam Hussein is an international criminal who no one wants to be seen
defending. Nevertheless, allowing the United States to move to a position above
the law will have repercussions for the law. Those repercussions will unlikely be
the ones the United States wants. The United States wants an orderly world under
the rule of law for everyone, but some also want the U.S. to have a right to pick

67. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 79.
68. Id. at 76.
69. The United States did put on a defense at the ICJ in a case brought by Yugoslavia. Basically,
it followed the British lead and argued the Yugoslav bombing came close to being justified. In the
weeks before the case, however, repeated calls to the Legal Adviser's Office at the U.S. Department of
State yielded promises of return calls that never came, referrals to telephone numbers for disconnected
phones, and recommendations to call the public affairs office, which had no idea what the request
meant.
70. Vagts, supranote 2, at 843.
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and choose the rules it obeys. This is not how law works. Law is based on a
psychological element of belief and commitment. When these are absent, there
can be no law. If the United States breaks this fiction and declares itself above the
law, it will help break down the commitment to law generally in the international
community.
The plan to invade Iraq jettisons American leadership toward a world order
under the rule of law that began with Roosevelt's vision for the United Nations,
continued with George H.W. Bush's declaration after the defeat of Iraq in 1991,
through to George W. Bush's report to the U.N. Security Council on the need for
Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
THE WAR ON TERRORISM
DEREK JINKS*
The September 11th terrorist attacks prompted a rethinking of the relationship
between liberty and security. The attacks exemplify a new mode of organizing
sustained violence that poses a fundamental challenge to United States (U.S.) and
international law. Indeed, Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White
recently described this critical juncture in global politics as an "international
constitutional moment."' In the wake of the attacks, the U.S. confronted this
challenge by initiating several important changes in its law and policy--the
architecture of the "war on terrorism." 2 To be sure, the U.S. response generated
substantial controversy concerning three related issues: (1) the most appropriate
forum for prosecuting individuals responsible for the September 11th attacks;3 (2)
the international legal status of combatants captured in Afghanistan; 4 and, more
*Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. This essay is based on my remarks
at the Sutton Colloquium, InternationalTerrorism, Ethnic Conflicts, and Self-Determination, held at the
University of Denver college of Law on March 23, 2002. Special thanks to Ved Nanda, Michael
Scharf, and Paul Williams for inspiring and organizing a remarkable conference.
1. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An InternationalConstitutionalMoment, 43
HARV. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
2. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Sept. 20,
2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (last visited
Oct. 21, 2002)
3. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, We Have the Right Courtsfor Bin-Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 2001, at A39 (arguing that any such trials should be conducted in federal district court); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should Be Tried Before the World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A23 (arguing
that the U.N. Security Council should establish another ad hoc tribunal); Paul R. Williams & Michael
P. Scharf, Prosecute Terroristson a World Stage, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at M5 (suggesting that
the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia be amended to confer
jurisdiction over the September I Ith attacks); Ruth Wedgwood, The Casefor Military Tribunals, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 3,2001, at A18 (supporting military commissions of the sort envisioned in President Bush's
Military Order); Laura Dickinson, Courts Can Avenge Sept. 11: InternationalJustice-Not War-will
Honor our Character while Ensuring our Safety, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at 66 (supporting
"internationalized" trials in other national jurisdictions). On the legality of military commissions
specifically, see Neal K. Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictionsin the
ProposedMilitary Tribunals, 25 HARV. J. L & PUB. POL'Y. 635 (2002); George P. Fletcher, War and
the Constitution; Bush's Military Tribunals Haven't Got a Legal Leg to Stand On, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT, Jan. 1-14, 2002, at 26.; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The ConstitutionalValidity
of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 249 (2002); Abraham D. Sofaer & Paul R. Williams,
DoingJustice During Wartime: Why Military Tribunals Make Sense, 111 POL'Y REv. 3 (2002).
4. The controversy concerns whether detained al Qaeda and Taliban fighters qualify for "prisoner
of war" (POW) status under the Geneva Conventions. See Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered intoforce Oct. 21, 1950. See
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generally, (3) the most appropriate role for law in any comprehensive strategy
against international terrorism. It is striking that these debates turn on which law,
if any, applies in the "war on terrorism." The questions structuring these debates
are by now familiar: Does the Constitution protect "enemy aliens"? Do the
Geneva Conventions protect "unlawful combatants"? Although these are critical
questions, the focus on U.S. constitutional law and international humanitarian law
has unfortunately obscured the importance of another potentially relevant body of
law: international human rights law. If applicable, international human rights law
would establish conclusively-irrespective of the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions or U.S. Constitution-that all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, as a matter of law, are entitled to certain basic rights including: the
right not to be detained arbitrarily; the right to humane conditions and treatment if
detained; and, the right to a fair trial on any criminal charges.
INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS STANDARDS

For example, international human rights law informs the legal analysis of the
most controversial aspects of U.S. antiterrorism policy including: trial of suspected
terrorists by military '7commission; 6 indefinite detention of citizens designated as
"enemy combatants;" and, prolonged detention of aliens suspected of terrorist
activity. 8 It is important to note that several international human rights treaties, 9
e.g., Coalition of Clergy et al. v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C. D. Cal. 2002) (denying habeas
petition brought on behalf of Camp X-Ray detainees); John Cerone, Status of Detainees in International
Armed Conflict, and their Protection in the Course of CriminalProceedings, ASIL INSIGHTS (Jan.
2002) available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh8l.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002); Alfred P.
Rubin, Applying the Geneva Conventions: Military Commissions, Armed Conflict, and al Qaeda, 26
FLETCHER F. WORLD. AFF. J 79 (2002).
5. See generally Sofaer & Williams, supra note 3; Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime,
Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1217 (2002); see also Ruth Wedgwood, The Rules of War
Can'tProtectAl Qaeda,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 2001, at AlIl (suggesting that the law has no role in war
on terror).
6. Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Military
Order]. The Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented the Order by issuing the rules of
procedure and evidence for the commissions. See Department of Defense, Military Commission Order
No. 1, Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, (Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinafter DOD Rules]. The use of military commissions in
U.S. history is well documented. See generally David J. Bederman, Article H Courts, 44 MERCER L.
REV. 825 (1993); WILLIAM E. BURKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 351-69
(Franklin Hudson Pub. 1914) (1892); GEORGE B. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 307-13 (John Wiley & Sons, 1915) (1898); William WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 832-34 (William S. Hein & Co., 1979) (1920).
7. See Amnesty International, Memorandum to the US. Government on the Rights of People in
US. Custody in Afghanistan and GuantanamoBay (April 2002), available at Amnesty International
Online, http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/recent/AMR510532002 (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
8. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953 (May 2002); David Firestone &
Christopher Drew, Al Qaeda Link Seen in Only a Handful of l,200 Detainees,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
2001, at Al.
9. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 9, 14, &
15, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June
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declarations, 10 and resolutions" establish minimum procedural protections for all
individuals deprived of their personal liberty. Under Article 9 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), no one shall be "subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention"'12 or "deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law."' 3 This
provision also specifies that "[a]nyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the
time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any
charges against him."' 4 Article 9(3) provides that all persons arrested or detained
on a criminal charge "shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to release."'15 As interpreted by the United Nations (U.N.)
Human Rights Committee, 16 the provision requires at a minimum that an
27, 1981, arts. 3, 6, & 7, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter Banjul Charter]; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 7, 8 & 9, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 5, 6 & 7, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and
Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118 [hereinafter ECHR]; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/5 1(1984), entered into force June 26, 1987 (art. 7) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
10. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 9-11, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., at 72, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
11. See, e.g., Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 Aug. to 7 Sept. 1990, U.N. Doe.
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 118 (1990); Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, Eighth U.N. Congress on
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 Aug. to 7 Sept. 1990, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.I at 189 (1990); Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, annex, 43 U.N. GAOR 43d Sess., Supp. No.
49, at 298, U.N. Doe. A/43/49 (1988)[hereinafter Body of Principles]; Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary, Seventh U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Milan, 26 Aug. to 6 Sept. 1985, U.N. Doc. A/ CONF.121/22/Rev.1 at 59 (1985); Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/61 1, annex 1, E.S.C. Res. 663C,
24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, 62 U.N.
ESCOR Supp. No. I at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977) (Part II. A. Prisoners Under Sentence and Part II.
C. Prisoners Under Arrest or Awaiting Trial).
12. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9(1).
13. Id.
14. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9(2).
15. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9(3). Note that Article 9(3) of the ICCPR applies only to
individuals arrested or detained on a criminal charge, while the other rights recognized in the Article
apply to all persons deprived of their liberty. People awaiting trial on criminal charges should not, as a
general rule, be held in custody. In accordance with the right to liberty and the presumption of
innocence, persons charged with a criminal offence, in general, should not be detained before trial. See
id.; id., art. 14(3). International standards explicitly recognize that there are, however, circumstances in
which authorities may detain an accused pending trial. See id., art. 9(3); see also Body of Principles,
supra note 11, Principle 39; United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures, 14
Dec. 1990, Res. 45/110 Principle 6; ACHR, supra note 9, art. 7(5). For example, pre-trial detention is
permissible if authorities determine that detention is necessary to prevent flight, interference with
witnesses, or when the accused poses a clear and serious risk to others which cannot be contained by
less restrictive means. See Van Alphen v. the Netherlands, (305/1988), 23 July 1990, Report of the
HRC Vol. 11,(A/45/40), 1990, at 115. Therefore, pre-trial detention must not only be lawful, but must
also be necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.
16. The ICCPR established the United Nations Human Rights Committee to monitor state parties'
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individual must be brought before a judge or other officer within "a few days."'
Finally, The ICCPR provides for the right to habeas corpus, or amparo.15 Under
this provision, anyone deprived of liberty by arrest or detention has the right to
"take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay
on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not

compliance with the treaty. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 40. This monitoring function involves three
complementary procedures. First, the ICCPR establishes a periodic reporting process. See id. art.
40(1). Under the reporting process, the Committee receives periodic written reports from state parties
which explain the measures they have taken to protect the rights recognized in the treaties. See id.
Government representatives present the reports to the U.N. Human Rights Committee in public
sessions; Committee members question the representatives about issues raised in the reports; and the
Committee publishes comments and recommendations on how to improve the protection of human
rights in the state in question. Second, the Committee drafts "general comments" typically concerning
the interpretation of the substantive rights and freedoms contained in the treaty each committee
oversees. See United Nations High Commission for Human Rights/United Nations Human Rights
Centre, Treaty Database Homepage at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited Oct. 21, 2002)
[hereinafter UNHCHR Database] See, e.g., DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
95 (Oxford University Press, 1991) ("The general comments serve rapidly to develop the jurisprudence
of the HRC under the Covenant."). Third, and most important, the Committee receives written
"communications" or "petitions" from individuals alleging that a State party has violated one or more
rights protected by the ICCPR. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, done Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Optional Protocol]; Torkel Opsahl,
The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HuMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

(Philip Alston, ed., Oxford University Press, 1992). This procedure is optional, however, and many
states party to the ICCPR do not recognize the competence of the Committee to receive individual
petitions.
See Human Rights Committee, Optional Protocol available at http://
wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/hrcommittee/hrc-page.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2000) (stating that 95 of
the 144 parties to the ICCPR have ratified the Optional Protocol). Under the First Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR, the Committee performs a quasi-judicial function when reviewing individual petitions. See
TOM ZWART, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PETITIONS (Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 1994).
Although the Committee's decisions are not legally binding, they are widely viewed as persuasive
authority and several States have implemented the Committee's interpretation of the treaty. See
Laurence R.
Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 344-45 (1997).
17. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Righ to Liberty and
Security of Persons (art. 9), 16t" Sess., CCPR General Comment 8, para. 2 (1982). Note that this
provision does not explicitly recognize a right to counsel for all accused at this stage of the proceedings.
The Human Rights Committee has stated, however, that "all persons arrested must have immediate
access to counsel." See Concluding Observations on State Part Report: Georgia, Human Rights
Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.74, 9 April 1997, at para. 28. See also Body of Principles,
supra note 11, principle 18(1); Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, supra note 11, principle I
(stating that "[a]ll persons are entitled to call upon the assistance of a lawyer of their choice to protect
and establish their rights and to defend them in all stages of criminal proceedings."); id., principle 7
(requiring governments to ensure that all persons arrested or detained have access to a lawyer within 48
hours from arrest or detention); see also id., Principle 5 (providing that all persons arrested, charged or
detained must be promptly informed of their right to legal assistance); id., principle 8 (requiring
authorities to ensure that all arrested, detained or imprisoned persons have adequate opportunities to be
visited by and to communicate with their lawyer without delay, interception or censorship, in full
confidentiality). It also has been widely recognized that prompt and regular access to a lawyer for all
detainees is an important safeguard against torture, ill-treatment, coerced confessions and other abuses.
See, e.g Report of the UN Special Rapporteuron Torture, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/17, 17 December
1991, at para.284.
18. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9(4).
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lawful." 19 International human rights law has also established an extensive
inventory of procedural rights for individuals facing criminal charges. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 20 ICCPR,21 African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, (Banjul Charter)22 Inter-American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR) 23 and the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) 24 all include detailed fair trial provisions. Specifically, Article 14 of the
ICCPR recognizes the right to "a fair trial and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law."25
This provision
enumerates the minimum procedural requirements of a "fair trial," including the
right to be presumed innocent,26 the right to be tried without undue delay,27 the
right to prepare a defense,28 the right to defend oneself in person or through
counsel, 29 the right to call and examine witnesses, 30 and the right to protection
from retroactive criminal laws.3'
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. LAW

The central claim of this essay is that international human rights law
conditions the exercise of U.S. power in the "war on terrorism. ' 32 In one sense,

19. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9(4).
20. See UDHR,supra note 10, art. 10.
21. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 14.
22. See Banjul Charter, supra note 9, arts. 7, 26. The African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights has adopted a resolution on the Right to Recourse Procedure and Fair Trial which
elaborates on article 7 (1) of the Banjul Charter and guarantees several additional rights, including:
notification of charges, appearance before a judicial officer, right to release pending trial, presumption
of innocence, adequate preparation of the defense, speedy trial, examination of witnesses and the right
to an interpreter. See Doc. No. ACHPR/COMM/FIN(XI)/Annex VII, 9 March 1992.
23. See ACHR, supra note 9, art. 8.
24. See ECHR, supra note 9, art. 6.
25. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 14(1).
26. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 14(2); ECHR, supra note 9, art. 6(2).
27. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 14(3)(c); ECHR, supra note 9, art 6(1).
28. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 14(3)(d); ECHR, supra note 9, art. 6(3)(b).
29. See, ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 14(3)(d); ECHR, supra note 9, at art. 6(3)(d):
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the
following minimum guarantees, in full equality:... (d) To be tried in his presence, and to
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it.
30. See, ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 14(3)(e). See also ECHR, supra note 9, at art. 6(3)(d);
ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 8(2)(f):
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the
following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (e) To examine, or have examined, the
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.
31. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 15(1) ("No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed").
32. Whether any particular U.S. policy contravenes the substantive provisions of the ICCPR is
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international human rights law clearly applies in that the United States has ratified
several human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, and all treaties lawfully made
under the U.S. Constitution are part of the "supreme law of the land."33 In
addition, agencies of the U.S. government, including the Department of Defense,
are required by Executive Order to comply with the ICCPR.34 Although the U.S.
made clear its understanding that the substantive provisions of the ICCPR are
"non-self executing," the treaty nevertheless establish international legal
obligations binding on the executive and legislative branches of government.35
Moreover, the nature of international human rights law suggests that it applies in
all circumstances. That is, international human rights law defines the minimum
rights protections necessary to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power. This body
of law reflects the collective normative aspirations of the international community;
and, as such, provides an indispensable framework for evaluating specific policy
options in the "war on terrorism."
WARTIME AND OTHER "STATES OF EXCEPTION"
The robust regime of procedural rights embodied in the ICCPR would, if
applicable, call into question several aspects of U.S. antiterrorism policy. Indeed,
the U.N. Human Rights Committee repeatedly declared special military courts and
"national security" detention laws inconsistent with the ICCPR.3 6

The application

beyond the scope of this essay. I will therefore analyze the substantive requirements of the treaty only
insofar as these provisions inform analysis of the conditions under which the ICCPR is applicable. See
ICCPR, supra note 9.
33. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, .§ 2.
34. Executive Order 13,107 directs all members of the executive branch to comply with the
ICCPR. See Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (1998), reprintedin 38 I.L.M. 493 (1999).
[hereinafter Executive Order]. The preamble of the Executive Order names three human rights treaties
in particular: the ICCPR, supra note 9; the Convention Against Torture, supra note 9; , and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966). However, it also recognizes that the Executive Order
shall apply to "other relevant treaties concerned with protection and promotion of human rights to
which the United States is now or may become a party in the future." Executive Order 13,107, supra, at
68,991.
35. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 198-204 (Foundation
Press, 2nd ed. 1996). In addition, the "non-self executing" declarations arguably do not preclude
defendants from invoking treaty rights defensively. See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 132 F. Supp.2d
1036, 1040 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding the prohibition against private causes of action does not apply
when raising "ICCPR claims defensively"); See also John Quigley, Human Rights Defenses in US.
Courts, 20 HuM. RTs. Q. 555, 580-82 (1998); David Sloss, The Domesticationof InternationalHuman
Rights: Non-Seif-Executing Declarationsand Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 210-214
(1999).
36. See, e.g., Acosta v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 110/1981 (1983), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/39/40) at 169 (1984); Scarrone v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 103/1981 (1982), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/39/40) at 154 (1984); Barbato & Barbato v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 84/1981, (1981), U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/38/40) at 124 (1983); Schweizer v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 66/1980 (1980), U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/38/40) at 117 (1983); Conteris v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 139/1983 (1985), U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/40/40) at 196 (1985); Machado v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 83/1981 (1982), U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/39/40) at 148 (1984); Lluberas v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 123/1982 (1983), U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/39/40) at 175 (1984); Nieto v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 92/1981 (1981), U.N. Doc. Supp. No.
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of the ICCPR to U.S. action in the "war on terrorism" is, however, complicated by
the fact that these actions are undertaken in the context of an ongoing, formally
proclaimed national emergency 37 and an international armed conflict. 38 Defining
the scope of application of the ICCPR therefore requires an assessment of the
degree to which international human rights law applies in times of war and other
states of emergency.
International human rights treaties allow the suspension of some rights in
public emergencies (such as times of war). 39 Article 4 of the ICCPR provides that
in situations threatening the life of the nation, a government may issue a formal
declaration suspending certain human rights guarantees provided that: (1) a state of
emergency that threatens the life of the nation exists; 40 (2) the exigencies of the
situation "strictly require" such a suspension; 4 1 (3) the suspension does not conflict
40 (A/38/40) at 201 (1983); Caldas v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 43/1979 (1979), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/38/40) at 192 (1983); Magana ex-Philibert v. Zaire, Comm. No. 90/1981 (1981), U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/38/40) at 197 (1983); Altesor v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.2/10 (1977), U.N. Doc. Supp. No.
40 (A/37/40) at 122 (1982); Pietraroia v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.10/44 (1979), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/36/40) at 153 (1981); Bouton v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.9/37 (1978), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/36/40) at 143 (1981); Touron v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.7/32 (1978), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/36/40) at 120 (1981); Motta v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.2/1 1 (1977), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/35/40) at 132 (1980); Muteba v. Zaire, Comm. No. 124/1982 (1983), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/39/40) at 182 (1984); Borda v. Columbia, Comm. No. R. 11/46 (1979), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/37140) at 193 (1982).
37. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National
Security Team, (September 12, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010912-4.html (last visited DATE).
38. Mike Mount, U.S. Mounts New al Qaeda Hunt in Afghanistan, available at CNN.com,
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/09/afghanistan.sweep/index.htm (last visited on
Oct, 21, 2002).
39. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 9, at art. 15(1); ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 4(1); ACHR,
supra note 9, art. 27(1). For useful surveys of this area of law, see ANNA-LENA SvENSSONMCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATES OF EXCEPTION (M.
Nijhoff Publishers, 1998); JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING STATES OF EMERGENCY (University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1994); JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Oxford University Press, 1992).
40. See SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at 195-281; FITZPATRICK, supra note 39;
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity:Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 101, 103 (1995) (arguing that the concept of a "state of emergency refers to
those exceptional circumstances resulting from temporary factors of a political nature, which, to varying
degrees, involve extreme and imminent danger that threaten the organized existence of the state");
Lawless Case (Ireland), 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. (Eur. Ct. H.R. 438, 472, 474) (holding that the
ECHR's derogation clauses may be invoked only in "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency
which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of
which the State is composed"). The concept of emergency does include circumstances other than
armed conflict. For example, national disasters and extreme economic crises may constitute "public
emergencies." See R. St. J. MacDonald, Derogationsunder Article 15 of the EuropeanConvention on
Human Rights, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 225 (1997). Furthermore, the emergency must be
temporary, imminent, and of such a character that it threatens the nation as a whole. See SVENSSONMCCARTHY, supra; ORAA, supra note 39, at 11-33.
41. This requirement incorporates the principle of proportionality into derogation regimes. This
principle requires that the restrictive measures must be proportional in duration, severity, and scope.
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with the nation's other international obligations; 42 (4) the emergency measures are
applied in a non-discriminatory fashion; 43 and, (5) the government notifies the
United Nations Secretary-General immediately. 44 Some rights, however, are not
subject to derogation even in times of public emergency.4 5 The ICCPR specifically
identifies several non-derogable obligations including the rights to be free from
arbitrary killing;46 torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment; 47 and slavery. 48 Although the rights to fair trial and personal liberty
are, as a formal matter, derogable provisions,49 the U.N. Human Rights Committee
has made clear that many restrictions of these rights are inappropriate even in
times of emergency. 50 Indeed, the Committee, in its General Comment 29, stated
Implicit in this requirement is that ordinary measures must be inadequate; and the emergency measures
must assist in the management of the crisis. See, e.g., ORAA, supra note 39, at 143; MacDonald, supra
note 40, at 233-35.
42. See SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at 624-639.
43. Id. at 640-682.
44. Id.at 683-718; ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 4(3); ECHR, supra note 9, at art. 15(3); ACHR,
supra note 9, at art. 27(3). The Human Rights Committee has emphasized the importance of
notification for effective international supervision of derogations in states of emergency. See Report of
the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex VII, at 110, U.N. Doc
A/36/40 (1981).
45. Each convention containing a derogation clause provides an explicit list of non-derogable
provisions. See ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 4(2) (prohibiting derogation from Articles 6 (right to life),
7 (prohibition on torture), 8 (prohibition of slavery and servitude), 11 (imprisonment for failure to fulfill
contractual obligation), 15 (prohibition on retrospective criminal offence), 16 (protection and guarantee
of legal personality), and 18 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion); ECHR, supra note 9, at art.
15(2) (prohibiting derogation from Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (freedom from torture), 4 (freedom from
slavery), and 7 (retrospective effect of penal legislation)); ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 27 (prohibiting
suspension of Articles 3 (right tojuridical personality), 4 (right to life), 5 (right to humane treatment), 6
(freedom from slavery), 9 (freedom from ex-post facto laws), 12 (freedom of conscience and religion),
17 (right of the family), 18 (right to name), 19 (right of child), 20 (right to nationality), and 23 (right to
participate in government)).
46. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 6.
47. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 7.
48. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 8.
49. Proposed drafts of ICCPR Article 4 submitted by French and U.S. representatives would have
made the prohibition on arbitrary arrest, the right to prompt notice of charges, and the right to fair and
prompt trial non-derogable. Both proposals, however, would have made derogable the right to take
prompt judicial proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of detention. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/324 (1949)
(French draft); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/325 (1949) (U.S. Draft). The representative of the U.K. argued that
the prohibition against arbitrary arrest and the right to a fair trial might be impossible to respect during
wartime or other grave emergency. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.126, at 4-5 (1949). The U.K. view
prevailed when the list of non-derogable rights was agreed to provisionally in 1950. See Joan Hartman,
Working Paperfor the Committee of Experts on the Article 4 DerogationProvision, 7 HUM. RTS. Q.
89, 115-18 (1985).
50. Although the Human Rights Committee recommended against adopting an Optional Protocol
to the ICCPR re-categorizing Articles 9 and 14 as non-derogable, the Committee noted that states
should not derogate from several of the protections included in these articles. The Committee reasoned
that:
The Committee notes that the purpose of the possible draft optional protocol is to add
article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, and article 14 to the list of non-derogable provisions in
article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant.. .The Committee is satisfied that States parties
generally understand that the right to habeas corpus and amparo should not be limited in
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that:
Safeguards related to derogation.., are based on the principles of legality and the
rule of law inherent in the Covenant as a whole. As certain elements of the right

to a fair trial are explicitly guaranteed under international humanitarian law during
armed conflict, the Committee finds no justification for derogation from these
guarantees during other emergency situations. The Committee is of the opinion
that the principles of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental
Only a
requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency.
51
court of law may try and convict a person for a criminal offence.
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has also emphasized that procedural
rights, such as fair trial rights, must be respected even in times of emergency in
order to protect other non-derogable rights.52 Finally, the Committee, following
that, at
the lead of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 53 strongly suggested
4
a minimum, the right to habeas corpus (or amparo) is non-derogable.
The United States has not, and arguably could not, invoke Article 4 to
preclude application of the ICCPR in the "war on terrorism." First, the United
States has not filed a derogation notice with the other state parties, through the
situations of emergency. Furthermore, the Committee is of the view that the remedies
provided in article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, read in conjunction with article 2 are inherent
to the Covenant as a whole. Having this in mind, the Committee believes that there is a
considerable risk that the proposed draft third optional protocol might implicitly invite
States parties to feel free to derogate from the provisions of article 9 of the Covenant
during states of emergency if they do not ratify the proposed optional protocol. Thus,
the protocol might have the undesirable effect of diminishing the protection of detained
persons during states of emergency.
Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. G.A.O.R., 49th Sess., Supp. No, 40, at 120,
U.N. Doc. A/49140, at para. 2 (1994).
51. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4),
UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.I 1 (2001) at para. 16, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf
(last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
52. The Committee concluded that:
It is inherent in the protection of [non-derogable] rights... that they must be secured by
procedural guarantees, including, often, judicial guarantees. The provisions of the
Covenant relating to procedural safeguards may never be made subject to measures that
Thus, for example, as
would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights ....
article 6 [the right to life] is non-derogable in its entirety, any trial leading to the
imposition of the death penalty during a state of emergency must conform to the
provisions of the Covenant, including all the requirements of articles 14 [fair trial] and
15 [prohibition on retroactive penalties].
Id. atpara. 15.
53. See Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American
Convention on Human Rights), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33, OEA/ser.L.N/lll.17, doc. 13
(1987); See also Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American
Convention on Human Rights), 9 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40, OEA/ser.L./VI/l11.9, doc. 13
(1987). The Court unanimously held that "'essential' judicial guarantees which are not subject to
derogation, according to Article 27(2) of the Convention, include habeas corpus (Art. 7(6)), amparo,
and any other effective remedy before judges or competent tribunals (Art. 25(1))." Id.
54. Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. G.A.O.R., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
120, U.N. Doc. A/49/40, at par. 2 (1994).
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Secretary-General of the United Nations, as required under Article 4(3). Indeed,
the United States has not proclaimed, as matter of domestic law, that emergency
conditions necessitating the suspension of fundamental rights exist. Second,
substantial evidence suggests that several of the "derogation measures" are not
strictly required by the exigencies of the circumstances. Of course, the United
States has offered no evidence that specific derogation measures are strictly
necessary to meet the immediate threat of catastrophic terrorism. Additionally, the
fact that investigation, trial, and conviction of Al Qaeda operatives has been
successfully conducted by utilizing ordinary criminal procedure and without
compromising national security, strongly suggests that many of the most
controversial measures are not necessary to confront the emergency conditions.
Third, the nature of the emergency itself may fail to satisfy the threshold
requirements of Article 4. Although the September 11th attacks almost certainly
constituted an emergency "threatening the life of the nation," the continuing, nonspecific and ill-defined threat of terrorist activity does not satisfy this requirement.
Moreover, because "states of exception" are, by their nature, of limited duration,
the U.S. may not manufacture an ongoing state of emergency by waging a
protracted--perhaps indefmite-"war on terrorism." Finally, the derogation
measures arguably suspend non-derogable rights (and rights necessary to protect
non-derogable rights) by violating the personal liberty and fair trial provisions of
the ICCPR.
CONCLUSION

International human rights law recognizes the bare minimum of standards
necessary to protect the safety and integrity of individuals from abuses of power.
As such, it governs how states treat all people in all circumstances--even in time
of war. Nevertheless, this body of law provides for "improved human rights to be
matched by accommodations in favor of the reasonable needs of the State to
perform its public duties for the common good."56 In furtherance of this objective,
human rights treaties explicitly authorize states to restrict or suspend some rights,
subject to several requirements, for an identified set of important public policy
objectives. These codified "states of exception" strike a balance between universal
human rights norms and national interests by specifying the circumstances in
which states may lawfully abrogate treaty obligations. Most important for the
55. The derogation measures do not, however, necessarily violate the prohibition on
discrimination in Article 4(1). Of course, many of the derogation measures are applied in a
discriminatory fashion. For example, the Military Order providing for trial by military commission
facially discriminates on the basis of citizenship. Military Order, supra note 6 (applying only to
noncitizens). Article 4(1) prohibits discrimination "solely on the ground of race colour, sex, language,
religion, or social origin." ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 4(1). Unlike Articles 2(1) and 26-the substantive
provisions on discrimination-Article 4(t) does not prohibit discrimination on the grounds of "national
origin." Compare ICCPR, supra note 9, arts. 2(1) and 26 with id. art. 4(1). The travauxpr~paraloires
of the treaty makes clear that states acknowledged that discrimination based on "national origin" might
be essential in times of war. See, e.g., SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at 643-646.
56. See Rosalyn Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B.I.L. 281, 281
(1976-77).
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purposes of this essay, "derogation clauses" permit the suspension of certain rights
in times of war or public emergency. This derogation regime does not, however,
preclude application of the ICCPR to the "war on terrorism."

TERRORIST CRIME, TALIBAN GUILT, WESTERN
VICTIMS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
MARK A. DRUMBL*
On September 1lth, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorists attacked the United States and
killed approximately 3,000 civilians from 81 countries.'
Traditionally,
international law treats armed attacks differently than criminal attacks. States
launch armed attacks against other states; organized insurgency movements having
some level of command or political structure also may launch internal armed
attacks against state governments. Individuals or groups, on the other hand,
initiate criminal attacks.
The law responds to criminal attacks through
investigation and trial. The law permits states to use force against other states in
self-defense to armed attacks. 2 The September 11th attack was a war-like attack
undertaken against a state by individuals from other states operating through a nonstate actor that has some command and political structure.3 As such, it does not
cleanly fit into either the armed attack or criminal attack category. In fact, it blurs
the distinction between the two.
Unsurprisingly, the U.S. response to the attack drew from both categories.
First, the U.S. argued that the Taliban harbored al-Qaeda and, consequently, the
attack was an armed attack attributable to Afghanistan. Therefore, the U.S. (and
its allies) had the right to initiate military strikes in collective self-defense. 4 These
strikes converted Afghanistan's internal armed conflict into an international one.
The strikes and subsequent ground campaign were militarily successful, prompting
the abdication of the Taliban, destruction of terrorist infrastructure and personnel,
and capture of thousands of fighters. 5 The follow-up response was one of both
criminal and military justice: apprehending, detaining, and prosecuting some alQaeda operatives and Taliban fighters. Thus far, two prosecutorial strategies have
Assistant Professor, School of Law, Washington & Lee University. E-mail: drumblm@wlu.edu.
1. Terrorists have not remained inactive since September 1lh; there have since been devastating
attacks in the Philippines, Indonesia, Yemen, Kuwait, Pakistan, Russia, and Afghanistan, some of
which have been closely connected to al-Qaeda.
2. See e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapter7.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
3. See Mark Drumbl, Judging the 11th September Terrorist Attack, 24 HUMAN RTs. Q. 323
(2002).
4. See U.N. Charter, supra note 2, at art. 51. See also War Powers Resolution, 50 USCS § 1541
(2002).
5. See No Remedy for Atrocities, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2002, at A22. See also Let the Rule of
Justice Prevail,THE IRISH NEWS LIMITED, Dec. 12, 2001, p. 6 (detailing the actions taken against the
Taliban as well as the results); Voice of the Times, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEwS, Nov. 27, 2001, at B5
(discussing the impact U.S. strikes have had on Osama Bin Laden's freedom to move about
Afghanistan).
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emerged: U.S. federal courts or U.S. military commissions having jurisdiction only
over foreign nationals. Although the commissions and their regulations contain
some due process protections, as currently envisioned they do not provide
defendants the same level of protection as the federal courts or the courts-martial
(conducted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice).6 Some foreign national
courts also have initiated judicial proceedings.7 Large numbers of terrorist
suspects remain in detention in many countries world-wide.
Thus, the U.S. simultaneously wages an armed conflict while it undertakes a
criminal investigation. As such, Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were combatants
for the purpose of justifying the lethal use of force. Once captured, they became
criminal detainees for the purpose of criminal and military justice, although not
true criminal detainees insofar as some may be tried outside the criminal justice
system by military commissions and thereby avoid the due process protections
given criminal defendants in U.S. courts. However, the fact that these detainees
were captured as combatants in an armed conflict means that, as they become
defendants facing trial, they may retain important rights, specifically the rights
accorded to prisoners of war by the Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War. 8 In
February 2002, the U.S. affirmed that Taliban detainees were entitled to the
coverage of the Geneva Conventions whereas al-Qaeda fighters were not. 9 Yet the
U.S. denied prisoner of war status to all detainees.' 0 According to the Geneva
Conventions, the actual determination of whether an individual is or is not a
prisoner of war is to be made by a tribunal, not unilaterally by a party to the armed
conflict." Until such a determination is made, the detainees are to be treated as
prisoners of war. 12 Thus, the U.S. declaration that it is abiding by the Geneva
Conventions may not be accurate, as this declaration arguably was not been
followed by strict adherence to the actual terms of the Conventions.
Given that prisoners of war were formerly soldiers authorized to use force,
they cannot be prosecuted for acts lawfully committed under that authorization
(e.g. killing and wounding the enemy).13 They only can be prosecuted for
activities that exceed that authorization, such as war crimes. Prisoners of war are
guaranteed the right to be tried by the same courts, under the same procedure, and
6. See How to Trya Terrorist,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,2001, at A32.
7. See generally Frank Davies, US. Has Many Choices of Courts in Dealing with Terrorists,
Knight Ridder, Dec. 19, 2001. On February 19, 2003, a Moroccan student, Mounir el Motassadeq, who
provided logistical support for the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell (which included lead September 11 hijacker
Mohammed Atta), was convicted in Germany of over 3,000 counts of accessory to murder and
sentenced to the maximum 15 years' imprisonment.
8. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, openedfor signature
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
9. See David Stout, Geneva Convention to Be Applied to Captured Taliban Fighters, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002.
10. See id.
11. Geneva Convention, supra note 8, art. 5.
12. Id.
13. See generally Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, InternationalHuman Rights Law In Practice:
The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2
CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001).
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with the same appeal rights as are members of the armed forces of the detaining
power.14 They are to be sentenced to the same penalties. 15 There are also rights to
counsel, to confer privately with counsel, to pre-trial assistance by counsel (for
example during interrogation), and to call witnesses.' 6 While awaiting trial,
prisoners of war are to be housed in the same conditions as their captors.' 7 In any
event, regardless of their status as prisoners of war, all detainees are entitled to the
protection of international human rights law, customary international law, and
other treaties.
Although the rules regarding commission procedure (issued in March 2002
after a draft had been circulated in December 2001) narrowed many of the gaps
between the initial construction of the commissions and international law,' 8 there
are still reasons to fear that the planned military commissions (together with the
ongoing detentions in which individuals have not yet been charged) do not fully
meet these standards.' 9 Skirting international humanitarian law places the U.S. in a
weakened position when criticizing rights violations, including those committed
against Americans, in other countries. Sustained Geneva Convention violations by
Iraq affecting Coalition soldiers spring to mind; so, too, do acts of perfidy
undertaken by Iraqi paramilitary forces.
This mixed criminal/military response is understandable. After all, to victims,
the September 11 th attack certainly feels like more than just a crime. It is almost
trivially true that the attack was criminal; and painfully obvious that it involved
murder, injury, hijacking, and property destruction. Prosecuting terrorists under
ordinary criminal law may sanitize their conduct as that of the ordinary criminal.
This may be one reason why military commissions have emotional appeal.
There is, however, another option. Consideration could be given to
prosecuting at least some of those responsible for the attack in an international
tribunal for crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity include acts of the
ultimate despicability that are among the most serious matters of concern to the
international community as a whole. In the past, the U.S. supported international
prosecution for such crimes. For example, following World War II, the U.S.
pushed for an international military tribunal when some Allies sought the summary
execution of captured Nazi leaders.2 ° More recently, the U.S. has strongly
supported the prosecution of crimes against humanity before international tribunals
14. Geneva Convention, supra note 8, art. 82.
15. See id.
16. See id. at art. 105.
17. See id. at art. 103.
18. See Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. I (Mar. 21, 2002). See generally
John Mintz, U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2002).
19. See Jordan Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: CourtingIllegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1 (2002). See also E-mail from Jordan Paust, Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston to
Mark A. Drumbl, Assistant Professor, School of Law, Washington & Lee University (March 21, 2002)
(on file with the author).
20. See Laurie Cohen, Comment: Application of the Realist and Liberal Perspectives to the
Implementation of War Crimes Trials: Case Studies of Nuremburg and Bosnia, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOR. AFF. 113, 123 (1997).
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in many places, including Bosnia, Kosovo, Croatia, Rwanda, and Cambodia.2'
Prosecuting September 1lth as a crime against humanity recognizes both the
criminal as well as war-like nature of the attack, and universally condemns
terrorism in the most serious way possible. It may also eliminate the timeconsuming debate whether the detainees are or are not prisoners of war.
To be sure, there are certain political advantages in proceeding through an
abridged military process. These include expediency, control, incapacitation of
attackers, and security. However, the military commissions may not develop a
comprehensive record of terrorist conduct that fully paints the reprehensibility of
this conduct. Moreover, military commissions will likely be perceived as lacking
in credibility, fairness, legitimacy, and legality in many parts of the world and
among audiences that we should care about. Military commission verdicts may be
expedient because they abridge due process and attenuate public access. However,
due process and public access help prosecutions become venues where competing
narratives clash and are synthesized. This can lead to an overarching narrative
that, if the trial process is viewed as credible, will itself have some legitimacy.
Moreover, military commissions could prompt an externalization of martyrdom
into uncontrolled political fora, such as the Islamic media, where exhortations of
injustice to Muslims may resonate - unchecked - on the very public that must view
terrorism as criminal and cancerous in order for it to be stamped out. Controlling
these perceptions is particularly relevant as Operation Iraqi Freedom takes place.
In the cases of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, international tribunals
have rendered lengthy, comprehensive decisions that have authenticated findings
of fact and complex historical narratives, established some important truths, and
worked to refute myths of ethnic, religious, and gender superiority. 22 To be sure,
international tribunal decisions have not always been well received in these
countries and there has, at times, been a disconnect between the work of the
23
international tribunals and the afflicted societies they were designed to assist.

However, with regard to September 11th, when contrasted with the perfunctory
verdict issued by a military commission, international tribunals offer a greater
possibility for discussion, dissensus, and neutral evaluation.24 Such possibilities
can help ensure that those prosecuted for September 11th are not perceived as
suffering political victor's justice. These perceptions would weaken the creation of

21. See generally War Crimes Tribunals: The Record And The Prospects: Conference
Convocation, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1383 (1998)
22. See generally Josd Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessonsfrom Rwanda, 24 YALE
J. INT'L L. 365 (1999); Symposium: The Fifth Annual Ernst C. Steifel Symposium: 1945-1995: Critical
Perspectives On The Nuremberg Trials And State Accountability: Panel II: Identifying And
Prosecuting War Crimes: Two Case Studies - The Former Yugoslavia And Rwanda, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 631 (1995).
23. This particularly is the case when the international tribunal externalizes justice for what
essentially is an internal conflict, which is the case in Rwanda. See Alvarez, supra note 22, at 395.
However, the September I lth terrorist attack is not an internal conflict, but a transnational one which,
given the broad panoply of victims, aggressors, and participants, quite readily can be cast as a global
crime.
24. See generally id.
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a transnational anti-terrorism consensus.25
An international criminal process captures the evil of the attack, adroitly
involves the global public in eradicating terrorism, and provides the opportunity
for universal cross-cultural condemnation. It also presents a number of strategic
advantages over proceeding domestically.
First, unlike U.S. criminal law,
international criminal law has limited discovery procedures that permit sensitive
information to be controlled. Second, the international tribunal could be situated in
a neutral, isolated location, thereby reducing security threats to the U.S. Witnesses
can testify through voice-altering technology, from behind screens, and there are
no juries. Third, international tribunals have juridical experience with the thorny
questions of command responsibility and conspiracy. Fourth, international
prosecutions offer the benefit of coordination. The September 11th attack involved
victims of multiple nationalities and was planned in multiple locations by a multinational cast of aiders, abettors, and accomplices. Responding internationally can
reduce the transaction costs of coordinating various domestic proceedings. It can
also bridge barriers caused by differential human rights standards among
prosecuting countries. Fifth, a coordinated international approach can lay the
groundwork for a global intelligence network and anti-terrorism police unit.
To be sure, there are drawbacks to international prosecutions. The number of
possible defendants could challenge the capacity of international tribunals
(although this could be mitigated by limiting the scope of the international tribunal
to senior members of al-Qaeda). Funding could be expensive (although so are
domestic trials and military commissions). Should it take too long to organize a
tribunal, the impetus to stamp out terrorism could wane. Moreover, the death
penalty is disfavored under international law.26 This was one of the reasons why
Rwanda initially opposed an international tribunal judging leaders of its 1994
genocide (where 800,000 people were murdered).27 However, the U.S. was one of
the major proponents of the international tribunal for Rwanda, which lacks the
jurisdiction to impose the death penalty. 2 8 There is no principled reason to treat

potential U.S. opposition any differently than the way Rwanda's opposition was
treated. Furthermore, insisting on the death penalty in criminal or military
proceedings may impede the extradition of suspects from abroad and, as may have
occurred in the capital trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, may prompt tensions in
international comity and relations among allies.29

25. Alvarez, supranote 22, at 376, 458-60.
26. See Michelle McKee, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: UnderstandingWhy the United
States' Use of the Death Penalty Violates Customary InternationalLaw, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
153, 153-58, 170 (2000). See also Kristi Tumminello Prinzo, The United States -"Capital" of the
World: An Analysis of Why the United States Practices Capital Punishment While the International
Trend is Towards Its Abolition, 24 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 855, 856-60 (1999).
27. See Christine M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International
Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda and The Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass
Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L. J. 163, 177 (2000).
28. See War Crimes Tribunals: The Record And The Prospects: Conference Convocation, supra
note 21; Alvarez, supranote 22, at 410.
29. See Due Processfor Terrorists, WALL ST. J., March 22, 2002 (discussing how the decision to
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Moreover, shying away from the international approach means that we may
be shying away from the precedent we may have created elsewhere. In the past,
the United States has been one of many strong supporters of open international
criminal prosecutions for atrocity in Nazi Germany, Rwanda, Cambodia, East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia.3 0 These "civilized" international trials have been
heralded as milestones in the incremental construction of a culture of human rights
and rule of law that is posited as the "best" way permanently to break the cycles of
violence. 3 ' Although a difficult question, it needs to be asked: should the logic be
any different now that Americans (along with other Westerners) predominantly are
the victims? It shouldn't be, yet it is. Law and due process are now often
rhetorically presented as inconveniences to the pursuit of justice, whereas in other
post-atrocity situations law and due process are rhetorically presented as
requirements for justice.
Whereas the legal responses to Rwandan, Bosnian, Kosovar, Cambodian,
Sierra Leonean and East Timorese atrocity each were internationalized (or, in the
case of Cambodia, is actively sought to be internationalized), the legal response to
September 1 th has decidedly not been internationalized. Despite the fact that
victims come from eighty-one countries and detainees from twenty-five countries,
the legal response to this tragedy has largely remained national and victim-based.
Moreover, the national response (if it proceeds through the planned military
commissions which strategically retain the benefits of national control without
national constitutional or judicial review obligations) may in fact clash with some
law, thereby
important precepts of international humanitarian and human3 rights
2
norms.
international
to
exceptionalism
of
sort
some
evidencing
Among the reasons the international community relied upon to support
international proceedings in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was concern that
domestic proceedings in both regions would be unable to satisfy international due
process concerns. 3 Yet, when the burden of victimization lies principally upon
Americans in particular and Westerners in general, it seems that domestic, victimbased, and territorial prosecutions emerge as a presumptive norm and concerns
with meshing these with international human rights law or humanitarian law are
constructed as inconveniences or as coddling terrorists.3 4 But did the Rwandans
pursue the death penalty against Moussaoui, the alleged 20' hijacker and a French national, in U.S.
district court has sparked a negative reaction in France; more problematic, however, is the question
whether some countries may be under a duty not to extradite an individual on their territory to face a
possible death sentence abroad).
30. See War Crimes Tribunals: The Record And The Prospects: Conference Convocation, supra
note 21.
31. See id.
32. See generally Antje C. Petersen, Extradition and the Political Offense Exception in the
Suppression of Terrorism, 67 IND. L.J. 767 (1992). See also Dino Kritsiotis, ReappraisingPolicy
Objections to HumanitarianIntervention, 19 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 1005 (1998).
33. See generally Osamu Inoue, The Due Process Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards in United States Federal Courts: A Proposalfor a Standard, II AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 247 (2000). See also William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Postgenocide Rwanda: SearchingforSolutions to Impossible Problems,7 CRiM. L.F. 523 (1996).
34. See Lee Casey, Assessments Of The United States Position: The Case Against The
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not feel that the leaders of the genocide were coddled at the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and that the granting of extensive due process to
these individuals (which may be one reason why Ignace Bagilishema was acquitted
(and released) in 2002 and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza temporarily released in
35
Whereas the U.S. strongly supported an
was an inconvenience?
1999)
and Bosnian Muslims through the
for
Rwandans
externalization of justice
36
the U.S. resists externalizing justice for serious
international tribunals,
international crimes, possibly even crimes against humanity, in the case of
terrorism. The legal response to September 1lth may demonstrate that when
Westerners are victims, justice may not be externalized from the West.37 However,
when "others" in "far away" "tribal" societies are victimized (even if by fellow
citizens), then justice for those victims may be subject to externalization in order to
an create international "rule of law."38
To be sure, the national judicial systems in both the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda were destroyed or seen as genuinely unable to prosecute offenders.39 In
fact, the principle of complementarity intrinsic to the International Criminal Court
defers international prosecutions when national courts are genuinely willing or able
to prosecute. Indeed, the U.S. and European national justice systems are those that
would be deemed able and willing to prosecute while respecting international
standards of due process. 40 Notwithstanding this ability to satisfy complementarity
concerns, the United States consciously chose to contract out of its domestic
judicial process and create new military commissions that may run afoul of
international standards and, as such, may not be the kind of domestic mechanisms
that the international community had in mind when seeking to ensure genuine
domestic prosecutions. 41 This is not to deny that the military commissions may be
as "fair" as the normal justice systems of many countries. However, international

InternationalCriminalCourt, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 840 (2002).

35. See Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda; InternationalCriminal Tribunal Chambers Judicial
Recess Starts On Monday, AFRICA NEWS, July 12, 2002.
36. See Alvarez, supra note 22.
37. This is not to deny that, as discussed previously, differences persist among Western nations
regarding the suitability of military commissions. By and large, many European allies are more
circumspect about the merits of the commissions; they also express reservations regarding the death
penalty and the absence of certain procedural safeguards. However, as I have argued elsewhere, many
of these differences may be more rhetorical than substantive and may represent differences of degree
rather than differences of kind. See Drumbl, supra note 3. True, allies had criticized the U.S. decision
not to declare the Geneva Conventions as applicable, but when the U.S. declared them applicable while
refusing actually to apply the procedural and substantive content of those Conventions, allies were
satisfied.
38. See Alvarez, supra note 22.
39. See Tara Sapru, Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Foray of the Security
Council Tribunal into the Rwandan Crisis, 32 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 329 (1997). See also Alvarez, supra
note 22.
40. See Douglass Cassel, The ICC's New Legal Landscape: The Need To Expand U.S. Domestic
Jurisdiction To Prosecute Genocide, War Crimes, And Crimes Against Humanity, 23 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 378 (1999).
41. See generally James D. Fry, Terrorism As A Crime Against Humanity And Genocide: The
Backdoor To UniversalJurisdiction,7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 169 (2002).
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institutions were designed to "take over" unless these normal justice systems could
approximate international standards.42
It is not as if domestic infrastructure destruction is the cause of the United
States' decision to skirt domestically recognized standards of due process. VicePresident Cheney flatly insists that accused terrorists do not deserve the "same
standards and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen" and that a
military commission is appropriate insofar as accused individuals will be given the
"kind of treatment... we believe they deserve." 43 The President refers to detainees
that await trial as "killers."" Yet the United States was supportive of an
international tribunal for Rwanda that gave the leaders of the Rwandan genocide
treatment vastly superior to that of the Rwandan domestic criminal justice system,
along with more lenient punishments.45
Moreover criminal accountability for the Taliban has, thus far, largely been
limited to the September 11th attacks. But what about the other crimes allegedly
committed by the Taliban? During its rule over Afghanistan, the Taliban is
reported to have terrorized Afghans through forced deportations, massacres,
torture, extra-judicial executions, and enforced disappearances among prisoners.46
Shia Muslims were persecuted.47 The Taliban established a system of gender
apartheid. 48 There were many allegations of state-sponsored sexual crimes and
rape.49 In addition, the Taliban embarked on deliberate destruction of cultural
property (e.g. the ancient Bamiyan Buddhas and objects d'art in the National
Museum in Kabul). 50
The international community did not intercede in
Afghanistan while these crimes were occurring. Early intervention to protect

42. See generally Alvarez, supra note 22; see also Carroll, supra note 27, at 193.
43. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Steven Lee Myers, Senior Administration Officials Defend Military
Tribunalsfor TerroristSuspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B6.
44. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Rules Set on Afghan War Prosecutions,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002,
at Al.
45. See Schabas, supra note 33, at 551-52 (illustrating that whereas Rwandan domestic courts
have awarded the death penalty, the ICTR is not empowered to do so; thus, the leaders of the Rwandan
genocide, over whom the ICTR has custody, are entitled to more advanced procedural protections and
avoid the death penalty, whereas the "lower-down" offenders in the custody of the Rwandan
government have less procedural protection but face more severe sentences).
46. See Ossai Miazad, Transitional Justice in Post-war Afghanistan, 9 HuM. RTS. BR. 2, 2-6
(2002). See also David Treyster, The Taliban May No Longer Control Afghanistan, but Their
Persecutionof Religious Minorities Will Forever Remain a Stain on GlobalHistory, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 527, 527-532 (2002).
47. See Treyster, supra note 46, at 529.
48. See generally Alicia Galea, No Freedom for Afghan Women: The Taliban Hides Behind
Religion To Control Its People, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 341 (2001). See also Anastasia Telesetsky,
In the Shadows and Behind the Veil: Women in Afghanistan Under Taliban Rule, 13 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 293 (1998); Shannon Middleton, Women's Rights Unveiled: Taliban's Treatment of
Women in Afghanistan, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 421 (2001).
49. Mark Drumbl, Put the Taliban on Trial - In Afghanistan; U.N. - Assisted Tribunals,
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Dec. 2, 2002, at Al3.
50. See Drumbl, supra note 49, at A13; Treyster, supra note 46, at 532. See also Steven Wilf,
Ownership and Protection of Heritage: Cultural Property Rights for the 21' Century: What is
Property's Fourth Estate? CulturalPropertyand the FiduciaryIdeal, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 177 (2001).
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suffering Afghans may have impeded the symbiotic growth of al-Qaeda and
Taliban power.
If proven, some of these crimes would constitute violations of customary
international law. Others would constitute gross human rights offenses, namely
serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights
law that, in turn, qualify as crimes under international law. Others would infringe
a number of international treaties and conventions. Full justice for all victims of
True
Taliban barbarity may therefore require more criminal prosecutions.
accountability would oblige the Taliban to answer to these charges in addition to
complicity in the September 11th attack.
Where should they be
Who should prosecute these alleged crimes?
adjudicated? For example, could U.S. federal courts exercise universal jurisdiction
to adjudicate criminally regarding torture? Alternately, there is a possibility of
civil lawsuits involving breaches of the law of nations undertaken pursuant to the
federal Alien Tort Claims Act or Torture Victim Protection Act. 5 1 Given the
difficulties that inhere enforcing any actual damage award, these claims could be
limited to providing victims with symbolic justice. Foreign national courts - in
particular, in Belgium, Switzerland and Germany - have been active in exercising
universal jurisdiction to criminally prosecute human rights abusers.52 The planned
U.S. military commissions appear unable to exercise universal jurisdiction over the
In all cases, and regardless of jurisdictional
Taliban's "other" crimes.53
possibilities, it appears doubtful that there is a political commitment to pursue
these crimes in the U.S. or through military prosecutions.54
Perhaps an international tribunal created by the Security Council would be
appropriate. Alternately, these may be the kinds of crimes that U.N.-assisted
tribunals in Afghanistan should address. Such tribunals could involve Afghan
jurists and inclusively invoke Afghan custom, Islamic law, and public international
law. In this vein, perhaps prosecutions of al-Qaeda operatives should be viewed
differently than those of Taliban officials. Although the U.S. legitimately asserts a
strong interest in prosecuting al-Qaeda operatives committing attacks within the
U.S., and the international community calls for the condemnation of terrorism as a
crime against humanity, it seems that Afghanistan is the place with the greatest
interest in prosecuting Taliban leaders for their overall pattern of criminality. Such
prosecutions could form an important part of nation-building in Afghanistan. They
could also help to construct a domestic judicial system, thwart the impunity that
has marked much of Afghan history, and promote the rule of law. They could also

51. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350 (2002).
52. See Beth Van Schaack, InternationalLaw Weekend Proceedings: The Civil Enforcement of
Human Rights Norms In Domestic Courts, 6 ILSA J INT'L & COMP L 295, 296-98 (2000). See also
Monica Hans, Providingfor Uniformity in the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction: Can Either the
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction or an InternationalCriminal Court Accomplish this

Goal?, 15

TRANSNAT'L LAW. 357

(2002).

53. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Agora: Military Commissions: JurisdictionOf MilitaryCommissions and
The Ambiguous War On Terrorism, 96 A.J.I.L. 345 (2002).
54. See generally Paust, supra note 19.
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form an important forum in which globalized human rights law is sedimentarily
layered upon Islamic law (as locally followed) in which both meet as "equal
strangers" and thereby build a universal rule of law. One of the greatest challenges
of human rights law is shedding its perceived status as a Western meta-narrative to
which other local narratives are subaltern. Prosecuting the Taliban's international
crimes committed locally in Afghanistan against Afghans could be a thoughtful
exercise in this reconciliation and harmonization process.
The Taliban's "other" crimes, committed systematically over a number of
years, should not be overlooked. Giving succor to terrorists is only one part of the
Taliban's litany of criminality. In avenging our own victimization we should not
brush aside the many other victims. It would be unfair for us to exercise primacy
and exclusivity over captured Taliban officials and try them only for the September
l1th attack. Doing so "hides" the Taliban's crimes when committed against
"others" as opposed to "us." Instead, we should endeavor to coordinate our needs
for justice with those felt by others. Only then would the Taliban face a thorough
accounting.
In conclusion, legal responses to the September 11 attack could operate at a
multiplicity of levels. Senior al-Qaeda leaders could face an international tribunal
charging them with crimes against humanity. Lower-level terrorists could be
processed through national court systems adjusted for national security concerns.
Taliban officials could face the Afghan people they have brutalized in U.N.
assisted tribunals integrated with the process of Afghanistan's reconstruction and
stabilization. This polycentric approach may strike an effective balance among
various goals, namely punishing terrorists, deterring future breaches, protecting
national security interests, demystifying terrorist mystique, and constructing multiethnic governance in Afghanistan. Such a process can also establish linkages
between Islamic and Western legal communities. On the other hand, summarily
prosecuting in military commissions may erode the rule of law that painstakingly drop-by-drop and bit-by-bit - has been built since Nuremberg. Ultimately, this
erosion may be precisely what terrorists perversely hoped for.
In thinking about how we respond to terrorism today, we need to be mindful
of the future effects our actions have on legalism and international rule of law.
The post-Nuremberg era has seen the gradual emergence in international relations
of what political theorist Judith Shklar calls "legalism" - "the ethical attitude that
holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to
consist of duties and rights determined by rules." "5 Legalism includes an important
element of process and has come into play even "when so doing has greatly
complicated international diplomacy. 56 Law has attempted, principally through
the vehicle of international human rights and international criminal law, to answer
complex problems of violence, hatred, and aggression. The reaction to massacre in
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and East Timor has been legalist, despite the fact

55. See generally JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1 (1986).
56. See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 20,24,280 (2000).
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57
that "this legalism may sometimes seem eccentric [or] absurdly pious."
Response to the atrocity of September 11 th - whether on the level of modifying the
rules regarding self-defense, avoiding strict adherence to Security Council
approval of the use of force, demonstrating diffidence regarding the Geneva
Conventions, or the exceptional use of military commissions - may signify a
movement away from legalism.

57. BASS, supra note 56, at 281.

THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND
SEPTEMBER 11TH:
WAKE-UP CALL TO GET THE TREATIES RIGHT
LARRY D. JOHNSON*
There are two international treaties currently being drafted specifically on
nuclear terrorism.' Both could require that specific measures be taken worldwide
to protect and secure nuclear facilities from terrorist attack and sabotage; but
neither one does. United States' efforts to include such requirements were
thwarted by some of our closest "coalition" allies before September 1 th. Now is
the time to revive those efforts. September 11th should have taught us some
important lessons.
LESSONS OF SEPTEMBER 1 ITH

The first lesson is that we can no longer assume that no one "in his right
mind" would commit a terrorist act for fear of dying or being exposed to dangerous
ionizing radiation. It is now clear that large numbers of people are more than
willing to die as martyrs for a cause. This undercuts a presumption, which up to
now, played a major role behind assessments of what is required to defend nuclear
materials and facilities against terrorists and sabotage.
The second lesson is drawn from the first: so-called "dirty" bombs are now
more plausible. We can no longer assume that a terrorist will be deterred by
concerns of self-preservation in order to build or disperse a "dirty" bomb, a
conventional explosive device designed to disperse radioactivity, whether as a
result of radioactive material being made a part of the device, or it being made the
target of the device. For example, a bomb directed at a nuclear reactor or a spent
fuel pond where "used" but highly radioactive fuel rods are cooling is a "dirty"
bomb. The effects of such a "dirty" bomb would not, of course, equal the
devastation of exploding a nuclear device, but its effects would be psychological

" Homer G. and Ann Berryhill Angelo Visiting Professor of Law at UC Davis School of Law in
California for the academic year 2001-2002, served as The Legal Adviser of the LAEA from 1997 to
2001. Prior to that he served as Principal Legal Officer in the Office of the UN Legal Counsel. He is a
graduate of the Harvard Law School, the JFK School of Government of Harvard University and the
University of Nebraska.
I. See Larry D. Johnson, Lessons of 9/11 for the Protection and Security of all Radioactive
Material, Pacific Council on International Policy, at http://www.pacificcouncil.org (last visited Sept.
22, 2002).
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and politically calamitous. In the town of Goifnia in Brazil, the rupture of a
radioactive "source," which had been used for medical purposes but carelessly
discarded caused disruption, panic, several deaths, and hundreds of people,
buildings, and large tracts of land to be contaminated. 2
The third lesson is, what happens in other parts of the world can have a direct
impact upon Americans' safety and security. While we strive to make sure our
own nuclear facilities are safe from theft or sabotage, a potential terrorist might
well be able to obtain material through theft or illegal purchase in other countries
for delivery to our doorstep. There are technical limitations in detecting nuclear
material at border locations For example, do we know how well the containers
arriving at the Port of Newark are screened? The preventive approach calls for
measures to make sure the material never leaves its place of origin, as we attempt
to do with other material we do not want to enter the country.
Fourth, as far as terrorism treaties are concerned, they miss the mark. They
focus on criminalizing the acts and punishing the terrorists, but only after the thief
has let the horse out of the barn. 4 In view of the nature of this beast - dangerous
radioactive material - the point should be to make sure the thief does not get
anywhere near the barn. Nuclear terrorism treaties should require specific
measures of prevention to make it harder for would-be terrorists to commit acts of
nuclear terrorism.
WHAT'S NEEDED?

Today, there are no binding preventive measures on the international level;
each country is on its own. It is the responsibility of national governments to
provide for protection and security as part of their "sovereign" rights and
responsibilities. 5 That does not fly after September 1Ith. Today, it is in our best
interest to have countries thousands of miles away apply preventive measures to
make it more difficult for terrorists to get their hands on this material and to inflict
harm on others including our own citizens.
WHAT KIND OF "DANGEROUS" RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

In the past, treaties and international regulation have focused on certain
radioactive material considered "dangerous" because it can be used to make
nuclear weapons. 6 Such "fissionable" material can start a chain reaction, which if
2. See INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), THE RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT IN
GOIANIA, (Vienna 1988).
3. See Johnson, supra note 1.
4. Doug Cassel, With UN Help, US. Has Tools for Pursuit; Desperately Seeking Osama,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 21, 2001, availableat http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/ihr/issues/
tribteffor102101 I.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2002).
5. Larry D. Johnson, Treaties Against Nuclear Terrorism: The Global Legal Framework can
Make a Difference, IAEA Bulletin 44/1/2002, available at http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Periodicals/
Bulletin/Bul1441/article2.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2002).
6. See Johnson, supra note 5.
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uncontrolled would lead to a nuclear explosion.7 This material is highly enriched
uranium and plutonium, which can also be used for peaceful purposes in nuclear
power plants to produce a controlled chain reaction. 8 It is this "nuclear material"
that is the subject of various non-proliferation treaties and agreements. 9 This
material may be described in a non-technical way as "weapons-usable" radioactive
material.
The interesting thing is that such material, depending on the
circumstances and the particular stage in the process, may or may not be
particularly dangerous to your health.' 0
Other radioactive material is not fissionable and thus cannot be used to
produce a nuclear explosion or weapon, but is nevertheless "dangerous" because
the ionizing radiation it emits may do serious damage to your health. This kind of
material is used, for example, in medicine and industry and is meant to be subject
to strict national regulation." Examples of this kind of radioactive material are
cesium, cobalt, iridium and strontium.
From the point of view of a terrorist, both types of radioactive material have
their attractions. Obviously, a terrorist might well try to get his hands on a nuclear
weapon or on weapons-usable material to try to construct a crude bomb on the
basis of the publicly available "cook books." But a terrorist might well also aim at
obtaining the other radioactive material in an attempt to make a "dirty" bomb.
THE TREATY ASPECTS TO THE PROBLEM

The international community has, up to now, not looked at the two
12
"dangerous" aspects of radioactive material in any comprehensive manner.
There are now two treaties currently being negotiated on aspects of nuclear
terrorism, with some overlap between them; not exactly ideal. Both could include
measures of prevention but both are woefully weak in that regard.
THE CONVENTION IN THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
13
The "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material" (CPPNM)
was adopted in 1980 under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), the U.N.-related international "watch-dog" organization with
technical expertise in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 14 The

7. How Nuclear Bombs Work, Marshall Brain's How Stuff Works, at
http://www.howstuffworks.com/nuclear-bomb3.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2002).
8. Energy Fact Sheet, Nuclear Fission, at http://www.iclei.orglefacts/fission.htm (last visited

Sept. 22,2002).
9. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970, U.N.T.S. no 10485, vol.
729, availableat http://www.unog.ch/disarm/distreat/npt.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2002).
10. See Johnson, supra note 5.

11. Id.
12. See Johnson, supra note 1.

13. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 28, 1979, IAEA doc.
NFCIRC/274/Rev.1 [hereinafter CPPNM].
14. Profile of the IAEA, at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/About/Profile/ (last visited Sept. 6,
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CPPNM concerns only weapons-usable material and mandates a few preventive
measures, but only during international transport.' 5 It also criminalizes various
acts, such as theft and illegal acquisition, possession, and use if nuclear material6
while in storage or during transport, whether domestic or international.'
Otherwise, how countries protect and make secure their own nuclear material is
left for them to decide, a matter of domestic sovereignty. Outside the framework
of the CPPNM, the IAEA in 1999 published specific preventive measures, which
States should take in order to protect nuclear material from theft and nuclear
facilities from sabotage. They are even termed "requirements," but in fact and in
law are only recommendations.' 7 Such measures include, for example, the posting
of guards and construction of barriers.' 8 A review process was started in 1999 to
ascertain if and how the CPPNM could be strengthened. 19 For a long time the
Director General of the IAEA and various Governments held that the treaty is too
limited and needs strengthening. Laudably, the U.S. initially proposed amending
the Convention to make the 1999 IAEA recommendations binding. In addition, it
proposed including in the Convention some form of review mechanism by which
countries would be held accountable for what they do to protect and secure their
nuclear material and facilities. While no public records of these meetings exist,
there have been reports that these proposals were opposed by none other than some
of our "grand coalition" partners against terrorism: the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and Belgium.20
As a result of opposition, the U.S. agreed in May 2001 to a "package deal" at
a meeting of experts held in Vienna. 2 1 By the terms of that deal, the scope of the
CPPNM was notionally expanded to cover domestic use, storage, and transport of
nuclear material as well as sabotage of nuclear facilities. But no new specific
preventive measures were required. Instead, broad "Objectives and Fundamental
Principles" are to be included in the revised CPPNM. These are vague, general
obligations without specifics. Examples of such "Objectives" are: "To protect
against unauthorized removal of nuclear material in use and storage, and during
transport," and "[tjo investigate or minimize the radiological consequences of
sabotage."
Examples of "Fundamental Principles" include "Fundamental

2002).
15. See CPPNM, supra note 16, at art. 1Ipara. 1.
16. See Id, at art. VII.
17. See The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, Table of Contents, at
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/program/protection/inf225rev4/rev4_content.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2002); See also Id at Preface [hereinafter Preface].
18. See Id at Introduction. See also Requirements for Physical Protection Against Unauthorized
Removal of Nuclear Material in Use and Storage, at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/program/
protection/inf225rev4/rev4_removal.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002); See also Requirements for
Physical Protection Against Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Material During Use and
Storage, at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/program/protection/ inf225rev4/rev4_sabotage.html (last
visited Sept. 6, 2002).
19. George Bunn, Raising InternationalStandardsfor ProtectingNuclear Materialsfrom Theft
and Sabotage, THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, 154 (Summer 2000).
20. Id. at 152.
21. Id. at 152-154.
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Principle A: Responsibility of the State. The responsibility for the establishment,
implementation and maintenance of the physical protection regime within a State
rests entirely with that State;" and "Fundamental Principle I: Defense in Depth
The State's requirements for physical protection should reflect a concept of several
layers and methods of protection (structural or other technical, personnel and
organizational) thai leave to be overcome or circumvented by an adversary in order
to achieve his objectives." 22 Countries are left free to decide how to implement
these "Objectives and Fundamental Principles", which basically are descriptive at
best and a mere "wish list" at worst.
In fact, the May 2001 package deal went further and specifically excluded
from future consideration the two most important proposed amendments: (a)
even taking note of them); and
making the 1999 preventive measures binding (or
23
mechanism.
review
of
sort
some
establishing
(b)
That was pre-September 11th. In the light of the lessons learned from
September 11th, the U.S. should revert to its earlier proposals and insist on the
need to do so. Meetings of legal and technical experts are being held in Vienna at
24
various times throughout 2002 to consider finalizing possible amendments.
Thus, the time to act is now.
THE DRAFT TREATY FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM

In New York, the Legal Committee of the United Nations General Assembly
has before it a draft treaty initially proposed by the Russian Federation on the
suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.25 Contrary to the IAEA's CPPNM, this
draft is focused on both kinds of radioactive material; both the "weapons-usable"
material and other material, which can be dangerous to life and limb. It includes
the usual criminalization provisions and a weak preventive measure, calling on
countries to simply take into account IAEA recommendations on the protection of
radioactive material.26
After September 1 th, the General Assembly should take a policy decision
that binding preventive measures should be included in the treaty. The drafters
must go beyond their focus on the suppression of criminal acts and the
extradition/prosecution of perpetrators.
The next meeting at which the General Assembly is due to take up the issue is

22. See International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference document, Nuclear Verification
and Security of Material: Physical Protection Objectives and FundamentalPrinciples, Sept. 14, 2001,
IAEA doc. GC(45)/INF/14 Attachment, available at http://www.iaea.org/worIdatom/About/Policy/
GC/GC45/Documents/gc45inf-14.pdf [hereinafter General Conference].
23. ld.
24. Id.
25. See General Conference, supranote 29.
26. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of
17 December 1996, available at gopher://gopher.un.org/00/ga/docs/53/plenary/a53-37.en (last visited
Sept. 6, 2002).
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in September 2002.27 The Assembly should task the Director General of the IAEA
to submit draft preventive measures, which could be included as requirements in
the treaty. What is important is that a policy decision be made by Governments to
include such provisions in the treaty. The experts competent in the field would be
instructed to come up with technically viable texts for Governments to examine
and insert into the treaty.
ARGUMENTS FOR MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

Those against the position advocated above may argue that the package deal
in the IAEA is a "done deal," the "train has left the station," and that we should not
risk undoing the results already achieved. They may argue that an overly legal,
treaty approach is too detailed, will take too much time, and disregards the
technical complexities involved. Others might worry that if the treaty were too
specific about preventive measures, it would reveal to would-be terrorists sensitive
information on how security is maintained, which they could then try to
circumvent. Another argument is that the U.S. and others are quietly, behind the
scenes, already providing sufficient protection and security advice to a number of
countries on a bilateral basis.
In reply to those who would argue we must stick to the pre-September 11 th
"package deal," under the law of treaties commitments can be adjusted in the event
of a fundamental change of circumstances (i.e., September 11th). Moreover, while
sensitive security matters must indeed be kept from potential terrorists. But the
1999 IAEA recommendations are already public; making them binding has nothing
to do with revealing secrets. Existing IAEA advisory missions on physical
protection have not resulted in exposing sensitive matters. Bilateral measures may
play a very important (if somewhat unknown) role in helping countries develop
preventive measures but tools at the multilateral level should not be overlooked if
we are engaged in comprehensive global efforts to combat terrorism.
There may be a legitimate concern that even if European coalition partners
were to go along with binding preventive measures, certain nuclear powers such as
China and Russia could still oppose them. It might be better to have consensus on
broad generalities than to have meaningful preventive measure accepted by some
but not all. But consensus is not the only test. Binding preventive measures
adopted by the other States of the former Soviet Union would be valuable in and of
itself, even if Russia were not immediately on board. Besides, Governments
would be reluctant to be perceived as "hold outs" in the campaign against global
terrorism.
WHAT IS NEEDED: POLICY-MAKERS FOCUSING ON THE ISSUE

One of the reasons the people of the United States established the Constitution
in 1789 was to "provide for the common defense." After September 11th, one
27. See Forthcoming General Assembly 57h Session: To Open on 10 September 2002, available
al http://www.un.org/ga/57/document57.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).

86

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 31 :1

could reasonably assume that the U.S. public wants our government to take all
possible and lawful measures to ensure that innocent civilians will never again be
subjected to such attacks by fanatical, suicidal purveyors of death and destruction,
and that all tools should be examined for use in that effort, including international
treaties.
These are public policy matters requiring the attention of policy-makers who
must be made aware of the problem, have options, weigh and balance the elements,
make informed decisions, and give instructions to the technical and legal experts as
to what the policy is. This is a matter of providing for the security and well-being
not only of Americans, but also of basically everyone on the planet. It should be
seen as part of the global campaign against terrorism, as well as of the homeland
security effort.
It is time for policy-makers to focus on the treaty-making aspect of this
campaign. The U.S. should go beyond "feel good" treaty amendments with no
"bite". If the drafters of nuclear terrorism treaties ignore the lessons of September
11th, they do so at their, and our, peril.

COMPULSORY INTER-STATE ARBITRATION OF
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
Srecko "Lucky" Vidmar*
Just or unjust, the decision of the arbiterswill save the credit, the honour, of
the contendingparty. - Jeremy Bentham'
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from
Yugoslavia. The two former republics were welcomed as independent states by
the international community on January 15, 1992, when the European Community
(EC) extended its official recognition.2 The two richest and most developed
former republics followed markedly different paths during the decade following
Slovenia's steady investment in transportation and
their independence.
information infrastructure, modernization of its economy, and rebuilding of its
civil society earned it praise as "poster child" 3 of post-Communist development.
On the other hand, Croatia, led by President Franjo Tudjman, was economically
stagnant and diplomatically isolated following a bloody civil war and its
involvement in the Bosnian conflict.
The two neighboring states professed their friendship and closeness during the
1990s, but the regional war and the international ostracism resulting from Croatian
government policies had the effect of freezing all negotiations between the two
states regarding the final demarcation of their boundary. This diplomatic stalemate
resulted in frequent, and sometimes violent, skirmishes between Slovenian fishing
boats and the Croatian Navy in the Bay of Piran.
President Tudjman's death in December 1999, 4 was followed by a resounding
defeat of his party in the subsequent parliamentary elections. The new coalition
government was welcomed with renewed enthusiasm both by the people of Croatia

"J.D. Candidate, May 2003, University of Denver College of Law; B.S., 1994, M.S., 1997, University
of Colorado at Boulder. The author wishes to thank Catherine McNamara, Amber Paris, and Debby
Paris, for their encouragement, help, and support.
1. JEREMY BENTHAM, A Plan for Universal and Perpetual Peace, in PRINCIPLES OF
LAW (Bowring ed. 1843), available at http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/
poltheory/benthan/pil/index.html#nOlret (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
2. Maurizio Ragazzi, Conference on Yugoslavia ArbitrationCommission: Opinions on Questions
Arising From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1490 (1992).
3. According to the U.S. President Bill Clinton. Going Nordic, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 29, 1999.
INTERNATIONAL

4. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Snubbed by the West, Tudjman Receives a Posthumous Rebuke,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at A5.
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and by the international community. 5 In addition to dealing with a depressed
economy and a corrupt civil service, the new government led by President Mesic
and Prime Minister Racan immediately sought to re-establish Croatia's ties to
Western Europe,6 and, closer to home, to resolve the outstanding boundary
questions with Slovenia, most notably the maritime delimitation of the Bay of
Piran (the Bay).
The Bay is located on the extreme northern end of the Adriatic Sea. As the
map in the Appendix indicates, the adjacent coasts of the Bay belong to Croatia on
the south, and Slovenia on the north. The Bay's small size (it is less than 10 km
wide at its mouth) does not reflect its importance in maritime delimitation of the
wider geographical area known as the Gulf of Trieste. The peculiar geographic
features of the Gulf of Trieste, bounded by Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia, create an
unusual triangular problem of maritime delimitation.
A straightforward
application of the equidistance principle8 results in enclavement of the Slovenian
territorial sea between the territorial waters of Italy and Croatia, leaving Slovenia
with no extended economic zone and, more importantly, no direct access to the
high seas.
While international law provides for freedom of peaceful navigation and
access to the high seas, 9 the government of Slovenia has insisted on a delimitation
that would result in its territorial waters directly opening to the high seas. As a
small, but commercially active, state,'0 Slovenia views sovereign control over the
access to the high seas as both an economic and military necessity. Given the
geography of the Gulf of Trieste, the only way to achieve the result desired by
Slovenia without disturbing the "external" frontiers of the former Yugoslavia and
Italy, is to delimit the Bay so that about twenty percent of its area remains Croatian
territorial sea, and the rest of it falls under Slovenian territorial sovereignty. This
delimitation would give Slovenia an aperture to the high seas about five kilometers
wide.
Recently, the two governments were involved in close consultations on
various levels, political and legal, trying to resolve the problem of maritime
delimitation. Finally, on July 20, 2001, the prime ministers of the two countries

5. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Pro-Western Opposition Defeats Croatia's Ruling Nationalists,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2000, at A4.
6. Vinka Drezga, Pregovoris Uniyom do podcetka ljeta? [Negotiations With the Union by This
Summer?], VJESNIK (Zagreb, Croatia), Mar. 29, 2000, at 1.
7. Saga Vidmajer, Vee Kot le Sosedstvo [More Than Mere Neighbors], DELO (Ljubljana,
Slovenia), Mar. 21, 2000, at 1; Mesi& Svi se problemi so Sloven yom mogu ryegiti u obostranom
nteresu [Mesic: All Problems With Slovenia Can be Solved To Mutual Satisfaction], VJESNIK, Mar. 21,
2000, at 1; Edgy Start: Croatia's CautiousNew Government, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 2000.
8. United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea, Dec. 10 1982, art. 15, U.N. Doc
A/CONF.62/122 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
9. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 17, protects the right of innocent passage.
10. Slovenia's 2 million inhabitants occupy an area of about 20,000 km2 . The CIA World
Factbook-Slovenia, at http://www.cia.gov/publications/factbook/goes/si.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2002).
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initialed a draft agreement that satisfied Slovenian desires, as described above."i
While the Parliament of Slovenia immediately ratified the agreement, the Croatian
Parliament refused to give its approval, citing abuse of power by the Prime
Minister in ceding territory without the constitutionally required procedures. The
Croatian government, frustrated with the process, called on the two states to submit
to binding third-party arbitration to finally settle the dispute.
Slovenia has, so far, refused the offer to arbitrate, hoping that international
pressure on Croatia will lead to its ratification of the agreement. In this paper, the
author argues that Slovenia and Croatia, and indeed all states, should accept
international arbitration as an effective method for resolving boundary delimitation
disputes. The Charter of the United Nations requires that states settle their disputes
by peaceful means. 12 The Charter, however, does not place an affirmative duty on
states to actually settle their disputes. Keeping in mind the stated goal of the13
United Nations (UN) to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,"'
and realizing that unresolved territorial disputes tend to lead to armed conflicts, the
UN should take affirmative steps to craft an international dispute resolution
infrastructure for settling territorial disputes before they threaten international
peace and security.
International arbitration has been a successful method for solving territorial
disputes for centuries. In Part II of this paper, the author gives an historical
overview of arbitral practice, especially as it relates to boundary disputes. In Part
III, following a survey of territorial disputes since the Second World War, the
author analyzes the aspects of international arbitration that continue to make it a
preferred method of territorial dispute resolution, and proposes a multilateral
agreement under the auspices of the UN, under which states-parties would agree to
compulsory arbitration of their territorial disputes. Finally, the proposed dispute
resolution mechanism is put to the test in Part IV where the author applies it to the
problem of the delimitation of the Bay.
II. ARBITRATING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES - A HISTORICAL

NOTE

The practice of arbitration significantly predates judicial settlement in
international relations, as opposed to municipal law. According to Greek
mythology, the dispute over possession of the Corinthian territory between
Poseidon, god of the sea, and Helios, the sun-god, was settled by Briareus, the
hundred-handed giant acting as an impartial arbitrator. 14 With such a distinguished
pedigree, international arbitration was relied upon by states for settling their
territorial disputes for centuries. Third-party settlement through arbitration is

11. Mihailo Nieota, Slovenya prvi put dobiva izlaz na otvoreno more [Slovenia Gains Access to
the Open Seas For the FirstTime], VJESNIK, July 21, 2001, at 1; Peter Zerjavid, Racan in Morfe [Racan
and the Sea], DELO, July 20, 2001, at 6.
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 3.
13. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
14. JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 153
(1929).
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particularly well suited to territorial disputes because the disputants usually have a
high incentive to achieve a timely settlement.
Certainty and stability of
international frontiers is essential for economic development and exploitation of
natural resources, and an authoritative decision-making arbitral panel tends to
imprint legitimacy on a solution that might otherwise be difficult to achieve in
light of domestic political pressures.' 5
While territorial disputes tend to be framed in highly emotional terms, the
disputants typically agree on the applicable law, e.g., the colonial principle of uti
possidetis16 or the application of the equidistance principle 17 to maritime
delimitation. An arbitral tribunal is an excellent medium for taking into account
extensive factual evidence, which usually spans centuries, such as maps, treaties,
and other ancient documents. Where the states have a different view of the
applicable law, as in the dispute between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, the arbitral
tribunal can play only a limited role.' 8 On the other hand, several cases involving
territorial delimitation in similar circumstances were successfully resolved by
arbitration because the disputants were in agreement on the applicability of the uti
possidetis principle, leaving to the arbitral tribunal the technical task of applying
that legal principle to the particular factual context of each dispute. 19 Finally,
arbitration by its very nature tends to produce delimitation solutions whereby both
sides can feel that they achieved at least some of what they desired, making arbitral
solutions an effective way of dealing with domestic political opinion.20
A. Early Origins of Inter State Arbitration
Inter-state arbitration was used as a tool for settling territorial disputes since
the earliest manifestations of statehood and inter-state relations. The treaty
between Sparta and Argos, dating to the fifth century B.C., provided:
If there should arise a difference between any of the towns of the Peloponesus or
beyond, either as to frontiers or any other object, there shall be an arbitration. If

among the allied towns they are not able to come to an agreement,
the dispute will
2
be brought before a neutral town chosen by common agreement.

The Middle Ages saw the organization of units of governance and territory
that may be recognizable as modem states. The disputes that inevitably arose

15. Christine Gray and Benedict Kingsbury, Developments in Dispute Settlement: Inter-state
ArbitrationSince 1945, 63 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 97, 108 (1992).

16. See infra note 149.
17. UNCLOS, supra note 8, at art. 15.
18. See, e.g., Arbitration Tribunal for the Determination of the Maritime Boundary between
Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), 1989 I.C.J.126 (July 31, 1989), where GuineaBissau denied the applicability of the uti possidetis principle to a colonial delimitation in treaty in
question.
19. Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 15, at 117.
20. Id. at 108.
21. RALSTON, supra note 14, at 157 (quoting Thucydides).
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among them were most often settled by way of Papal arbitration.22 This arbitral
method was heavily influenced by the historical context of the Papacy, which,
invested with both divine and sovereign power, often acted without regard for law
or justice, having its own interests foremost in mind. Perhaps it is precisely
because the Papal arbitration was more likely to be concerned with attaining and
maintaining order that the earthly princes of Mediaeval Europe often availed
themselves of the dispute resolution mechanism run by the Papacy.23 One of the
more telling illustrations of the power and flexibility of Papal arbitrations is the
award by Pope Alexander V124 who settled disputed claims in the New World
between Spain and Portugal by drawing
an imaginary line from one pole to the
25
other, dividing the territory in half.

The 1794 General Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between
the United States and the United Kingdom (commonly known as the Jay Treaty
after John Jay, the U.S. Secretary of State who negotiated it) formalized, perhaps
for the first time, arbitration as an accepted method for settling complex disputes
among states. 26 One of the issues settled by arbitration under the Jay Treaty was
the boundary line between the remaining British possessions and the United States,
specifically the exact position and course of the St. Croix River. It is interesting to
note that the award was agreed upon by a mixed commission of arbitrators
appointed by the states, who then together appointed one neutral commissioner.
The 1814 Treaty of Ghent, ending the War of 1812 between the United States
and the United Kingdom, provided that four outstanding territorial questions
between the states would be resolved by four separate arbitral panels.27 The
procedural wrinkles in the Treaty of Ghent were slightly different from the Jay
Treaty, giving power to settle the matter to a disinterested sovereign in the event
the mixed commissions appointed by the parties failed to reach an agreement. 28
This recourse to a more old-fashioned arbitral practice, relying on the authority and
putative wisdom of a sovereign, did not prove successful. The question of the
northeastern boundary could not be resolved by the commissioners and was
referred to the King of the Netherlands for his decision. The United States rejected
the King's recommendatory decision that did not follow the terms of the
compromis, and the parties ended up settling the issue through negotiations and the
subsequent Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842.29 This early example, later

22. RALSTON, supra note 14, at 174.

23. The Papacy offered "the singular spectacle of conciliation and peace advancing between
populations of the most warlike character." RALSTON, supra note 14, at 176.
24. Pope Alexander VI, infamous for the deeds of his children, Cesare and Lucrezia Borgia,
ascended to the Papacy in 1492. He was the first Pope to send missionaries to the New World. Catholic
Encyclopedia: Pope Alexander VI, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01289a.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2002).
25. RALSTON, supra note 14, at 181.
26. J. L. SIMPSON & HAZEL Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (1959);
RALSTON, supra note 14, at 191.
27. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 26, at 2; RALSTON, supra note 14, at 194.
28. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 26, at 2.
29. Id.; RALSTON, supra note 14, at 194.
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confirmed by modem practice, shows that the success of an arbitral panel largely
depends on the ability of the party-appointed arbitrators to reach an agreement
without recourse to the neutral member of the panel. Territorial disputes, by their
very nature, allow the arbitrators to "temper justice with diplomacy, to give a
measure of satisfaction to both sides. 30
The remainder of the relatively peaceful 19th Century witnessed scores of
inter-state arbitrations dealing with state responsibility, 31 injury to aliens, and
frequent territorial disputes. 32 Disputes over boundaries were not always referred
to mixed expert commissions. States continued to rely on august sovereigns, as in
the Bulama Island case33 and the San Juan de Fuca arbitration.34 The use of mixed
commissions or collegiate courts, however, prevailed towards the end of the
century, perhaps because the European sovereigns realized that arbitral decisions
should no longer be their personal responsibility. The President of France, for
example, having been given broad power by the disputants to resolve the Delagoa
Bay issue between Portugal and the United Kingdom, created a commission of
respected jurists and signed the award that it produced.35
The turn into the 20th Century was marked by two seminal international
gatherings at the Hague in 1899 and 1907, both dealing with the issue of peaceful
settlement of disputes.36 The conferences resulted in two Conventions for the
37
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which devoted extensive treatment
to the arbitral process including the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA), which was supposed to provide the infrastructure for the peaceful world
imagined by the conference participants.
After a promising beginning during which several complex cases were
referred to the PCA and settled,3 8 the institution suffered a steady and welldocumented decline into disuse. 39 Interest in arbitrating territorial disputes,

30. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 26, at 3.
31. See, e.g., PETER SEIDEL, The Alabama, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
97-99 (1992), for a discussion on the Alabama Claim between the United States and the United
Kingdom.
32. It has been suggested that frequent recourse to arbitration might have contributed to the
relative calm during the 19 h Century. See Louis B. Sohn, The Function of InternationalArbitration
Today, in 1963 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 10 (1963) [hereinafter InternationalArbitration Today].
33. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 26, at 7.
34. Id.at 9.
35. Id. at 10-11.
36. Each of the two Hague documents is known as the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
Intemational Disputes. For text of the First Hague Convention of July 29, 1899, see MAJOR PEACE
TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1115 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1967). The Second Hague Convention of
October 18, 1907 is available at page 1197 of the same volume.
37. 54 articles out of the 97 comprising the Convention are devoted to arbitration. See The
Avalon Project - Laws of War, Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/pacific.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
38. The Pious Fund Case (1902), 9 R.I.A.A. 14; Venezuelan Preferential Case (1904), 9 R.I.A.A.
107; Japanese House Tax Case (1905), 11 R.I.A.A. 51.
39. See, e.g., William E. Butler, The PermanentCourt ofArbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 43 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992).
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however, remained strong, both by reference to royal settlement as well as mixed
commissions.40 Such commissions were at times granted permanent existence and
jurisdiction over disputes covering specific geographic areas, such as the U.S.Mexico Boundary Commission.4 '
B. Modern Inter-StateArbitration
The UN Charter expressly provided a place for arbitration among the
acceptable methods of peaceful settlement following the Second World War.42
The total number of inter-state arbitrations, however, declined dramatically
compared to the years before the war. A comprehensive survey of inter-state
arbitrations since 1900 indicates that 178 disputes were heard before 1945,
followed by less than fifty since then.43 This apparent disfavor of arbitration is
confirmed by the caseload of the PCA, which saw only a handful of cases referred
to it in the latter part of the 20th Century, following the early flurry of arbitrations
in the years leading up to the Second World War.44
This minimization of the role of arbitration is particularly telling given the
significant increase in the number of states since the war, as well as the
"astoundingly high" number of arbitration clauses inserted into bilateral and
multilateral treaties.45 Furthermore, arbitration remains popular in international
commercial relations.46
The bleak view of inter-state arbitration as a whole, however, does not reflect
its continued role in settling territorial disputes. The number of boundary
delimitation cases referred to arbitration, as a percentage of all arbitrated disputes,
remains steady, accounting for about a quarter of all arbitrations.47 This
phenomenon reflects the fact that territorial sovereignty disputes occur most
frequently when new states are emerging, as during the post-Colonial struggles of
the early post-War period, and the current territorial issues arising out of the

40. EVAN LUARD, FrontierDisputes in Modern InternationalRelations, in THE INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF FRONTIER DISPUTES 7, 26 (1970).

41. The Chamizal Case (1911), 11 R.I.A.A. 316.
42. The Charter lists negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and judicial
settlement. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
43. Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 15, at 98; A. M. STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS 1794-1989 (1990).
44. "Of the twenty-five cases considered by [the PCA...I, twenty-one were disposed of within its
first three decades (1902-1932), one in 1935, and others successively in 1940, 1956, and the last in
1970." Butler, supra note 39, at 43-44.
45. See Gray & Kingsbury supra note 15, at 99. About two hundred bilateral dispute resolution
treaties are listed in UN Secretariat, Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of
InternationalDisputes, 1928-1948, U.N. Sales No. 1949.v.3. (1949). See also H. SMIT & V. PECHOTA,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION TREATIES (1998).
46. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 39, at 44; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter The New York Convention];
United Nations: U.N. Commission On International Trade Law Decision On Arbitration Rules And The
Text Of The Rules, 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976).
47. Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 15, at 108.

DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 1:1

breakdown of the communist states of Eastern Europe.4 g
One of the first and most notable territorial disputes settled by arbitration in
the latter part of the 20th Century was the Western Boundary dispute between
India and Pakistan, better known as the Rann of Kutch Arbitration. 49 The tribunal
was asked to delimit the Rann, a marine feature particular to the area, characterized
by varying degrees of salt-water flooding during the course of each year. India and
Pakistan, which became independent states in 1947 under the provisions of the
British Parliament's Indian Independence Act, abut either side of the Rann in the
old British Dominion of Kutch, near the Arabian Sea. The dispute over the
delimitation of the Rann led to armed hostilities in April, 1965, one of several
transgressions of peace between the parties in the latter part of the century. The
arbitration compromis of June 30, 1965, is notable not only for specifying a
flexible and efficient procedure of settling the dispute, but also for containing
within itself explicit cease-fire provisions ending the hostilities and recognizing the
desires of the disputants to settle their differences amicably. 50 The tribunal's
award, issued on February 19, 1968, was largely respected by India and Pakistan,
notwithstanding their continued differences over territorial delimitation in
Kashmir.
Relying on a somewhat more historic form, Chile and Argentina referred their
territorial dispute to arbitration by Queen Elizabeth II in 1966, 51 and again in 1971
when she was asked to intervene in the recurring problem of the delimitation of the
islands of the Beagle Channel. 2 Recent years saw the creation of a number of ad
hoc tribunals tasked with resolving territorial disputes, most notably the maritime
delimitation between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau in 1985, 53 the 1988 boundary
award concerning the Taba area between Egypt and Israel, 54 the dispute over St.
Pierre and Miquelon between Canada and France settled in 1992, 5 and most
recently, the proceedings under the auspices of the PCA delimiting the maritime
boundary between Yemen and Eritrea.56

48. LUARD, supra note 40, at 10.
49. The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal, 17 R.I.A.A. 1 (1968).
50. Id. at 7.
51. Hazel Fox, Arbitration, in THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FRONTIER DISPUTES 168,
172 (Evan Luard ed., 1970).
52. In the latter case, Her Britannic Majesty referred the dispute to arbitration by five former ICJ
judges, headed by Judge Fitzmaurice. She ratified their unanimous decision in 1977 which was not
accepted by the parties until 1984 under diplomatic mediation by the Vatican. See FRIEDRICH
KRATOCHWIL ET AL., PEACE AND DISPUTED SOVEREIGNTY 75 (1985).
53. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau: Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary, Feb. 14,
1985, 25 I.L.M. 251.
54. Egypt-Israel Arbitration Tribunal: Award in Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Area,
Sept. 29, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 1421.
55. Court of Arbitration for the Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada and France:
Decision in Case Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas, June 10, 1992,31 I.L.M. 1145.
56. Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration (Maritime Delimitation), Dec. 17, 1999, 40 I.L.M. 983.
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C. ArbitrationandJudicialSettlement
It has been suggested that "no intellectually persuasive distinction can be
made" between modem arbitration and judicial settlement.57 Proponents of this
position point to the relatively recent willingness of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) to temper the "ultra-positivist," strict and literal interpretation of
international law for which it was widely criticized.5 8 Any distinction between
arbitration and adjudication, it is argued, is blurred by the ICJ's increased reliance
on policy-based weighing and equity, along with the relaxation of ICJ Chambers
procedures. 59
Inter-state arbitration and adjudication by the ICJ share many similarities. On
the surface, the procedure followed by the ICJ in the cases of joint notification
closely resembles the arbitral procedure provided by the Hague Conventions. 60 In
both instances, proceedings are initiated by a compromis, a treaty between the
disputants that defines the subject of the dispute, lists relevant facts, and specifies
other procedural details. Arbitral tribunals and the ICJ both enjoy the compdtence
de la compitence, i.e., the presumption that each body has jurisdiction to decide
whether it is competent to hear the case presented to it by the compromis of the
parties. 6' Both situations typically involve presentation of arguments in two
phases - written pleadings and oral arguments.62
The composition of arbitral panels may closely resemble a Chamber of the
ICJ. For example, the five-member panel arbitrating the Beagle Channel dispute
63
between Argentina and Chile was composed entirely of the ICJ judges.
Furthermore, the principles of international law relied upon by the ICJ will
necessarily be reflected in any arbitral decision.
The degree of similarity between arbitration and adjudication, however,
should not mask several important distinctions that may make arbitration the
preferred method for resolving most territorial disputes. Chief among those factors
are secrecy, inability of third parties to intervene, and the flexibility with respect to
the issues to be resolved, the applicable law, the composition of the panel, and
other procedural aspects of an arbitral proceeding.

57. Edward McWhinney, The InternationalCourt as ConstitutionalCourt andthe Blurringof the
Arbitral/Judicial Processes, in THE FLAME REKINDLED: NEW HOPES FOR INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 81, 85 (Sam Muller & Wim Mijs eds., 1993); Professor Brownlie calls the distinction
"formal." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 705 (5th ed.,1998).
58. See McWhinney, supra note 57, at 85, especially referring to the South West Africa Case (Eth.
v. S. Mr.; Liber. v. S. Mr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (Judgment of July 18).
59. The United States and Canada relied on the permissive, although inconclusive, language of
Article 17(2) of the ICJ Rules to select the judges for the Chamber hearing the Gulf of Maine Case,
infra note 91. See, e.g., Shigeru Oda, FurtherThoughts on the ChambersProcedure of the International
Court of Justice, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 556 (1988); Steven M. Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the
InternationalCourtof Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1987).
60. See Second Hague Convention, supranote 36, at Part IV, Chapter III.
61. I.C.J. STATUTE, art. 36, para. 6; Second Hague Convention, supranote 36, at art. 73.
62. I.C.J. STATUTE, art. 43, para. 1; Second Hague Convention, supranote 36, at art. 63.
63. Beagle Channel Arbitration (Arg. v. Chile), Award of Apr. 18, 1977, 17 I.L.M. 634 (1978).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 1:1

The Statute and the Rules of the ICJ do not allow for complete secrecy in its
proceedings. To the contrary, the founding documents of the ICJ require that any
compromis and all judgments must be made available to the public and circulated
to all Members of the United Nations. 64 While it is possible, in principle, to
arrange for private written pleadings and oral arguments, this discretion has not
been exercised by the ICJ, and it is not likely that it will be in the future, save in
extraordinary circumstances.65 On the other hand, arbitral proceedings conducted
confidentially allow the disputants to raise arguments free from fear that these may
be cited against them by another state in a later proceeding. The concern about
pressures is also diminished if all proceedings are
playing to domestic political
66
carried out in secrecy.
The ICJ Statute expressly permits intervention by third states where the
interests of the intervening state may be affected by the Court's decision. 67 This
procedural aspect of the ICJ, while ensuring that the Court's proceedings are
detailed and meticulous, may have the effect of further complicating and drawing
out the dispute. For example, the boundary dispute between Cameroon and
Nigeria was submitted to the ICJ in March, 1994 and the Court finally decided the
case on October 10, 2002. The delay was caused, in no small part, by the
intervention of Equatorial Guinea whose potential interests in the broader dispute
between Nigeria and Cameroon are relatively minor. 68
The key feature of arbitration that makes it suitable for resolving territorial
disputes is its flexibility in choosing the panel of arbitrators. The freedom to select
the arbitrators in territorial disputes is not a mere formality meant to give the
parties confidence that the panel will act impartially. It allows states to constitute a
panel that will have the requisite technical expertise, knowledge of the area in
dispute, and appreciation of local culture and customs. 69 Since most territorial
disputes are deeply rooted in local history and involve neighboring states, an
arbitral panel that appreciates such local circumstances will be more likely to
utilize the particular legal and cultural norms observed in the area in order to craft
an imaginative solution that would not be evident to a panel comprised of jurists
without such local knowledge. 70 Furthermore, the ICJ has been criticized for
basing its judgments largely upon uncontested facts. In fact, the ICJ has used its
Channel
power to empanel special fact-finding commissions only in the
72 Corfu
Case, 7' and visits by judges to relevant sites are quite infrequent.

64. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 58, art. 40, para. 3; I.C.J. RULES arts. 42, 93.

65. Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 15, at 110.
66. Id. at 111.
67. I.C.J. STATUTE, art. 62.
68. See Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Camer. v. Niger.; Eq.
See http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icnijudgment_
Guinea intervening).
200210 10.PDF (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
69. See, e.g., Giorgio Bernini, CulturalNeutrality: A Prerequisiteto Arbitral Justice, 10 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 39 (1989).
70. For example, Judge Koo's culturally sensitive dissent in the Case Concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 75 (Judgment of June 15).
71. Corfu Channel Case (Merits) (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 9 (Judgment of Apr. 9); see also
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The ICJ has undoubtedly played a significant role in promoting international
law and "civilized methods of settling disputes," but its contribution to attaining
and maintaining peace are not notable.73 The relative merits of numerous scholarly
opinions of the jurisprudence of the ICJ are beyond the scope of this paper.
Suffice it to say that arbitrating territorial disputes should be preferred over their
reference to the ICJ precisely because the ICJ does, as it must, take into account its
own standing and reputation whenever it issues a decision. Such concerns
typically do not surround arbitral tribunals, since their life-span is, by definition,
finite. Perhaps it is the whiff of permanent existence that made the PCA
so under74
utilized that it has been called "the sleeping beauty of the peace palace.
III. INTER-STATE ARBITRATION: AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

A. Boundary Disputes as Threats to InternationalPeace andSecurity
In 1907, Lord Curzon called boundaries "the razor's edge on which hang
suspended the modem issues of war and peace, of life or death to nations. 75 The
creation of new states during much of the 20th Century as a result of decolonization and the fall of communism has only reiterated the importance of
boundaries in international relations. The increased number of states resulted in a
relatively large number of territorial disputes, many of which led to armed conflict.
An empirical study of international relations between 1945 and 1974 found 66
disputes having a clear boundary component, of which 24 involved some military
action.76
The most recent territorial disputes that directly threatened international peace
and security were the dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the
Falkland Islands, the recent war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the continuing
dispute over Kashmir between Pakistan and India. Far more frequently, however,
territorial conflicts remain out of sight of the international community, in a state of
low-level animosity that threatens to escalate into a full scale conflict. For
example, the long-standing dispute between Japan and Russia involving the
Habomai Islands continues to be the source of skirmishes, 77 as does the
delimitation between the two Koreas,78 the Aegean Sea delimitation between
Turkey and Greece, 79 and the land and maritime boundary dispute between Nigeria

I.C.J. STATUTE art. 50.

72. Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 15, at 117.
73. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 728.
74. SAM MULLER & WIM MIJS, The Flame Rekindled, in THE FLAME REKINDLED: NEW HOPES
FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 5, 6 (1993).
75. KRATOCHWIL ET AL., supra note 52, at 3.

76. Id. at 26.
77. BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 302 (Alan J. Day ed., 1982).

78. Id.at 320.
79. KRATOCHWIL ET AL., supra note 52, at 93-95.
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and Cameroon, which was decided by the ICJ in October 2002.80
Studies show that territorial disputes that flare up into armed conflict tend to
be of considerable duration, yet they produce relatively few casualties. 8' It is this
smoldering feature that gives boundary disputes such potential for disturbing
international peace. Another feature of boundary disputes is that the parties have
conflicting as well as common interests, making a zero-sum solution
impracticable. 82 Because the clichd is accurate that boundaries join as well as
divide - they "mediate social relationships and exchanges '8 3 - it is often the case
that an armed resolution to a boundary problem does not end the dispute. A
territorial settlement that is imposed or not fully embraced by both parties will
inevitably resurface, perhaps in an even more violent form, as was the case with
the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iran and Iraq. The two states
reached an agreement regarding the delimitation in the area in 1975 only to see it
abrogated by an Iraqi invasion in 1980. s4
Territorial disputes, even when they are of a low intensity, continue to
represent a significant threat to the international peace and security. The
international community should strive to settle boundary disputes in their germinal
stages, before they blossom into open hostilities. In order to achieve a stable
settlement, the disputants should be encouraged to engage in a process whereby
their entire relationship
is reconstituted and the expectations of normal relations
85
are established.
B. Compulsory Arbitrationof TerritorialDisputes
The preceding section discusses the potential for boundary disputes erupting
into conflicts that threaten intemational peace and security. This is particularly
true of those conflicts that remain unresolved for a long time, allowing the factual,
rational bases of settlement to give way to emotional posturing. The UN should
engage itself more actively in the process of international dispute resolution by
making recourse to arbitration a compulsory first step in dealing with any dispute
involving territorial sovereignty or boundary delimitation.
Proposals for such a "third Hague Conference" 8 6 were made previously, often
coming from Asian and African nations, which were largely unrepresented during
the first two Hague meetings. Yet the general tenor underlying such proposals is
the creation of a universally acceptable mandatory dispute resolution mechanism
that would be applicable to all states and all disputes. However, as Judge De

80. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, supranote 68.

81.

KRATOCHWIL ET AL.,

supranote 52, at 27.

82. Id. at31.
83. Id.
84. BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DIsPUTES, supra note 77, at 218.
85. KRATOCHWIL ET AL., supra note 52, at 31.
86. M.C.W. Pinto, Structure, Process, Outcome: Thoughts on the 'Essence' of International
Arbitration,in 6 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 241,241 (1993).
87. Id.
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Visscher noted, such universal proposals are doomed to failure because they ignore
the "order of importance of the interests involved. 8 8 While arbitration is, in
principle, suitable for resolving a wide range of inter-state disputes, defining the
range of disputes that are well-suited to the process is essential if the arbitration is
to be successful. 8 9
Inter-state arbitration proved itself as an effective method for settling
boundary disputes because its salient characteristics are well-suited to the very
nature of territorial disputes: every case of delimitation is a unicum,90 governed
only by "a few basic legal principles" 9' of international law which must be
weighed against "physical, mathematical, historical, political, economic or other
92
facts.
Therefore, the UN should formalize the requirement to arbitrate territorial
disputes, either through a General Assembly Resolution, or through a widelyattended treaty-making conference. Such an effort would create a tangible
requirement for states to submit their territorial disputes to arbitral decision,
subject to review of procedural issues by the ICJ. Any compulsory international
settlement procedure is vulnerable to criticism that it violates state sovereignty
because it dispenses with the requirement of express consent of states. 93 The
geopolitical reality, however, is that a dispute involving a state that is predisposed
to belligerent posture will not be solved by peaceful means, no matter what form is
adopted. For the vast majority of remaining disputes, the compulsory referral to
arbitration hinges on a "sufficient moral community between the contracting
parties, and, on the other hand, on the condition of general political relations
between them." 94 As Professor Sohn has noted:
Effective legal procedures for dispute settlement are especially important for small
countries and for economically weak States. While larger and more powerful
nations can apply extra-legal, political and economic pressures, it is safer for
smaller and weaker ones to have the dispute 95directed into legal channels where the
principle of equality before the law prevails.
The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of
88. Charles De Visscher, Reflections on the Presentprospects of InternationalAdjudication, 50

AM. J. INT'L L. 467,468-69 (1956).
89. HELEN MAY CORY, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 105 (1932).

90. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau: Dispute Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Boundary, supra note
53, at 289-90.
91. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can.v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J 246, 290 (Judgment of Oct. 12).
92. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau: Dispute Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Boundary, supra note
53, at 289.
93. "Every recourse of states to international adjudication proceeds from their free will." De
Visscher, supra note 88, at 467. "The authority to decide whether or not to submit a dispute to
international arbitration is an incident of party autonomy and, in the case of inter-state disputes, of state
sovereignty." Pinto, supranote 86, at 260.
94. De Visscher, supra note 88, at 469.
95. Louis B. Sohn, The Role ofArbitrationin Recent InternationalMultilateral Treaties, 23 VA. J.
INT'L L. 171, 171-72 (1983) [hereinafter The Role of Arbitration].

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 1:1

1907 devoted fifty-four of its ninety-seven articles to a section entitled
International Arbitration.96 Besides creating the PCA, the treaty dealt with such
procedural minutiae as whether the arbitral panel may ask questions of the agents
and the counsel, 97 and the choice of language. 98 The compulsory nature of the
mechanism proposed in this paper should only describe the "manner in which the
decisions of states to have recourse to arbitration are taken," 99 having due regard
for the fact that flexibility is the chief advantage of arbitration over other methods
of dispute resolution. Judge De Visscher stated the principle most succinctly:
To plug up all the openings and to foresee every loophole, in a word, to enclose
arbitration within a rigid framework, runs the risk of hindering its development.
As the Netherlands Government observed, perfectionist
100 aspirations threaten to end
up by 'petrifying' the evolution of arbitral practice.
The Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, 10 1 promulgated by the International
Law Commission in 1958, repeated this error by regulating every aspect of the
arbitral procedure, from a comprehensive compromis, through the provisions
regulating the composition of the panel, to the strict regulation of the sources of
law available to the arbitrators. While the Model Rules are hailed as "the high
watermark of legal scholarship"' 1 2 and were supported by the United States and a
few other Western European states, they were rejected by the majority of General
Assembly Members because they took away the autonomy and flexibility of the
parties in crafting a settlement mechanism that is suitable for them. 0 3 Naturally,
the autonomy of the parties must be bounded by the intrinsic requirements of the
process, viz. the "freedom to negotiate agreementon aspects of the process, not the
freedom to introduce into it any element that serves its own interests or conforms
to its special view of arbitration."' 1°4
It is beyond the scope of this proposal to suggest detailed provisions that may
or must be included in any compromis of arbitration, or to apologize for a
particular choice of procedural approaches. 0 5 Similarly, it would be futile to
attempt to discuss all potential obstacles and problems surrounding inter-state
arbitration as they have been thoroughly treated elsewhere.1°6 The remainder of
this paper discusses only some of the issues that should guide the UN in preparing
the proposed territorial dispute arbitration document: selection of arbitrators, role
96. See Avalon Project, supranote 37.
97. Second Hague Convention, supranote 36, at art. 72.
98. Id. at art. 61.
99. CORY, supranote 89, at ix.
100. De Visscher, supranote 88, at 469-70.
101. International Law Commission, Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure,2 Y.B. I.L.C. 12 (1958).
102. Pinto, supra note 86, at 252.
103. Id. at 253.
104. Id. at 261.
105. Extremely detailed arbitration proposals have been suggested, even ones which "could be
immediately used in practice." Kenneth S. Carlston, Codificationof InternationalArbitral Procedure,
47 AM. J. INT'L L., No. 2,203,205 (1953).
106. STEVEN M. SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS (1987);
InternationalArbitrationToday, supra note 32.
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of equity, and enforcement and control.
1. Composition of the Panels
The right of states to choose their own arbitrators has been hailed as "a right
which is of the very essence of arbitral justice."'' 0 7 Corresponding to the practice
of appointing ad hoc judges in the ICJ, 10 8 it gives confidence to the disputants that
the proceedings of the arbitral panel will not be unfair or prejudicial, and that the
interests and concerns of a particular party will be vigorously represented before
the panel.'0 9 This confidence is likely to translate into respect for the decision
rendered by the panel, even if it is not completely favorable to a particular party.
The need for respecting the wishes of the parties in appointing their own
arbitrators must be weighed against the requirement that the panel must not appear
to be partial or incompetent." 0 As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Black noted, albeit
in a municipal context, one should be "even more scrupulous to safeguard the
impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely free rein
to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review."'''
Impartiality, however, must not be confused with neutrality. Neutrality refers to an
objective determination of an arbitrator's conduct with respect to the parties during
the proceedings, whereas partiality is a subjective relationship between the
arbitrator and each individual party. 1 2 Therefore, an arbitrator can be impartial
without being neutral, while no arbitrator can be considered neutral if he or she
acts partially." 3 Arbitrators appointed by a party do not necessarily have to be
citizens of that state. In the Rann of Kutch case, for example, India appointed a
Constitutional Court Judge from Yugoslavia, whereas Pakistan was represented by
an Iranian diplomat." 4 Furthermore, recent history of inter-state arbitrations
indicates that party-appointed arbitrators have, on occasion, voted against the
positions taken by their own state." 5
While territorial disputes have been successfully settled by a single arbitrator,
the preceding section makes it plain that states should prefer to empanel a tribunal
consisting of an equal number of party-appointed arbitrators, along with one or
more neutral members. The most successful and frequently followed method has
been to allow the party-appointed arbitrators to select the neutral members,
although this task could be delegated to an individual or an organization external to
the dispute.
107. Pinto, supra note 86, at 245, quoting Leon Bourgeois, the President of the Second Hague
Conference [emphasis omitted].
108. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 31.
109. Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 15, at I11.
110. Henry P. de Vries, PracticalAspectsof InternationalLitigation - Arbitration, 64 AM. J. INT'L
L., NO. 4, at 251 (1970).
111. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
112. Bernini, supra note 69, at 39.
113. Id.
114. Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case (Rann of Kutch), 17 R.I.A.A. 9 (1968).
115. See, e.g., Spanish arbitrator's vote in the Lac Lanoux Case (1957), 12 R1I.A.A. 281.
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The power of the disputants to appoint the arbitrators may turn into the "vice"
of the process as it may paralyze or frustrate the establishment of the tribunal. l 6
Previous dispute resolution proposals have spent much ink on detailed provisions
that would ensure the cooperation of the parties in selecting the arbitrators."t 7 Any
modem dispute resolution agreement should reject such formalism because the
proposed compulsory arbitration of territorial disputes must be founded on the a
priori consent and belief of the parties that this particular class of disputes can,
should, and must be resolved early, privately, and equitably. A process of
international settlement has not been invented that would compel a party unwilling
to resolve a dispute amicably to do so. Such a state may frustrate the process by
declining to negotiate a compromis, delaying the appointment of its own arbitrator,
refusing to agree on a neutral member, or by ignoring the award.
A state may, however, have a good-faith objection to the selection of an
arbitrator. In light of the need for expediency and efficiency in settling territorial
disputes, the parties should be given some time, e.g., six months, to agree on the
arbitrators. Failing such an agreement, the proposed dispute resolution procedure
should provide for an external appointment of one or more neutral panelists by a
joint decision of the President of the ICJ and the Secretary General of the UN.
No special requirements should be placed on the qualifications of the
arbitrators. The Hague Convention, for example, required arbitrators to be of
"known competency in questions of international law," and of "highest moral
reputation."' "18 Others have suggested that arbitrators should be "jurists of
repute.""l 9 Such requirements are hortatory at best, meaningless in practice, and at
their worst may be too restrictive and inflexible, causing further frustration of the
process. The parties should be given the complete freedom to agree on an arbitral
panel subject to the appointing authority of the President of the ICJ and the
Secretary General of the UN discussed above.
2. Role of Equity
The parties involved in a territorial dispute must be given broad latitude in
crafting the arbitration compromis as it relates to the choice of law that the tribunal
may rely upon. It would be perfectly acceptable, although not advisable in most
cases, that the parties restrict the tribunal to reliance only on treaty provisions
binding on both parties, or on established principles of international law. In most
some degree of
successful arbitrations, however, the parties gave the tribunal
0
discretion to take into account principles of equity and justice.12
The subject of equity in international dispute settlement is rich, complex, and
controversial both in jurisprudence and academy. The aim of this section is merely
116. SIMPSON & Fox, supranote 26, at 82.

117. See id. at 83 (providing an excellent overview).
118. Second Hague Convention, supra note 36, at art. 44.

119. Carlston, supra note 105, at 209.
120. See MASAHIRO MIYOSHI, CONSIDERATIONS OF EQUITY IN THE SETTLEMENT OF TERRITORIAL
AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES (1993).
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to raise the awareness of the issue of equity in resolving territorial disputes through
arbitration. It is suggested that an arbitration panel given broad powers to decide
equitably is only suited to decided non-legal, political disputes.' 21 While a•.purely
122
political dispute can be resolved only by recourse to an amiable compositeur, or
an umpire not bound by any legal considerations, the modem scholarly view holds
that "equity is built into the legal system."' 123 Especially in territorial disputes,
124
equity should not be viewed as giving "a blank cheque to be filled in by judges.',
On the contrary, a legal resolution of any boundary dispute must be informed by
the particular context in which it arose. 25 As Judge Lachs noted:
Equity aims at proper application of law in a particular case in order to avoid
decisions that are a reflection of 26abstract principles detached from the
circumstances that a tribunal may face.1
In the specific context of a delimitation dispute, the ICJ has noted that
reliance of equity is not merely a matter of "abstract justice, but of applying a rule
of law which itself requires the application of equitable principles."'127 This view
was applied consistently in the modem practice of territorial delimitation where
equity is considered to be "nothing more than the taking into account of complex
historical and geographical circumstances the consideration of which does not
diminish justice but, on the contrary, enriches it.' 12 8 Equity can play such a role by
giving due regard to "considerations of
"tempering the rigors of strict law," or by
1 29
fairness, reasonableness and good faith."'
In a recent arbitral delimitation of territory under the Dayton Peace
Agreement, 30 the tribunal suggested the following non-exhaustive list of equitable
principles that should inform a fair, just, and reasonable award in a territorial
dispute:
(1) the consideration of the factual context of the dispute - the unique political,
economic, historical and geographical circumstances surrounding the dispute [... ]
and (2) a set of equitable doctrines associated with fairness, such as the doctrine of
121. InternationalArbitrationToday, supra note 32, at 24.

122.

RALSTON,

supra note 14, at 23.

123. Manfred Lachs, Equity in Arbitrationand in JudicialSettlement of Disputes, in THE FLAME
REKINDLED: NEW HOPES FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 125, 127 (Sam Muller & Wim Mijs eds.,
1993).
124. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 317

(1973).
125. "It is needles to say that each territorial or boundary arbitration, like any other kind of
arbitration, is sui generis with its own peculiarities of historical, political, economic, and cultural
backgrounds and implications." MIYOSHI, supra note 120, at 99.
126. Lachs, supra note 123, at 127.
127. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 47 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
128. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 106. (Judgment of Feb.
24, Arechaga, J, Sep. Op.).
129. Case Conceming Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den.
v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 613 (Judgment of June 14, J. Weeramantry, Sep. Op.).
130. Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia:General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia andHerzegovina, 35 1.L. M. 75 (1996) [citations omitted].
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unclean hands, by which the inequitable conduct of one of the parties may be
taken into account in the decision. 131
Since most disputes over territory will not be suitable for a strict legal
determination or for an award that completely ignores legal principles, arbitration
compromis should give the tribunals broad flexibility to rely on equitable criteria in
applying the legal principles that govern territorial delimitation. 132
3. Enforcement and Control
It should be emphasized that this section deals with control and enforcement
of awards concerning parties that were willing and active participants in the
underlying arbitral process. Therefore, the focus is not on ensuring compliance or
participation by an unwilling disputant, but, rather, maintenance of a fair and
impartial process with the view of establishing an international dispute mechanism
in which all states can have full confidence. Maintaining some control over the
process is especially important where, as here, a compulsory framework is
proposed. As Professor Reisman has noted, "[I]egal decision without control runs
the danger of reducing predictability, and rational actors are unlikely to submit
matters that are important to them to a voluntary dispute system that ranges from
1 33
uncertain to capricious."
The most basic, yet often overlooked, aspect of control is ensuring full
domestic support for arbitration and its outcome, whatever it may be. This is
particularly important in territorial disputes, which often involve emotional issues
such as possible cession of territory to an erstwhile enemy, or the loss of control
over historically significant areas. Furthermore, many states, under their municipal
laws, require that any changes in boundaries be supported by super-majority votes
in their parliaments. 134 To that end, states should seek ratification of the arbitration
compromis by the same method as is required for modification of boundaries or
cession of territory.
The essential feature of arbitration is that it produces an award that is final
and binding.135 Especially in the case of compulsory arbitration, however, this rule
is subject to the condition that the award is within the parameters prescribed by the
parties in the compromis, and that the tribunal followed procedure that was
fundamentally fair. If either of the two conditions is not met, the disputants may
consider the award a nullity and ignore the award.
The first requirement reflects the classical maxim, arbiter nihil extra
compromissum facere potest, according to which an arbitrator must respect the
131. Award in the Republika Srpska v. The Federationof Bosnia and Herzegovina (Control over
the Brcko Corridor),36 1. L. M. 396, 427 (Feb. 14, 1997).
132. See MIYOSHI, supra note 120, at 103 (discussing the possible ramifications of the exact
provision chosen).
133. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND

(1992).
134. See, e.g., CROAT. CONST. art. 8.
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135. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 26, at 250.
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agreement of the parties as to the scope of the award. 136 This doctrine of excks de
pouvoir was raised, for example, by the United States in the Northeastern
Boundary Award by the King of the Netherlands who was given the power to
lines proposed by the parties, yet he drew a
choose between two delimitation
37
own.1
his
of
line
boundary
The second defense by a "losing" party rests on the objections to the
procedural aspects of the arbitral proceedings. Sometimes referred to as denial of
justice, this doctrine specifies that an award is void if it resulted from a procedure
that lacked the aspects of fundamental fairness "inherent in the judicial process, or
which are generally recognized by civilized nations." 138 Procedural objections
may be raised, for example, where the tribunal fails to observe the rule of audi
alterampartem, i.e., fails to afford each party equal opportunity to be heard during
all stages of the proceedings. 139 This objection strikes not only at the procedural
fairness of the arbitration, but also at the capacity of the tribunal to render a fully
informed judicial determination. 140 In order to avoid even an appearance of denial
should, furthermore, be required to clearly state the
of justice, arbitral tribunals
14 1
reasons for the award.
The doctrines of nullity give states some potential for abuse of the
international arbitration process. A state unhappy with an award may unilaterally
claim that the award reaches beyond the compromis or that it was procured
unfairly. To ensure that such a state is not "simultaneously prosecutor, judge and
jury in sua causa,"'4 2 claims of nullity must be referred to the ICJ for final
determination. Professor Reisman draws a distinction between appeal and control,
noting that appeal is concerned with a wide range of issues directly affecting the
parties in questions, whereas control systems are meant to preserve the underlying
process itself.143 While the proposed reference of nullity disputes to the ICJ may
be framed in the form of an appeal, the ICJ should be given only the power to
determine whether the claims of nullity may be sustained, without performing any
true appellate review of the substantive issues between the parties.
This "reviewing" function is not new to the ICJ, which has on numerous
occasions dealt successfully with the issue of the obligation of states to submit to
arbitration, as well as the determination of the validity or nullity of an award. '44 It
has been noted that the ICJ "has been scrupulous in maintaining the sharp

136. REISMAN, supra note 133, at 6.

137. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 26, at 250.
138. Id. at 252-3.
139. Id. at 253.
140. Eastern Carelia Case, 1923 P. C. I. J., SER. B., No.5, at 28-9.
141. It was not customary for heads of states to give reasons for their arbitral awards. Modem
arbitrators, however, should be required to either signify their assent to the decision or to issue their
own separate or dissenting views, as is the case with the ICJ. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 56.
142. REISMAN, supra note 133, at 6.
143. Id. at 8.
144. See, e.g., Concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on December 23, 1906
(Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192 (Nov. 18); Concerning the Arbitral Award of July 31, 1989 (GuineaBissau v. Sen), 1991 1.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12).
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distinction between its own functions in the concrete case brought before it, and
those of the organ in question."' 145 While it may be difficult to separate the
question of validity of an award from the underlying substantive issues about
which the ICJ must not trespass upon the province of the arbitral tribunal, the ICJ
has shown, e.g., in the Ambatielos Case, that it is capable of the requisite
finesse. 146
As with any international judgment, the question of its enforcement is quickly
raised, usually by those with little faith in the efficacy of international law. While
the detailed treatment that this subject deserves is beyond the scope of this work, it
should be noted that a functioning international community is predicated on some
degree of self-policing. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan has recently noted,
"[r]espect for international legal obligations is an indispensable core of the system
we seek."' 1 47 It is noteworthy that the very same sentiment was echoed in the
beginning of the 20th Century by Professor Ralston, who wrote:
The great interest of every state internationally is to stand well with its fellows,
and any departure from a course of conduct sanctioned by mankind generally
carries punishment of some sort. There is further much greater reason for
observing an award than there is for paying obeisance to an abstract principle of
law. 148
IV. ARBITRAL SOLUTION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION BETWEEN CROATIA AND
SLOVENIA
The maritime boundary between Croatia and Slovenia has a colorful history.
After their secession from Yugoslavia in January, 1992, they established a land
boundary that followed the internal, administrative boundaries of the former
Yugoslavia, under the principle of uti possidetis, as required by the EC as a
condition of its recognition of the new governments in Zagreb and Ljubljana. 149
The internal boundaries of the former Yugoslavia were established during the
Second World War and immediately thereafter, largely following the boundaries
50
between wartime partisan administrative units.'

145. Shabtai Rosenne, The International Court of Justice and InternationalArbitration, in THE
FLAME REKINDLED: NEW HOPES FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 122 (Sam Muller & Wim Mijs

eds., 1993).
146. See Ambatielos Case (Greece v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 14 (July 1); see also SIMPSON & FOX,
supra note 26, at 77.
147. Kofi Annan, The Effectiveness of the InternationalRule of Law in MaintainingInternational
Peace and Security, in INTERNATIONAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 158 (Int'l Bureau of the PCA ed., 2000).

148. RALSTON, supra note 14, at 108.
149. Under the utipossidetis approach, colonial demarcations are preserved where colonial entities
emerge as new States. See, e.g., Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565-7;Dec. 20);
see also Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion No 3,311. L. M. 1488, 1499 (Jan.
11, 1992) (Discussing the direct applicability of uti possidetis to Yugoslavia); BROWNLIE, supra note
57, at 133.
150. VLADIMIR DEDIJER, HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA (1974).
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Unfortunately, this principle could not be applied to maritime delimitation as
the dominion over the territorial seas before the break-up of Yugoslavia was
reserved as a federal issue, hence the boundary between the former republics on
the sea never existed. During the 1990s, Slovenia and Croatia put forth conflicting
claims over the Bay, leading to occasional localized armed hostilities. The chief
difficulty in delimiting the Bay is its peculiar position within the greater context of
the Gulf of Trieste, and the inviolability of the previous "external" maritime
boundary between Yugoslavia and Italy. This maritime boundary was established
by the 1975 Treaty of Osimo, which finally settled the post-war dispute over the
land and maritime areas in the Northern Adriatic.15 '
Following a decade of intermittent negotiations, the two governments reached
an agreement about the delimitation of the Bay on July 20, 2001. As the map in
the Appendix shows, the Croatian cabinet was willing not only to eschew the
equidistance principle of maritime delimitation, but also to reclassify a corridor of
Croatian territorial waters as open sea, creating a direct connection between
Slovenian territory and the high seas. While this agreement was immediately
accepted by Slovenia, it was met with harsh and widespread criticism in Croatia,
by the opposition parties, legal and political scholars, 152 as well as the general
public. The widely held view in Croatia is that the government gave away too
much, giving up about 20 km 2 of its territory in exchange, as is believed, for
Slovenia's concessions regarding several outstanding issues, as well as Slovenia's
support for Croatia's own desires to more closely integrate itself with the West.
Furthermore, the opponents of the agreement claim that the government of
Prime Minister Racan overstepped its authority by ceding territory without the
constitutionally required parliamentary super-majority vote. The only solution, the
opponents claim, is to submit the dispute to international arbitration where the
strict application of the equidistance method, a legal phrase that has entered into
the every-day Croatian lexicon, would divide the Bay in half, leaving Slovenian
territorial waters without direct contact with the high seas. Slovenian politicians
and pundits reject arbitration, claiming that Croatia should honor the agreement
reached by the two governments. A frequently heard explanation in Slovenia is
that the two states should strive to reach an agreement without external influence
to show the international community they are mature participants in the
community of nations and that they are capable of resolving their differences
amicably. The undertone to the discussion, however, seems to be that Slovenia is
not prepared to submit the dispute to binding arbitration for fear the award would
not address its principal concern - access to the open seas.
Had there existed a UN-administered obligation to submit territorial disputes
to arbitration ten years ago, it is likely that the dispute between Slovenia and
Croatia would have been settled early and quietly, and that the delimitation
reached by an arbitral tribunal would closely resemble that negotiated by the two
151. See, e.g., DAY, supra note 77, 73-4; 25"h Anniversary of the Osimo Agreements, available at
http://www.uvi.si/eng/new/background-information/osimo (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
152. For the views of one Croatian legal scholar, see, Law of the Sea & Maritime Law, at
http://www.lawofthesea.net/piranski-zaljev.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
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Governments in July, 2001. In fact, having in mind the salient features of interstate arbitration of boundary disputes discussed in this paper, Slovenia should
consider acquiescing to the popular opposition in Croatia and submit the dispute to
binding arbitration. It is likely that arbitration would result in an equitable result
giving Slovenia sovereign access to the high seas. The alternative is to continue
negotiations in an emotionally charged atmosphere, keeping in mind the volatility
and unpredictability of the Croatian political landscape.
Slovenia and Croatia should negotiate a flexible arbitration compromis that
would provide for secret proceedings before a tribunal that is empowered to
delimit the maritime boundary between the two states in the Bay according to legal
and equitable principles. Secrecy in these proceedings would be of the utmost
importance, as Croatia must be given the flexibility to advance positions that may
be prejudicial to its other outstanding maritime delimitation questions, viz. those
with Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina." 3
The principal question before the tribunal would be whether there exist
sufficient historical, geographical, economical, cultural, or political circumstances
that would support Slovenia's contention that the Bay should not be delimited
according to the principle of equidistance. A similar situation was presented to the
arbitral tribunal in the Maritime Delimitation Case between Guinea and GuineaBissau where the tribunal pointed out that:
[it] considers that the equidistance method is just one among many and that there
is no obligation to use it or give it priority, even though it is recognized as having
a certain intrinsic value because
54 of its scientific character and the relative ease
with which it can be applied.1
Another tribunal tasked with drawing a maritime boundary between French
island possessions and Canada noted that while "geographical features are at the
heart of the delimitation process," they "do not, in themselves, determine the line
to be drawn."'15 5 Finally, the ICJ has also recognized that strict application of the
equidistance principle "leads unquestionably to inequity" in a number of cases
56
where the underlying geographical features are unusual.1
Both the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau and the France/Canada tribunals rejected
blind applications of the equidistance principle where it would lead to a cut-off
effect or enclavement. 157 In the case of the Bay, however, Croatia may distinguish
the situation by pointing out that there is no internationally recognized right that a
state's territorial sea should abut the high seas. Furthermore, it could be argued,
Croatia must, as a party to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, respect the
153. The Central Adriatic town of Neum belongs to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is not
inconceivable that Bosnia and Herzegovina might demand from Croatia a sovereign channel to the high
seas if such a concession is made to Slovenia.
154. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation, supra note 53, at 294.
155. Canada/France Maritime Delimitation, supranote 55, at 1160.
156. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,49 (Feb. 20).
157. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation, supra note 53, at 298; Canada/France Maritime
Delimitation, supra note 55, at 1170.
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right of Slovenian vessels to free navigation to the open seas. 58 The interest of
Slovenia for a sovereign access to the high seas, however, has both a
commercial' 59 and a military component, the latter stemming from Slovenia's
desire to join NATO. If the Bay were delimited according to the equidistance
be in the position to control access to
principle, the Government of Croatia would
160
Slovenian ports by NATO's warships.
Of the equities working in Croatia's favor, the strongest are its desire to
maintain a territorial boundary with Italy and the historical fishing rights of
Croatian fishermen in the Bay.
The delimitation negotiated by the two
governments (shown in the Appendix) contemplates a sliver of Croatian territorial
sea between the territorial waters of Italy and the corridor of Croatian waters that
would be internationalized. Maintaining direct contact with Italy is important due
to the historical, cultural, and economic ties between the two Adriatic nations.' 6 1
Following the break-up of Yugoslavia, Croatia's only boundary with Italy is in the
Gulf of Trieste and Croatia is keen to keep it.
Furthermore, the rich waters of the Bay were fished for generations both by
Slovenian and Croatian fishermen. 62 While Croatia has a long and beautiful
coast, 163 the interests of the fishing communities on the Croatian side of the Bay
must be taken into account locally. The proposed delimitation of the Bay, where
only twenty percent of its area would remain Croatian, would be unpopular at best
with the local population, and it may endanger the very survival of the traditional
fishing culture in the area.
The settlement negotiated by the two governments appears, on its face, to be
too one-sided, giving Slovenia everything that it asked for, and leaving Croatia
virtually nothing in return, at least not in the area of the Bay. 164 A legal and
equitable solution to the delimitation problem must, if possible, address the

158. UNCLOS, supra note 8, at Part 11,sect. 3.
159. Slovenia's strategic position makes it an important transportation hub of Central Europe. The
Port of Koper handles much of Austrian and Hungarian trade, and Ljubljana, the capital city, is located
on the crossroads of two major motorways planned by the EU. Going Nordic, supra note 3.
160. Article 19(2) of the UNCLOS, supra note 8, lists situations in which the coast state has the
right to deny passage through its territorial sea. Furthermore, a significant number of states require
prior authorization for the passage of warships. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 194.
161. The Treaty of Osimo, besides setting the boundary in the Gulf of Trieste, contains detailed
provisions regarding the treatment of ethnic minorities that were separated from their nations as a result
of the delimitation.
162. See Darja Mihelic, The Bay of Piran: Towards the Tradition of FishingandFishingRights, 14
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(1998),
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kp.si/Zaloznistvo/annales/analil4/mihelic.htm#eng (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
163. Croatia's mainland coastline stretches for almost 1,800 km. See The CIA World Factbook,at
http://www.cia.gov/publications/factbook (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
164. It has been speculated that Prime Minister Racan acquiesced to the Bay of Piran delimitation
in exchange for a promise, or perhaps even a commitment, for Slovenian concessions regarding other
open questions between the two states, such as the jointly-built nuclear power plant at Krsko and the
status of the Croatian deposits in Slovenian banks. Marko Barisic, Sto Dobiva Hrvatska u Zamjenu za
Odricanje od Dijela Svoga Teritoria [What is Croatia Getting in Return for Ceding a Part of its
Territory], VJESNIK, July 21, 2001, at 1.
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interests of both sides. To that end, an arbitral tribunal in this case might delimit
the Bay exactly as is shown in the Appendix, but on the condition that certain
economic concessions are made. For example, the arbitral award may require
Slovenia to respect the historical fishing rights of Croatian fishermen in the entire
Bay. Furthermore, Slovenia would be required to give up any further economic
claims with respect to the delimitation of the Gulf of Trieste, viz. it would not seek
any further rights to the continental shelf, or establishment
of special contiguous or
65
exclusive economic zones in the Northern Adriatic. 1
V. CONCLUSION

The UN Charter demands that states settle their disputes peacefully, but the
UN has not been sufficiently active in encouraging states to take affirmative steps
towards settling their differences.
This passive approach is especially
counterproductive in territorial delimitation disputes, which have a great potential
to threaten the international peace and security if they are not identified and settled
early.
The UN should consider convening a multilateral treaty-making conference
with the goal of setting up a new regime of recourse to inter-state arbitration as a
compulsory first step in resolving any outstanding territorial sovereignty or
boundary delimitation dispute. The compulsory nature of the process would
ensure that those states that are ready to settle their disputes peacefully would have
an internationally sanctioned outlet to do so, along with a shield against domestic
political forces that might prefer diplomatic or even hostile posturing over
amicable settlement.
Disputants should retain broad flexibility in the selection of the arbitration
panel and the choice of applicable law. The proposed dispute resolution
mechanism should include the right to appeal to the ICJ for final and binding
determination of all procedural aspects, such as the existence of the obligation to
arbitrate and the validity of the award.
The maritime delimitation dispute over the Bay of Piran was an
uncomfortable distraction to the diplomacies of both Slovenia and Croatia for over
ten years. While this particular dispute has not resulted in any significant military
conflagrations, it has seen its share of emotional flare-ups. More importantly,
perhaps, the dispute will continue to be a diplomatic obstacle for both emerging
nations in their attempts to join the European integration processes.
The settlement that was negotiated in July, 2001 serves as a suitable starting
point, but it will, in its present form, not be politically acceptable in Croatia. The
best course of action would undoubtedly be for the two neighbors and friends to
reach a solution on their own by negotiation. If, however, it becomes apparent that
this cannot be accomplished in a relatively short time, recourse should be taken to
an arbitral tribunal whose final and binding award would, if constituted and carried
out properly, carry the weight and moral authority of international law. As such, it
165. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 8, at Part II, sect. 4; Part V.
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would, almost certainly, be acceptable both to Croatia and Slovenia, popularly and
politically.

APPENDIX - MAP OF THE BAY OF PIRAN

ITALY

aKoper,

*h

20kn= 11nm= 12.5 mi

1- Equidistance line of delimitation of the Bay of Piran.
2- Delimitation line agreed by the two Governments on July 20, 2001.
3 - Corridor of Croatian territorial sea that is to be internationalized.
4- Sliver of Croatian territorial sea maintaining direct boundary with Italy.
5 - "External" maritime boundary according to the 1975 Treaty of Osimo.
6- Area of the Bay of Piran that would become Slovenian territorial sea.
(Adapted by author from map appearing in VjiSIK, Sept. 24,2001 at 5,available at http://www'lawofthesea'nettimages/mgranica'jpg)

